Richard Levitte [Mon, 14 Nov 2016 22:53:45 +0000 (23:53 +0100)]
Stop init loops
Under certain circumstances, the libcrypto init code would loop,
causing a deadlock. This would typically happen if something in
ossl_init_base() caused an OpenSSL error, and the error stack routines
would recurse into the init code before the flag that ossl_init_base()
had been run was checked.
This change makes sure ossl_init_base isn't run once more of the base
is initiated.
Thanks to Dmitry Kostjuchenko for the idea.
Fixes Github issue #1899
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1922)
prio openssl 1.1.0 seed_len < q was accepted and the seed argument was
then ignored. Now DSA_generate_parameters_ex() returns an error in such
a case but no error string.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1657)
The proposed fix is incorrect. It marks the "run_once" code as having
finished before it has. The intended semantics of run_once is that no
threads should proceed until the code has run exactly once. With this
change the "second" thread will think the run_once code has already been
run and will continue, even though it is still in progress. This could
result in a crash or other incorrect behaviour.
DK [Sun, 13 Nov 2016 12:48:15 +0000 (14:48 +0200)]
Fixed deadlock in CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once for Windows
Fixed deadlock in CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() if call to init() is causing
a recursive call to CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() again that is causing a hot
deadloop inside do { } while (result == ONCE_ININIT); section.
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1913)
Kurt Roeckx [Fri, 11 Nov 2016 20:41:50 +0000 (21:41 +0100)]
Cast to an unsigned type before negating
llvm's ubsan reported:
runtime error: negation of -9223372036854775808 cannot be represented in
type 'int64_t' (aka 'long'); cast to an unsigned type to negate this
value to itself
In order to minimize dependency on assembler version a number of
post-SSE2 instructions are encoded manually. But in order to simplify
the procedure only register operands are considered. Non-register
operands are passed down to assembler. Module in question uses pshufb
with memory operands, and old [GNU] assembler can't handle it.
Fortunately in this case it's possible skip just the problematic
segment without skipping SSSE3 support altogether.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Richard Levitte [Thu, 10 Nov 2016 21:03:28 +0000 (22:03 +0100)]
Small fixups of util/process_docs.pl
- the pod path hadn't been changed with the directory layout change
- apparently, pod2html doesn't add ".html" at the end of links, making
them useless, so we need to fix that
With thanks for the report to Michel <michel.sales@free.fr>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1896)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 10 Nov 2016 15:35:42 +0000 (15:35 +0000)]
Fix test_sslcorrupt when using TLSv1.3
The test loops through all the ciphers, attempting to test each one in turn.
However version negotiation happens before cipher selection, so with TLSv1.3
switched on if we use a non-TLSv1.3 compatible cipher suite we get "no
share cipher".
Matt Caswell [Wed, 9 Nov 2016 14:51:06 +0000 (14:51 +0000)]
Rename the Elliptic Curves extension to supported_groups
This is a skin deep change, which simply renames most places where we talk
about curves in a TLS context to groups. This is because TLS1.3 has renamed
the extension, and it can now include DH groups too. We still only support
curves, but this rename should pave the way for a future extension for DH
groups.
Richard Levitte [Wed, 9 Nov 2016 19:01:51 +0000 (20:01 +0100)]
Building: make it possible to force linking with static OpenSSL libs
Very simply, support having the .a extension to denote depending on
static libraries. Note that this is not supported on native Windows
when building shared libraries, as there is not static library then,
just an import library with the same name.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1889)
Some of stone-age assembler can't cope with r0 in address. It's actually
sensible thing to do, because r0 is shunted to 0 in address arithmetic
and by refusing r0 assembler effectively makes you understand that.
Emilia Kasper [Mon, 7 Nov 2016 15:53:15 +0000 (16:53 +0100)]
Add main() test methods to reduce test boilerplate.
Simple tests only need to implement register_tests().
Tests that need a custom main() should implement test_main(). This will
be wrapped in a main() that performs common setup/teardown (currently
crypto-mdebug).
Note that for normal development, enable-asan is usually
sufficient for detecting leaks, and more versatile.
enable-crypto-mdebug is stricter as it will also
insist that all static variables be freed. This is useful for debugging
library init/deinit; however, it also means that test_main() must free
everything it allocates.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 8 Nov 2016 10:33:35 +0000 (10:33 +0000)]
Add support for initialising WPACKETs from a static buffer
Normally WPACKETs will use a BUF_MEM which can grow as required. Sometimes
though that may be overkill for what is needed - a static buffer may be
sufficient. This adds that capability.
Matt Caswell [Mon, 7 Nov 2016 10:16:57 +0000 (10:16 +0000)]
Update HKDF to support separte Extract and Expand steps
At the moment you can only do an HKDF Extract and Expand in one go. For
TLS1.3 we need to be able to do an Extract first, and the subsequently do
a number of Expand steps on the same PRK.
Richard Levitte [Tue, 8 Nov 2016 23:14:56 +0000 (00:14 +0100)]
Unix Makefile: Make sure to use $(PERL) when running ./Configure
For consistency, it's better to use the perl that was specified to
Configure last time it was called.
Use case:
perl v5.8.8 was first along $PATH, perl v5.22.2 was available and
specified as: PERL=/opt/local/bin/perl ./config. When make wanted to
reconfigure and called './Configure reconf', configuration broke down,
complaining about a perl that's too old.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1884)
David Benjamin [Mon, 7 Nov 2016 00:12:47 +0000 (19:12 -0500)]
Improve RSA test coverage.
MD5/SHA1 and MDC-2 have special-case logic beyond the generic DigestInfo
wrapping. Test that each of these works, including hash and length
mismatches (both input and signature). Also add VerifyRecover tests. It
appears 5824cc298174d462c827cd090675e30fc03f0caf added support for
VerifyRecover, but forgot to add the test data.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1474
David Benjamin [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 19:48:56 +0000 (15:48 -0400)]
Make RSA_sign.pod less confusing.
PKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as "PKCS #1 v1.5" after an earlier
document which specified it. This gets further confusing because the
document PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms,
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
Refer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find
anyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1474
David Benjamin [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 17:35:17 +0000 (13:35 -0400)]
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified.
RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode
the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key
operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal.
OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding
round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient
laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html
Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme,
this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This
avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy
ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations
which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature
producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and
accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a
responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical.
In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and
security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not
here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so
this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL
releases.
See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00
As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this
version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces
digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath
wasn't quite doing this right.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1474
Matt Caswell [Thu, 27 Oct 2016 09:46:25 +0000 (10:46 +0100)]
Partial revert of "Fix client verify mode to check SSL_VERIFY_PEER"
This partially reverts commit c636c1c47. It also tweaks the documentation
and comments in this area. On the client side the documented interface for
SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() is that setting the flag
SSL_VERIFY_PEER causes verfication of the server certificate to take place.
Previously what was implemented was that if *any* flag was set then
verification would take place. The above commit improved the semantics to
be as per the documented interface.
However, we have had a report of at least one application where an
application was incorrectly using the interface and used *only*
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT on the client side. In OpenSSL prior to
the above commit this still caused verification of the server certificate
to take place. After this commit the application silently failed to verify
the server certificate.
Ideally SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() could be modified to indicate
if invalid flags were being used. However these are void functions!
The simplest short term solution is to revert to the previous behaviour
which at least means we "fail closed" rather than "fail open".
Thanks to Cory Benfield for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>