From c2293d2e9a601d07d0f3b064bc4581ef24c6f015 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?utf8?q?Bodo=20M=C3=B6ller?= <bodo@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2006 06:41:32 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] make consistent with 0.9.8-branch version of this file

---
 NEWS                 |  1 +
 crypto/rsa/rsa.h     |  1 -
 crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 13 ++-----------
 crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c |  1 -
 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 04c7b10b96..818ffde0ac 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
 
+      o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
       o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 2ebf1ea41e..0b639cd37f 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -390,7 +390,6 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
-#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT			 105
 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED		 130
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index eea7d2e049..d1986c1908 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
 		{
-		if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+		if (1)
 			{
 			/* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
 
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
 		{
-		if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+		if (1)
 			{
 			/* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
 
@@ -651,15 +651,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		{
 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
-		/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
-		   this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
-		   signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
-		   small. */
-		if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto err;
-			}
 		break;
 	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index 7a2fe52f21..2ec4b30ff7 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED)  ,"salt length recovery failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
-- 
2.40.0