From ed83ba53212f81e590b3cf9adb49c04069430659 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 13:18:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Add compilation flag to disable certain protocol checks and allow use of some invalid operations for testing purposes. Currently this can be used to sign using digests the peer doesn't support, EC curves the peer doesn't support and use certificates which don't match the type associated with a ciphersuite. --- apps/s_client.c | 4 ++++ apps/s_server.c | 4 ++++ ssl/ssl.h | 3 ++- ssl/ssl_lib.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ ssl/t1_lib.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c index 783a49e083..0591adde24 100644 --- a/apps/s_client.c +++ b/apps/s_client.c @@ -1007,6 +1007,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert_strict") == 0) cert_flags |= SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT; +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug_broken_protocol") == 0) + cert_flags |= SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL; +#endif else { BIO_printf(bio_err,"unknown option %s\n",*argv); diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c index 3924171924..45eea960b8 100644 --- a/apps/s_server.c +++ b/apps/s_server.c @@ -1440,6 +1440,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert_strict") == 0) cert_flags |= SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT; +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug_broken_protocol") == 0) + cert_flags |= SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL; +#endif else { BIO_printf(bio_err,"unknown option %s\n",*argv); diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h index d1104fadee..73bb026723 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/ssl/ssl.h @@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st /* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */ #define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS 0x30000 - +/* Perform all sorts of protocol violations for testing purposes */ +#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL 0x10000000 /* Flags for building certificate chains */ /* Treat any existing certificates as untrusted CAs */ diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 548ba1c5e9..f2318f114e 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -2396,6 +2396,14 @@ CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s) c = s->cert; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + /* Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may + * mismatch the one expected. + */ + if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL) + return c->key; +#endif + i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); /* This may or may not be an error. */ @@ -2415,6 +2423,15 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c=s->cert; +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + /* Broken protocol test: use last key: which may + * mismatch the one expected. + */ + if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL) + idx = c->key - c->pkeys; + else +#endif + if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index ecac97b3aa..b3166d6254 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -686,6 +686,11 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) { unsigned char curve_id[2]; EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ + if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL) + return 1; +#endif /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, * no other curves permitted. */ @@ -864,7 +869,10 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) return 0; if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; + } /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { @@ -3385,6 +3393,32 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s); +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL) + { + /* Use first set signature preference to force message + * digest, ignoring any peer preferences. + */ + const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; + if (s->server) + sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; + else + sigs = c->client_sigalgs; + if (sigs) + { + idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); + md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); + c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; + c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; + if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) + { + c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; + c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; + } + } + } +#endif + for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { @@ -3798,6 +3832,15 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, /* If no cert or key, forget it */ if (!x || !pk) goto end; +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ + if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL) + { + rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN; + cpk->valid_flags = rv; + return rv; + } +#endif } else { -- 2.40.0