From 84fba19d80ba7e62def0270378bdf2c4904a90f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "William A. Rowe Jr" <wrowe@apache.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2016 22:30:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Revert 1746645, was sitting in the wrong tree, mea culpa...

git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1746646 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
---
 docs/manual/mod/mod_ssl.xml | 60 +++++++++++--------------------------
 modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c |  4 +--
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/manual/mod/mod_ssl.xml b/docs/manual/mod/mod_ssl.xml
index 08348df192..2927eea2d4 100644
--- a/docs/manual/mod/mod_ssl.xml
+++ b/docs/manual/mod/mod_ssl.xml
@@ -1917,32 +1917,17 @@ SSLProxyCheckPeerExpire on
 <p>
 This directive sets whether the remote server certificate's CN field is
 compared against the hostname of the request URL. If both are not equal
-a 502 status code (Bad Gateway) is sent. <code>SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</code> is
-superseded by <directive module="mod_ssl">SSLProxyCheckPeerName</directive>
-in release 2.4.5 and later. 
+a 502 status code (Bad Gateway) is sent.
 </p>
 <p>
-In all releases 2.4.5 through 2.4.20, setting
-<code>SSLProxyCheckPeerName off</code> was sufficient to enable this behavior
-(as the <code>SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</code> default was <code>on</code>.) In 
-these releases, both directives must be set to <code>off</code> to completely
-avoid remote server certificate name validation. Many users reported this
-to be very confusing.
-</p>
-<p>
-As of release 2.4.21, all configurations which enable either one of the
-<code>SSLProxyCheckPeerName</code> or <code>SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</code> options
-will use the new <directive module="mod_ssl">SSLProxyCheckPeerName</directive>
-behavior, and all configurations which disable either one of the 
-<code>SSLProxyCheckPeerName</code> or <code>SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</code> options
-will supress all remote server certificate name validation. Only the following
-configuration will trigger the legacy certificate CN comparison in 2.4.21 and
-later releases;
+In 2.4.5 and later, SSLProxyCheckPeerCN has been superseded by
+<directive module="mod_ssl">SSLProxyCheckPeerName</directive>, and its
+setting is only taken into account when
+<code>SSLProxyCheckPeerName off</code> is specified at the same time.
 </p>
 <example><title>Example</title>
 <highlight language="config">
 SSLProxyCheckPeerCN on
-SSLProxyCheckPeerName off
 </highlight>
 </example>
 </usage>
@@ -1960,30 +1945,21 @@ SSLProxyCheckPeerName off
 
 <usage>
 <p>
-This directive configures host name checking for server certificates when 
-mod_ssl is acting as an SSL client. The check will succeed if the host name 
-from the request URI matches one of the CN attribute(s) of the certificate's 
-subject, or matches the subjectAltName extension. If the check fails, the SSL 
-request is aborted and a 502 status code (Bad Gateway) is returned.
-</p>
-<p>
-Wildcard matching is supported for specific cases: an subjectAltName entry
-of type dNSName, or CN attributes starting with <code>*.</code> will match
-with any host name of the same number of name elements and the same suffix.
-E.g. <code>*.example.org</code> will match <code>foo.example.org</code>,
-but will not match <code>foo.bar.example.org</code>, because the number of
-elements in the respective host names differs.
+This directive configures host name checking for server certificates
+when mod_ssl is acting as an SSL client. The check will
+succeed if the host name from the request URI is found in
+either the subjectAltName extension or (one of) the CN attribute(s)
+in the certificate's subject. If the check fails, the SSL request
+is aborted and a 502 status code (Bad Gateway) is returned.
+The directive supersedes <directive module="mod_ssl">SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</directive>,
+which only checks for the expected host name in the first CN attribute.
 </p>
 <p>
-This feature was introduced in 2.4.5 and superseded the behavior of the 
-<directive module="mod_ssl">SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</directive> directive, which 
-only tested the exact value in the first CN attribute against the host name.
-However, many users were confused by the behavior of using these directives
-individually, so the mutual behavior of <code>SSLProxyCheckPeerName</code> 
-and <code>SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</code> directives were improved in release 
-2.4.21. See the <directive module="mod_ssl">SSLProxyCheckPeerCN</directive> 
-directive description for the original behavior and details of these 
-improvements.
+Wildcard matching is supported in one specific flavor: subjectAltName entries
+of type dNSName or CN attributes starting with <code>*.</code> will match
+for any DNS name with the same number of labels and the same suffix
+(i.e., <code>*.example.org</code> matches for <code>foo.example.org</code>,
+but not for <code>foo.bar.example.org</code>).
 </p>
 </usage>
 </directivesynopsis>
diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c
index ea2319328d..0737640ada 100644
--- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c
+++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c
@@ -1189,8 +1189,6 @@ static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_handshake(ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx)
             }
         }
         if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_name != SSL_ENABLED_FALSE) &&
-            ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn != SSL_ENABLED_FALSE) ||
-             (sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_name == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE)) &&
             hostname_note) {
             apr_table_unset(c->notes, "proxy-request-hostname");
             if (!cert
@@ -1202,7 +1200,7 @@ static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_handshake(ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx)
                               "for hostname %s", hostname_note);
             }
         }
-        else if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) &&
+        else if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn != SSL_ENABLED_FALSE) &&
             hostname_note) {
             const char *hostname;
             int match = 0;
-- 
2.40.0