From 5b9d0995a126e1813677b9ea0b5b55337e253cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 13:34:22 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reported by: Solar Designer of Openwall

Make sure tkeylen is initialised properly when encrypting CMS messages.
---
 CHANGES              | 4 ++++
 crypto/cms/cms_enc.c | 4 ++--
 ssl/d1_enc.c         | 8 +++++++-
 ssl/t1_enc.c         | 8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 943502ec0b..1e2f31277f 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
      approved.
      [Steve Henson]
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
index 580083b45f..f873ce3794 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -139,10 +139,10 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 				CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
 		goto err;
 		}
+	tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
 	/* Generate random session key */
 	if (!enc || !ec->key)
 		{
-		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
 		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
 		if (!tkey)
 			{
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 			/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
 			 * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
 			 */
-			if (ec->debug)
+			if (enc || ec->debug)
 				{
 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
 						CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index becbab91c2..a8b75d7c96 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -208,6 +208,12 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 				rec->input[k]=j;
 			l+=i;
 			rec->length+=i;
+if (rec->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+	{
+	memset(rec->input, 63, 64);
+	rec->length = 64;
+	l = 64;
+	}
 			}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@@ -260,7 +266,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 				}
 			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
 			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
+			if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
 				{
 				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
 				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 201ca9ad6d..3f13934acb 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -793,6 +793,12 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 				rec->input[k]=j;
 			l+=i;
 			rec->length+=i;
+if (rec->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+	{
+	memset(rec->input, 63, 64);
+	rec->length = 64;
+	l = 64;
+	}
 			}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@@ -889,6 +895,8 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
 				&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 				{
+				if (bs > (int)rec->length)
+					return -1;
 				rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */
 				rec->input += bs;
 				rec->length -= bs;
-- 
2.40.0