From a3efe1b6e9d2aa2ce5661e4d4b97262eae743fa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 15:13:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Avoid multiple lock using FIPS DRBG. Don't use multiple locks when SP800-90 DRBG is used outside FIPS mode. PR#3176 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz --- crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 22 +++++++++------------- crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 1 + crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c index aee1c30b0a..5dd0a37d65 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c @@ -335,6 +335,11 @@ static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) } static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) + { + return md_rand_bytes_lock(buf, num, pseudo, 1); + } + +int md_rand_bytes_lock(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock) { static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx; @@ -383,10 +388,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the * global 'md'. */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - /* NB: in FIPS mode we are already under a lock */ - if (!FIPS_mode()) -#endif + if (lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ @@ -466,9 +468,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ crypto_lock_rand = 0; -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (!FIPS_mode()) -#endif + if (lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); while (num > 0) @@ -521,15 +521,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) MD_Init(&m); MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (!FIPS_mode()) -#endif + if (lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); MD_Final(&m,md); -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (!FIPS_mode()) -#endif + if (lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h index 618a8ec899..725cdb31c2 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h @@ -154,5 +154,6 @@ #define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL) #endif +int md_rand_bytes_lock(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock); #endif diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index 5ac0e14caf..54f1d35c6c 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS #include #include +#include "rand_lcl.h" #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE @@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ static size_t drbg_get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout, *pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len); if (!*pout) return 0; - if (RAND_SSLeay()->bytes(*pout, min_len) <= 0) + if (md_rand_bytes_lock(*pout, min_len, 0, 0) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(*pout); *pout = NULL; -- 2.40.0