From b9e7843709b0e3148ed1765a024339fa5b2dd8f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Unknown <>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 03:39:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] add files for 2007-01-31T03:39:23Z

---
 src/c-client/auth_md5.c | 495 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 495 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 src/c-client/auth_md5.c

diff --git a/src/c-client/auth_md5.c b/src/c-client/auth_md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29ab947
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/c-client/auth_md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+/* ========================================================================
+ * Copyright 1988-2007 University of Washington
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * 
+ * ========================================================================
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Program:	CRAM-MD5 authenticator
+ *
+ * Author:	Mark Crispin
+ *		Networks and Distributed Computing
+ *		Computing & Communications
+ *		University of Washington
+ *		Administration Building, AG-44
+ *		Seattle, WA  98195
+ *		Internet: MRC@CAC.Washington.EDU
+ *
+ * Date:	21 October 1998
+ * Last Edited:	30 January 2007
+ */
+
+/* MD5 context */
+
+#define MD5BLKLEN 64		/* MD5 block length */
+#define MD5DIGLEN 16		/* MD5 digest length */
+
+typedef struct {
+  unsigned long chigh;		/* high 32bits of byte count */
+  unsigned long clow;		/* low 32bits of byte count */
+  unsigned long state[4];	/* state (ABCD) */
+  unsigned char buf[MD5BLKLEN];	/* input buffer */
+  unsigned char *ptr;		/* buffer position */
+} MD5CONTEXT;
+
+
+/* Prototypes */
+
+long auth_md5_valid (void);
+long auth_md5_client (authchallenge_t challenger,authrespond_t responder,
+		      char *service,NETMBX *mb,void *stream,
+		      unsigned long *trial,char *user);
+char *auth_md5_server (authresponse_t responder,int argc,char *argv[]);
+char *auth_md5_pwd (char *user);
+char *apop_login (char *chal,char *user,char *md5,int argc,char *argv[]);
+char *hmac_md5 (char *text,unsigned long tl,char *key,unsigned long kl);
+void md5_init (MD5CONTEXT *ctx);
+void md5_update (MD5CONTEXT *ctx,unsigned char *data,unsigned long len);
+void md5_final (unsigned char *digest,MD5CONTEXT *ctx);
+static void md5_transform (unsigned long *state,unsigned char *block);
+static void md5_encode (unsigned char *dst,unsigned long *src,int len);
+static void md5_decode (unsigned long *dst,unsigned char *src,int len);
+
+
+/* Authenticator linkage */
+
+AUTHENTICATOR auth_md5 = {
+  AU_SECURE,			/* secure authenticator */
+  "CRAM-MD5",			/* authenticator name */
+  auth_md5_valid,		/* check if valid */
+  auth_md5_client,		/* client method */
+  auth_md5_server,		/* server method */
+  NIL				/* next authenticator */
+};
+
+/* Check if CRAM-MD5 valid on this system
+ * Returns: T, always
+ */
+
+long auth_md5_valid (void)
+{
+  struct stat sbuf;
+				/* server forbids MD5 if no MD5 enable file */
+  if (stat (MD5ENABLE,&sbuf)) auth_md5.server = NIL;
+  return T;			/* MD5 is otherwise valid */
+}
+
+
+/* Client authenticator
+ * Accepts: challenger function
+ *	    responder function
+ *	    SASL service name
+ *	    parsed network mailbox structure
+ *	    stream argument for functions
+ *	    pointer to current trial count
+ *	    returned user name
+ * Returns: T if success, NIL otherwise, number of trials incremented if retry
+ */
+
+long auth_md5_client (authchallenge_t challenger,authrespond_t responder,
+		      char *service,NETMBX *mb,void *stream,
+		      unsigned long *trial,char *user)
+{
+  char pwd[MAILTMPLEN];
+  void *challenge;
+  unsigned long clen;
+  long ret = NIL;
+				/* get challenge */
+  if (challenge = (*challenger) (stream,&clen)) {
+    pwd[0] = NIL;		/* prompt user */
+    mm_login (mb,user,pwd,*trial);
+    if (!pwd[0]) {		/* user requested abort */
+      fs_give ((void **) &challenge);
+      (*responder) (stream,NIL,0);
+      *trial = 0;		/* cancel subsequent attempts */
+      ret = LONGT;		/* will get a BAD response back */
+    }
+    else {			/* got password, build response */
+      sprintf (pwd,"%.65s %.33s",user,hmac_md5 (challenge,clen,
+						pwd,strlen (pwd)));
+      fs_give ((void **) &challenge);
+				/* send credentials, allow retry if OK */
+      if ((*responder) (stream,pwd,strlen (pwd))) {
+	if (challenge = (*challenger) (stream,&clen))
+	  fs_give ((void **) &challenge);
+	else {
+	  ++*trial;		/* can try again if necessary */
+	  ret = LONGT;		/* check the authentication */
+	}
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  memset (pwd,0,MAILTMPLEN);	/* erase password in case not overwritten */
+  if (!ret) *trial = 65535;	/* don't retry if bad protocol */
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Server authenticator
+ * Accepts: responder function
+ *	    argument count
+ *	    argument vector
+ * Returns: authenticated user name or NIL
+ *
+ * This is much hairier than it needs to be due to the necessary of zapping
+ * the password data.
+ */
+
+static int md5try = MAXLOGINTRIALS;
+
+char *auth_md5_server (authresponse_t responder,int argc,char *argv[])
+{
+  char *ret = NIL;
+  char *p,*u,*user,*authuser,*hash,chal[MAILTMPLEN];
+  unsigned long cl,pl;
+				/* generate challenge */
+  sprintf (chal,"<%lu.%lu@%s>",(unsigned long) getpid (),
+	   (unsigned long) time (0),mylocalhost ());
+				/* send challenge, get user and hash */
+  if (user = (*responder) (chal,cl = strlen (chal),NIL)) {
+				/* got user, locate hash */
+    if (hash = strrchr (user,' ')) {
+      *hash++ = '\0';		/* tie off user */
+				/* see if authentication user */
+      if (authuser = strchr (user,'*')) *authuser++ = '\0';
+				/* get password */
+      if (p = auth_md5_pwd ((authuser && *authuser) ? authuser : user)) {
+	pl = strlen (p);
+	u = (md5try && !strcmp (hash,hmac_md5 (chal,cl,p,pl))) ? user : NIL;
+	memset (p,0,pl);	/* erase sensitive information */
+	fs_give ((void **) &p);	/* flush erased password */
+				/* now log in for real */
+	if (u && authserver_login (u,authuser,argc,argv)) ret = myusername ();
+	else if (md5try) --md5try;
+      }
+    }
+    fs_give ((void **) &user);
+  }
+  if (!ret) sleep (3);		/* slow down possible cracker */
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Return MD5 password for user
+ * Accepts: user name
+ * Returns: plaintext password if success, else NIL
+ *
+ * This is much hairier than it needs to be due to the necessary of zapping
+ * the password data.  That's why we don't use stdio here.
+ */
+
+char *auth_md5_pwd (char *user)
+{
+  struct stat sbuf;
+  int fd = open (MD5ENABLE,O_RDONLY,NIL);
+  unsigned char *s,*t,*buf,*lusr,*lret;
+  char *r;
+  char *ret = NIL;
+  if (fd >= 0) {		/* found the file? */
+    fstat (fd,&sbuf);		/* yes, slurp it into memory */
+    read (fd,buf = (char *) fs_get (sbuf.st_size + 1),sbuf.st_size);
+				/* see if any uppercase characters in user */
+    for (s = user; *s && ((*s < 'A') || (*s > 'Z')); s++);
+				/* yes, make lowercase copy */
+    lusr = *s ? lcase (cpystr (user)) : NIL;
+    for (s = strtok_r ((char *) buf,"\015\012",&r),lret = NIL; s;
+	 s = ret ? NIL : strtok_r (NIL,"\015\012",&r))
+				/* must be valid entry line */
+      if (*s && (*s != '#') && (t = strchr (s,'\t')) && t[1]) {
+	*t++ = '\0';		/* found tab, tie off user, point to pwd */
+	if (!strcmp (s,user)) ret = cpystr (t);
+	else if (lusr && !lret) if (!strcmp (s,lusr)) lret = t;
+      }
+				/* accept case-independent name */
+    if (!ret && lret) ret = cpystr (lret);
+				/* don't need lowercase copy any more */
+    if (lusr) fs_give ((void **) &lusr);
+				/* erase sensitive information from buffer */
+    memset (buf,0,sbuf.st_size + 1);
+    fs_give ((void **) &buf);	/* flush the buffer */
+    close (fd);			/* don't need file any longer */
+  }
+  return ret;			/* return password */
+}
+
+/* APOP server login
+ * Accepts: challenge
+ *	    desired user name
+ *	    purported MD5
+ *	    argument count
+ *	    argument vector
+ * Returns: authenticated user name or NIL
+ */
+
+char *apop_login (char *chal,char *user,char *md5,int argc,char *argv[])
+{
+  int i,j;
+  char *ret = NIL;
+  char *s,*authuser,tmp[MAILTMPLEN];
+  unsigned char digest[MD5DIGLEN];
+  MD5CONTEXT ctx;
+  char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+				/* see if authentication user */
+  if (authuser = strchr (user,'*')) *authuser++ = '\0';
+				/* get password */
+  if (s = auth_md5_pwd ((authuser && *authuser) ? authuser : user)) {
+    md5_init (&ctx);		/* initialize MD5 context */
+				/* build string to get MD5 digest */
+    sprintf (tmp,"%.128s%.128s",chal,s);
+    memset (s,0,strlen (s));	/* erase sensitive information */
+    fs_give ((void **) &s);	/* flush erased password */
+    md5_update (&ctx,(unsigned char *) tmp,strlen (tmp));
+    memset (tmp,0,MAILTMPLEN);	/* erase sensitive information */
+    md5_final (digest,&ctx);
+				/* convert to printable hex */
+    for (i = 0, s = tmp; i < MD5DIGLEN; i++) {
+      *s++ = hex[(j = digest[i]) >> 4];
+      *s++ = hex[j & 0xf];
+    }
+    *s = '\0';			/* tie off hash text */
+    memset (digest,0,MD5DIGLEN);/* erase sensitive information */
+    if (md5try && !strcmp (md5,tmp) &&
+	authserver_login (user,authuser,argc,argv))
+      ret = cpystr (myusername ());
+    else if (md5try) --md5try;
+    memset (tmp,0,MAILTMPLEN);	/* erase sensitive information */
+  }
+  if (!ret) sleep (3);		/* slow down possible cracker */
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2104 HMAC hashing
+ * Accepts: text to hash
+ *	    text length
+ *	    key
+ *	    key length
+ * Returns: hash as text, always
+ */
+
+char *hmac_md5 (char *text,unsigned long tl,char *key,unsigned long kl)
+{
+  int i,j;
+  static char hshbuf[2*MD5DIGLEN + 1];
+  char *s;
+  MD5CONTEXT ctx;
+  char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+  unsigned char digest[MD5DIGLEN],k_ipad[MD5BLKLEN+1],k_opad[MD5BLKLEN+1];
+  if (kl > MD5BLKLEN) {		/* key longer than pad length? */
+    md5_init (&ctx);		/* yes, set key as MD5(key) */
+    md5_update (&ctx,(unsigned char *) key,kl);
+    md5_final (digest,&ctx);
+    key = (char *) digest;
+    kl = MD5DIGLEN;
+  }
+  memcpy (k_ipad,key,kl);	/* store key in pads */
+  memset (k_ipad+kl,0,(MD5BLKLEN+1)-kl);
+  memcpy (k_opad,k_ipad,MD5BLKLEN+1);
+				/* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
+  for (i = 0; i < MD5BLKLEN; i++) {
+    k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+    k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
+  }
+  md5_init (&ctx);		/* inner MD5: hash ipad and text */
+  md5_update (&ctx,k_ipad,MD5BLKLEN);
+  md5_update (&ctx,(unsigned char *) text,tl);
+  md5_final (digest,&ctx);
+  md5_init (&ctx);		/* outer MD5: hash opad and inner results */
+  md5_update (&ctx,k_opad,MD5BLKLEN);
+  md5_update (&ctx,digest,MD5DIGLEN);
+  md5_final (digest,&ctx);
+				/* convert to printable hex */
+  for (i = 0, s = hshbuf; i < MD5DIGLEN; i++) {
+    *s++ = hex[(j = digest[i]) >> 4];
+    *s++ = hex[j & 0xf];
+  }
+  *s = '\0';			/* tie off hash text */
+  return hshbuf;
+}
+
+/* Everything after this point is derived from the RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
+ */
+
+/* You may wonder why these strange "a &= 0xffffffff;" statements are here.
+ * This is to ensure correct results on machines with a unsigned long size of
+ * larger than 32 bits.
+ */
+
+#define RND1(a,b,c,d,x,s,ac) \
+ a += ((b & c) | (d & ~b)) + x + (unsigned long) ac; \
+ a &= 0xffffffff; \
+ a = b + ((a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)));
+
+#define RND2(a,b,c,d,x,s,ac) \
+ a += ((b & d) | (c & ~d)) + x + (unsigned long) ac; \
+ a &= 0xffffffff; \
+ a = b + ((a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)));
+
+#define RND3(a,b,c,d,x,s,ac) \
+ a += (b ^ c ^ d) + x + (unsigned long) ac; \
+ a &= 0xffffffff; \
+ a = b + ((a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)));
+
+#define RND4(a,b,c,d,x,s,ac) \
+ a += (c ^ (b | ~d)) + x + (unsigned long) ac; \
+ a &= 0xffffffff; \
+ a = b + ((a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)));
+
+/* Initialize MD5 context
+ * Accepts: context to initialize
+ */
+
+void md5_init (MD5CONTEXT *ctx)
+{
+  ctx->clow = ctx->chigh = 0;	/* initialize byte count to zero */
+				/* initialization constants */
+  ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; ctx->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+  ctx->state[2] = 0x98badcfe; ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+  ctx->ptr = ctx->buf;		/* reset buffer pointer */
+}
+
+
+/* MD5 add data to context
+ * Accepts: context
+ *	    input data
+ *	    length of data
+ */
+
+void md5_update (MD5CONTEXT *ctx,unsigned char *data,unsigned long len)
+{
+  unsigned long i = (ctx->buf + MD5BLKLEN) - ctx->ptr;
+				/* update double precision number of bytes */
+  if ((ctx->clow += len) < len) ctx->chigh++;
+  while (i <= len) {		/* copy/transform data, 64 bytes at a time */
+    memcpy (ctx->ptr,data,i);	/* fill up 64 byte chunk */
+    md5_transform (ctx->state,ctx->ptr = ctx->buf);
+    data += i,len -= i,i = MD5BLKLEN;
+  }
+  memcpy (ctx->ptr,data,len);	/* copy final bit of data in buffer */
+  ctx->ptr += len;		/* update buffer pointer */
+}
+
+/* MD5 Finalization
+ * Accepts: destination digest
+ *	    context
+ */
+
+void md5_final (unsigned char *digest,MD5CONTEXT *ctx)
+{
+  unsigned long i,bits[2];
+  bits[0] = ctx->clow << 3;	/* calculate length in bits (before padding) */
+  bits[1] = (ctx->chigh << 3) + (ctx->clow >> 29);
+  *ctx->ptr++ = 0x80;		/* padding byte */
+  if ((i = (ctx->buf + MD5BLKLEN) - ctx->ptr) < 8) {
+    memset (ctx->ptr,0,i);	/* pad out buffer with zeros */
+    md5_transform (ctx->state,ctx->buf);
+				/* pad out with zeros, leaving 8 bytes */
+    memset (ctx->buf,0,MD5BLKLEN - 8);
+    ctx->ptr = ctx->buf + MD5BLKLEN - 8;
+  }
+  else if (i -= 8) {		/* need to pad this buffer? */
+    memset (ctx->ptr,0,i);	/* yes, pad out with zeros, leaving 8 bytes */
+    ctx->ptr += i;
+  }
+  md5_encode (ctx->ptr,bits,2);	/* make LSB-first length */
+  md5_transform (ctx->state,ctx->buf);
+				/* store state in digest */
+  md5_encode (digest,ctx->state,4);
+				/* erase context */
+  memset (ctx,0,sizeof (MD5CONTEXT));
+}
+
+/* MD5 basic transformation
+ * Accepts: state vector
+ *	    current 64-byte block
+ */
+
+static void md5_transform (unsigned long *state,unsigned char *block)
+{
+  unsigned long a = state[0],b = state[1],c = state[2],d = state[3],x[16];
+  md5_decode (x,block,16);	/* decode into 16 longs */
+				/* round 1 */
+  RND1 (a,b,c,d,x[ 0], 7,0xd76aa478); RND1 (d,a,b,c,x[ 1],12,0xe8c7b756);
+  RND1 (c,d,a,b,x[ 2],17,0x242070db); RND1 (b,c,d,a,x[ 3],22,0xc1bdceee);
+  RND1 (a,b,c,d,x[ 4], 7,0xf57c0faf); RND1 (d,a,b,c,x[ 5],12,0x4787c62a);
+  RND1 (c,d,a,b,x[ 6],17,0xa8304613); RND1 (b,c,d,a,x[ 7],22,0xfd469501);
+  RND1 (a,b,c,d,x[ 8], 7,0x698098d8); RND1 (d,a,b,c,x[ 9],12,0x8b44f7af);
+  RND1 (c,d,a,b,x[10],17,0xffff5bb1); RND1 (b,c,d,a,x[11],22,0x895cd7be);
+  RND1 (a,b,c,d,x[12], 7,0x6b901122); RND1 (d,a,b,c,x[13],12,0xfd987193);
+  RND1 (c,d,a,b,x[14],17,0xa679438e); RND1 (b,c,d,a,x[15],22,0x49b40821);
+				/* round 2 */
+  RND2 (a,b,c,d,x[ 1], 5,0xf61e2562); RND2 (d,a,b,c,x[ 6], 9,0xc040b340);
+  RND2 (c,d,a,b,x[11],14,0x265e5a51); RND2 (b,c,d,a,x[ 0],20,0xe9b6c7aa);
+  RND2 (a,b,c,d,x[ 5], 5,0xd62f105d); RND2 (d,a,b,c,x[10], 9, 0x2441453);
+  RND2 (c,d,a,b,x[15],14,0xd8a1e681); RND2 (b,c,d,a,x[ 4],20,0xe7d3fbc8);
+  RND2 (a,b,c,d,x[ 9], 5,0x21e1cde6); RND2 (d,a,b,c,x[14], 9,0xc33707d6);
+  RND2 (c,d,a,b,x[ 3],14,0xf4d50d87); RND2 (b,c,d,a,x[ 8],20,0x455a14ed);
+  RND2 (a,b,c,d,x[13], 5,0xa9e3e905); RND2 (d,a,b,c,x[ 2], 9,0xfcefa3f8);
+  RND2 (c,d,a,b,x[ 7],14,0x676f02d9); RND2 (b,c,d,a,x[12],20,0x8d2a4c8a);
+				/* round 3 */
+  RND3 (a,b,c,d,x[ 5], 4,0xfffa3942); RND3 (d,a,b,c,x[ 8],11,0x8771f681);
+  RND3 (c,d,a,b,x[11],16,0x6d9d6122); RND3 (b,c,d,a,x[14],23,0xfde5380c);
+  RND3 (a,b,c,d,x[ 1], 4,0xa4beea44); RND3 (d,a,b,c,x[ 4],11,0x4bdecfa9);
+  RND3 (c,d,a,b,x[ 7],16,0xf6bb4b60); RND3 (b,c,d,a,x[10],23,0xbebfbc70);
+  RND3 (a,b,c,d,x[13], 4,0x289b7ec6); RND3 (d,a,b,c,x[ 0],11,0xeaa127fa);
+  RND3 (c,d,a,b,x[ 3],16,0xd4ef3085); RND3 (b,c,d,a,x[ 6],23, 0x4881d05);
+  RND3 (a,b,c,d,x[ 9], 4,0xd9d4d039); RND3 (d,a,b,c,x[12],11,0xe6db99e5);
+  RND3 (c,d,a,b,x[15],16,0x1fa27cf8); RND3 (b,c,d,a,x[ 2],23,0xc4ac5665);
+				/* round 4 */
+  RND4 (a,b,c,d,x[ 0], 6,0xf4292244); RND4 (d,a,b,c,x[ 7],10,0x432aff97);
+  RND4 (c,d,a,b,x[14],15,0xab9423a7); RND4 (b,c,d,a,x[ 5],21,0xfc93a039);
+  RND4 (a,b,c,d,x[12], 6,0x655b59c3); RND4 (d,a,b,c,x[ 3],10,0x8f0ccc92);
+  RND4 (c,d,a,b,x[10],15,0xffeff47d); RND4 (b,c,d,a,x[ 1],21,0x85845dd1);
+  RND4 (a,b,c,d,x[ 8], 6,0x6fa87e4f); RND4 (d,a,b,c,x[15],10,0xfe2ce6e0);
+  RND4 (c,d,a,b,x[ 6],15,0xa3014314); RND4 (b,c,d,a,x[13],21,0x4e0811a1);
+  RND4 (a,b,c,d,x[ 4], 6,0xf7537e82); RND4 (d,a,b,c,x[11],10,0xbd3af235);
+  RND4 (c,d,a,b,x[ 2],15,0x2ad7d2bb); RND4 (b,c,d,a,x[ 9],21,0xeb86d391);
+				/* update state */
+  state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d;
+  memset (x,0,sizeof (x));	/* erase sensitive data */
+}
+
+/* You may wonder why these strange "& 0xff" maskings are here.  This is to
+ * ensure correct results on machines with a char size of larger than 8 bits.
+ * For example, the KCC compiler on the PDP-10 uses 9-bit chars.
+ */
+
+/* MD5 encode unsigned long into LSB-first bytes
+ * Accepts: destination pointer
+ *	    source
+ *	    length of source
+ */ 
+
+static void md5_encode (unsigned char *dst,unsigned long *src,int len)
+{
+  int i;
+  for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+    *dst++ = (unsigned char) (src[i] & 0xff);
+    *dst++ = (unsigned char) ((src[i] >> 8) & 0xff);
+    *dst++ = (unsigned char) ((src[i] >> 16) & 0xff);
+    *dst++ = (unsigned char) ((src[i] >> 24) & 0xff);
+  }
+}
+
+
+/* MD5 decode LSB-first bytes into unsigned long
+ * Accepts: destination pointer
+ *	    source
+ *	    length of destination
+ */ 
+
+static void md5_decode (unsigned long *dst,unsigned char *src,int len)
+{
+  int i, j;
+  for (i = 0, j = 0; i < len; i++, j += 4)
+    dst[i] = ((unsigned long) (src[j] & 0xff)) |
+      (((unsigned long) (src[j+1] & 0xff)) << 8) |
+      (((unsigned long) (src[j+2] & 0xff)) << 16) |
+	(((unsigned long) (src[j+3] & 0xff)) << 24);
+}
-- 
2.40.0