From 2da4adbc5fc5989126208a90b4acd0e3ae9afeff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Tsyrklevich Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 22:33:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Add the -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack flag Summary: Add support for the -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack flag which causes clang to add ShadowCallStack attribute to functions compiled with that flag enabled. Reviewers: pcc, kcc Reviewed By: pcc, kcc Subscribers: cryptoad, cfe-commits, kcc Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D44801 git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/cfe/trunk@329122 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8 --- docs/ShadowCallStack.rst | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/index.rst | 1 + include/clang/Basic/Sanitizers.def | 3 + lib/CodeGen/CGDeclCXX.cpp | 4 + lib/CodeGen/CodeGenFunction.cpp | 2 + lib/Driver/SanitizerArgs.cpp | 5 +- lib/Driver/ToolChain.cpp | 2 + lib/Lex/PPMacroExpansion.cpp | 2 + test/CodeGen/shadowcallstack-attr.c | 16 +++ test/Driver/sanitizer-ld.c | 15 +++ 10 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 docs/ShadowCallStack.rst create mode 100644 test/CodeGen/shadowcallstack-attr.c diff --git a/docs/ShadowCallStack.rst b/docs/ShadowCallStack.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1436df274b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/ShadowCallStack.rst @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +=============== +ShadowCallStack +=============== + +.. contents:: + :local: + +Introduction +============ + +ShadowCallStack is an **experimental** instrumentation pass, currently only +implemented for x86_64, that protects programs against return address +overwrites (e.g. stack buffer overflows.) It works by saving a function's return +address to a separately allocated 'shadow call stack' in the function prolog and +checking the return address on the stack against the shadow call stack in the +function epilog. + +Comparison +---------- + +To optimize for memory consumption and cache locality, the shadow call stack +stores an index followed by an array of return addresses. This is in contrast +to other schemes, like :doc:`SafeStack`, that mirror the entire stack and +trade-off consuming more memory for shorter function prologs and epilogs with +fewer memory accesses. Similarly, `Return Flow Guard`_ consumes more memory with +shorter function prologs and epilogs than ShadowCallStack but suffers from the +same race conditions (see `Security`_). Intel `Control-flow Enforcement Technology`_ +(CET) is a proposed hardware extension that would add native support to +use a shadow stack to store/check return addresses at call/return time. It +would not suffer from race conditions at calls and returns and not incur the +overhead of function instrumentation, but it does require operating system +support. + +.. _`Return Flow Guard`: https://xlab.tencent.com/en/2016/11/02/return-flow-guard/ +.. _`Control-flow Enforcement Technology`: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf + +Compatibility +------------- + +ShadowCallStack currently only supports x86_64. A runtime is not currently +provided in compiler-rt so one must be provided by the compiled application. + +Security +======== + +ShadowCallStack is intended to be a stronger alternative to +``-fstack-protector``. It protects from non-linear overflows and arbitrary +memory writes to the return address slot; however, similarly to +``-fstack-protector`` this protection suffers from race conditions because of +the call-return semantics on x86_64. There is a short race between the call +instruction and the first instruction in the function that reads the return +address where an attacker could overwrite the return address and bypass +ShadowCallStack. Similarly, there is a time-of-check-to-time-of-use race in the +function epilog where an attacker could overwrite the return address after it +has been checked and before it has been returned to. Modifying the call-return +semantics to fix this on x86_64 would incur an unacceptable performance overhead +due to return branch prediction. + +The instrumentation makes use of the ``gs`` segment register to reference the +shadow call stack meaning that references to the shadow call stack do not have +to be stored in memory. This makes it possible to implement a runtime that +avoids exposing the address of the shadow call stack to attackers that can read +arbitrary memory. However, attackers could still try to exploit side channels +exposed by the operating system `[1]`_ `[2]`_ or processor `[3]`_ to discover +the address of the shadow call stack. + +.. _`[1]`: https://eyalitkin.wordpress.com/2017/09/01/cartography-lighting-up-the-shadows/ +.. _`[2]`: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/eu-16-Goktas-Bypassing-Clangs-SafeStack.pdf +.. _`[3]`: https://www.vusec.net/projects/anc/ + +Leaf functions are optimized to store the return address in a free register +and avoid writing to the shadow call stack if a register is available. Very +short leaf functions are uninstrumented if their execution is judged to be +shorter than the race condition window intrinsic to the instrumentation. + +Usage +===== + +To enable ShadowCallStack, just pass the ``-fsanitize=shadow-call-stack`` flag +to both compile and link command lines. + +Low-level API +------------- + +``__has_feature(shadow_call_stack)`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +In some cases one may need to execute different code depending on whether +ShadowCallStack is enabled. The macro ``__has_feature(shadow_call_stack)`` can +be used for this purpose. + +.. code-block:: c + + #if defined(__has_feature) + # if __has_feature(shadow_call_stack) + // code that builds only under ShadowCallStack + # endif + #endif + +``__attribute__((no_sanitize("shadow-call-stack")))`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Use ``__attribute__((no_sanitize("shadow-call-stack")))`` on a function +declaration to specify that the shadow call stack instrumentation should not be +applied to that function, even if enabled globally. + +Example +======= + +The following example code: + +.. code-block:: c++ + + int foo() { + return bar() + 1; + } + +Generates the following x86_64 assembly when compiled with ``-O2``: + +.. code-block:: gas + + push %rax + callq foo + add $0x1,%eax + pop %rcx + retq + +Adding ``-fsanitize=shadow-call-stack`` would output the following: + +.. code-block:: gas + + mov (%rsp),%r10 + xor %r11,%r11 + addq $0x8,%gs:(%r11) + mov %gs:(%r11),%r11 + mov %r10,%gs:(%r11) + push %rax + callq foo + add $0x1,%eax + pop %rcx + xor %r11,%r11 + mov %gs:(%r11),%r10 + mov %gs:(%r10),%r10 + subq $0x8,%gs:(%r11) + cmp %r10,(%rsp) + jne trap + retq + + trap: + ud2 diff --git a/docs/index.rst b/docs/index.rst index ed479534ee..be7a371cd7 100644 --- a/docs/index.rst +++ b/docs/index.rst @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ Using Clang as a Compiler ControlFlowIntegrity LTOVisibility SafeStack + ShadowCallStack SourceBasedCodeCoverage Modules MSVCCompatibility diff --git a/include/clang/Basic/Sanitizers.def b/include/clang/Basic/Sanitizers.def index 30d5cc8166..416dab20ae 100644 --- a/include/clang/Basic/Sanitizers.def +++ b/include/clang/Basic/Sanitizers.def @@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ SANITIZER_GROUP("cfi", CFI, // Safe Stack SANITIZER("safe-stack", SafeStack) +// Shadow Call Stack +SANITIZER("shadow-call-stack", ShadowCallStack) + // -fsanitize=undefined includes all the sanitizers which have low overhead, no // ABI or address space layout implications, and only catch undefined behavior. SANITIZER_GROUP("undefined", Undefined, diff --git a/lib/CodeGen/CGDeclCXX.cpp b/lib/CodeGen/CGDeclCXX.cpp index d6e97dd577..fc92425f7e 100644 --- a/lib/CodeGen/CGDeclCXX.cpp +++ b/lib/CodeGen/CGDeclCXX.cpp @@ -343,6 +343,10 @@ llvm::Function *CodeGenModule::CreateGlobalInitOrDestructFunction( !isInSanitizerBlacklist(SanitizerKind::SafeStack, Fn, Loc)) Fn->addFnAttr(llvm::Attribute::SafeStack); + if (getLangOpts().Sanitize.has(SanitizerKind::ShadowCallStack) && + !isInSanitizerBlacklist(SanitizerKind::ShadowCallStack, Fn, Loc)) + Fn->addFnAttr(llvm::Attribute::ShadowCallStack); + return Fn; } diff --git a/lib/CodeGen/CodeGenFunction.cpp b/lib/CodeGen/CodeGenFunction.cpp index 3d7b906587..e5db4e52b4 100644 --- a/lib/CodeGen/CodeGenFunction.cpp +++ b/lib/CodeGen/CodeGenFunction.cpp @@ -861,6 +861,8 @@ void CodeGenFunction::StartFunction(GlobalDecl GD, Fn->addFnAttr(llvm::Attribute::SanitizeMemory); if (SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SafeStack)) Fn->addFnAttr(llvm::Attribute::SafeStack); + if (SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::ShadowCallStack)) + Fn->addFnAttr(llvm::Attribute::ShadowCallStack); // Apply fuzzing attribute to the function. if (SanOpts.hasOneOf(SanitizerKind::Fuzzer | SanitizerKind::FuzzerNoLink)) diff --git a/lib/Driver/SanitizerArgs.cpp b/lib/Driver/SanitizerArgs.cpp index 23aa6b6951..70dbc5fcb2 100644 --- a/lib/Driver/SanitizerArgs.cpp +++ b/lib/Driver/SanitizerArgs.cpp @@ -343,7 +343,10 @@ SanitizerArgs::SanitizerArgs(const ToolChain &TC, std::make_pair(Scudo, Address | HWAddress | Leak | Thread | Memory | KernelAddress | Efficiency), std::make_pair(SafeStack, Address | HWAddress | Leak | Thread | Memory | - KernelAddress | Efficiency)}; + KernelAddress | Efficiency), + std::make_pair(ShadowCallStack, Address | HWAddress | Leak | Thread | + Memory | KernelAddress | Efficiency | + SafeStack)}; // Enable toolchain specific default sanitizers if not explicitly disabled. SanitizerMask Default = TC.getDefaultSanitizers() & ~AllRemove; diff --git a/lib/Driver/ToolChain.cpp b/lib/Driver/ToolChain.cpp index 645f357530..23d6503d33 100644 --- a/lib/Driver/ToolChain.cpp +++ b/lib/Driver/ToolChain.cpp @@ -814,6 +814,8 @@ SanitizerMask ToolChain::getSupportedSanitizers() const { getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::wasm32 || getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::wasm64) Res |= CFIICall; + if (getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::x86_64) + Res |= ShadowCallStack; return Res; } diff --git a/lib/Lex/PPMacroExpansion.cpp b/lib/Lex/PPMacroExpansion.cpp index 8814b23d3f..5af8ba5724 100644 --- a/lib/Lex/PPMacroExpansion.cpp +++ b/lib/Lex/PPMacroExpansion.cpp @@ -1275,6 +1275,8 @@ static bool HasFeature(const Preprocessor &PP, StringRef Feature) { .Case("is_union", LangOpts.CPlusPlus) .Case("modules", LangOpts.Modules) .Case("safe_stack", LangOpts.Sanitize.has(SanitizerKind::SafeStack)) + .Case("shadow_call_stack", + LangOpts.Sanitize.has(SanitizerKind::ShadowCallStack)) .Case("tls", PP.getTargetInfo().isTLSSupported()) .Case("underlying_type", LangOpts.CPlusPlus) .Default(false); diff --git a/test/CodeGen/shadowcallstack-attr.c b/test/CodeGen/shadowcallstack-attr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45e710d875 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/CodeGen/shadowcallstack-attr.c @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-linux-unknown -emit-llvm -o - %s -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack | FileCheck -check-prefix=UNBLACKLISTED %s + +// RUN: %clang_cc1 -D ATTR -triple x86_64-linux-unknown -emit-llvm -o - %s -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack | FileCheck -check-prefix=BLACKLISTED %s + +// RUN: echo -e "[shadow-call-stack]\nfun:foo" > %t +// RUN: %clang_cc1 -fsanitize-blacklist=%t -triple x86_64-linux-unknown -emit-llvm -o - %s -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack | FileCheck -check-prefix=BLACKLISTED %s + +#ifdef ATTR +__attribute__((no_sanitize("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif +int foo(int *a) { return *a; } + +// CHECK: define i32 @foo(i32* %a) + +// BLACKLISTED-NOT: attributes {{.*}}shadowcallstack{{.*}} +// UNBLACKLISTED: attributes {{.*}}shadowcallstack{{.*}} diff --git a/test/Driver/sanitizer-ld.c b/test/Driver/sanitizer-ld.c index c3d628accc..9ccdf61a91 100644 --- a/test/Driver/sanitizer-ld.c +++ b/test/Driver/sanitizer-ld.c @@ -557,6 +557,21 @@ // CHECK-SAFESTACK-LINUX: "-lpthread" // CHECK-SAFESTACK-LINUX: "-ldl" +// RUN: %clang -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack %s -### -o %t.o 2>&1 \ +// RUN: -target x86_64-unknown-linux -fuse-ld=ld \ +// RUN: | FileCheck --check-prefix=CHECK-SHADOWCALLSTACK-LINUX-X86-64 %s +// CHECK-SHADOWCALLSTACK-LINUX-X86-64-NOT: error: + +// RUN: %clang -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack %s -### -o %t.o 2>&1 \ +// RUN: -target x86-unknown-linux -fuse-ld=ld \ +// RUN: | FileCheck --check-prefix=CHECK-SHADOWCALLSTACK-LINUX-X86 %s +// CHECK-SHADOWCALLSTACK-LINUX-X86: error: unsupported option '-fsanitize=shadow-call-stack' for target 'x86-unknown-linux' + +// RUN: %clang -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack %s -### -o %t.o 2>&1 \ +// RUN: -fsanitize=safe-stack -target x86_64-unknown-linux -fuse-ld=ld \ +// RUN: | FileCheck --check-prefix=CHECK-SHADOWCALLSTACK-SAFESTACK %s +// CHECK-SHADOWCALLSTACK-SAFESTACK: error: invalid argument '-fsanitize=shadow-call-stack' not allowed with '-fsanitize=safe-stack' + // RUN: %clang -fsanitize=cfi -fsanitize-stats %s -### -o %t.o 2>&1 \ // RUN: -target x86_64-unknown-linux -fuse-ld=ld \ // RUN: --sysroot=%S/Inputs/basic_linux_tree \ -- 2.50.1