Geoff Thorpe [Mon, 12 Feb 2001 02:28:29 +0000 (02:28 +0000)]
This change was a quick experiment that I'd wanted to try that works quite
well (and is a good demonstration of how encapsulating the SSL in a
memory-based state machine can make it easier to apply to different
situations).
The change implements a new command-line switch "-flipped <0|1>" which, if
set to 1, reverses the usual interpretation of a client and server for SSL
tunneling. Normally, an ssl client (ie. "-server 0") accepts "cleartext"
connections and conducts SSL/TLS over a proxied connection acting as an SSL
client. Likewise, an ssl server (ie. "-server 1") accepts connections and
conducts SSL/TLS (as an SSL server) over them and passes "cleartext" over
the proxied connection. With "-flipped 1", an SSL client (specified with
"-server 0") in fact accepts SSL connections and proxies clear, whereas an
SSL server ("-server 1") accepts clear and proxies SSL. NB: most of this
diff is command-line handling, the actual meat of the change is simply the
line or two that plugs "clean" and "dirty" file descriptors into the item
that holds the state-machine - reverse them and you get the desired
behaviour.
This allows a network server to be an SSL client, and a network client to
be an SSL server. Apart from curiosity value, there's a couple of possibly
interesting applications - SSL/TLS is inherently vulnerable to trivial DoS
attacks, because the SSL server usually has to perform a private key
operation first, even if the client is authenticated. With this scenario,
the network client is the SSL server and performs the first private key
operation, whereas the network server serves as the SSL client. Another
possible application is when client-only authentication is required (ie.
the underlying protocol handles (or doesn't care about) authenticating the
server). Eg. an SSL/TLS version of 'ssh' could be concocted where the
client's signed certificate is used to validate login to a server system -
whether or not the client needs to validate who the server is can be
configured at the client end rather than at the server end (ie. a complete
inversion of what happens in normal SSL/TLS).
NB: This is just an experiment/play-thing, using "-flipped 1" probably
creates something that is interoperable with exactly nothing. :-)
Bodo Möller [Sat, 10 Feb 2001 13:16:16 +0000 (13:16 +0000)]
Add German SiG root certificates (extracted from the official cert registry
file http://www.nrca-ds.de/ftp/pkd.ttp, which contains a total of 288
certificates issued by the RegPT so far)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 8 Feb 2001 17:59:29 +0000 (17:59 +0000)]
Add the -VAfile option to 'openssl ocsp'. This option will give the
client code certificates to use to only check response signatures.
I'm not entirely sure if the way I just implemented the verification
is the right way to do it, and would be happy if someone would like to
review this.
Bodo Möller [Thu, 8 Feb 2001 12:14:51 +0000 (12:14 +0000)]
Integrate my implementation of a countermeasure against
Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. With this implementation, the expected
number of iterations never exceeds 2.
New semantics for BN_rand_range():
BN_rand_range(r, min, range) now generates r such that
min <= r < min+range.
(Previously, BN_rand_range(r, min, max) generated r such that
min <= r < max.
It is more convenient to have the range; also the previous
prototype was misleading because max was larger than
the actual maximum.)
Richard Levitte [Mon, 5 Feb 2001 09:15:09 +0000 (09:15 +0000)]
Fix a memory leak in BIO_get_accept_socket(). This leak was small and
only happened when the port number wasn't parsable ot the host wasn't
possible to convert to an IP address.
Contributed by Niko Baric <Niko.Baric@epost.de>
Richard Levitte [Tue, 30 Jan 2001 13:38:59 +0000 (13:38 +0000)]
Increase consistency of header data (some mail readers really do not
like spaces before the semicolon, and besides, other parts of this
file makes the values without those spaces), and move spacing of
continuation lines to support BIO's that break lines after each
write.