Baptiste Jonglez [Mon, 30 Oct 2017 13:38:19 +0000 (14:38 +0100)]
afalg: Use eventfd2 syscall instead of eventfd
The eventfd syscall is deprecated and is not available on aarch64, causing
build to fail:
engines/e_afalg.c: In function 'eventfd':
engines/e_afalg.c:108:20: error: '__NR_eventfd' undeclared (first use in this function)
return syscall(__NR_eventfd, n);
^
Instead, switch to the newer eventfd2 syscall, which is supposed to be
supported by all architectures.
This kind of issues would be avoided by simply using the eventfd(2)
wrapper from the libc, but there must be subtle reasons not to...
Tested on a aarch64 system running OpenSUSE Leap 42.1 (gcc118 from
https://cfarm.tetaneutral.net/machines/list/ ) and also cross-compiling
for aarch64 with LEDE (kernel 4.9).
This properly fixes #1685.
CLA: trivial Fixes: 7f458a48 ("ALG: Add AFALG engine") Signed-off-by: Baptiste Jonglez <git@bitsofnetworks.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4618)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 20 Oct 2017 16:11:03 +0000 (17:11 +0100)]
Don't use strcasecmp and strncasecmp for IA5 strings
The functions strcasecmp() and strncasecmp() will use locale specific rules
when performing comparison. This could cause some problems in certain
locales. For example in the Turkish locale an 'I' character is not the
uppercase version of 'i'. However IA5 strings should not use locale specific
rules, i.e. for an IA5 string 'I' is uppercase 'i' even if using the
Turkish locale.
This fixes a bug in name constraints checking reported by Thomas Pornin
(NCCGroup).
This is not considered a security issue because it would require both a
Turkish locale (or other locale with similar issues) and malfeasance by
a trusted name-constrained CA for a certificate to pass name constraints
in error. The constraints also have to be for excluded sub-trees which are
extremely rare. Failure to match permitted subtrees is a bug, not a
vulnerability.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4569)
Paul Yang [Mon, 23 Oct 2017 17:35:31 +0000 (01:35 +0800)]
Fix doc-nits in doc/man3/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod
<compar> to <compare> to match the var name in function prototype
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4559)
Richard Levitte [Tue, 24 Oct 2017 16:32:22 +0000 (18:32 +0200)]
asn1_item_embed_new(): if locking failed, don't call asn1_item_embed_free()
asn1_item_embed_free() will try unlocking and fail in this case, and
since the new item was just allocated on the heap, free it directly
with OPENSSL_free() instead.
Richard Levitte [Tue, 24 Oct 2017 11:39:04 +0000 (13:39 +0200)]
asn1_item_embed_new(): don't free an embedded item
The previous change with this intention didn't quite do it. An
embedded item must not be freed itself, but might potentially contain
non-embedded elements, which must be freed.
So instead of calling ASN1_item_ex_free(), where we can't pass the
embed flag, we call asn1_item_embed_free() directly.
This changes asn1_item_embed_free() from being a static function to
being a private non-static function.
Matt Caswell [Wed, 18 Oct 2017 13:07:57 +0000 (14:07 +0100)]
Don't make any changes to the lhash structure if we are going to fail
The lhash expand() function can fail if realloc fails. The previous
implementation made changes to the structure and then attempted to do a
realloc. If the realloc failed then it attempted to undo the changes it
had just made. Unfortunately changes to lh->p were not undone correctly,
ultimately causing subsequent expand() calls to increment num_nodes to a
value higher than num_alloc_nodes, which can cause out-of-bounds reads/
writes. This is not considered a security issue because an attacker cannot
cause realloc to fail.
This commit moves the realloc call to near the beginning of the function
before any other changes are made to the lhash structure. That way if a
failure occurs we can immediately fail without having to undo anything.
Thanks to Pavel Kopyl (Samsung) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4550)
Xiangyu Bu [Wed, 18 Oct 2017 00:10:53 +0000 (17:10 -0700)]
Fix memory leak in GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4544)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 18 Oct 2017 09:23:33 +0000 (10:23 +0100)]
Correct value for BN_security_bits()
The function BN_security_bits() uses the values from SP800-57 to assign
security bit values for different FF key sizes. However the value for 192
security bits is wrong. SP800-57 has it as 7680 but the code had it as
7690.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4546)
Patrick Steuer [Fri, 20 Oct 2017 18:51:05 +0000 (20:51 +0200)]
s390x assembly pack: define OPENSSL_s390xcap_P in s390xcap.c
Remove all .comm definitions from the asm modules.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4563)
Jakub Jelen [Fri, 20 Oct 2017 13:41:43 +0000 (15:41 +0200)]
ECDSA_* is deprecated. EC_KEY_* is used instead
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4561)
(cherry picked from commit 9b02dc97e4963969da69675a871dbe80e6d31cda)
An instruction's QUERY function is executed at initialization, iff the required
MSA level is installed. Therefore, it is sufficient to check the bits returned
by the QUERY functions. The MSA level does not have to be checked at every
function call.
crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl: The AES key schedule must be computed if the
required KM or KMC function codes are not available. Formally, the availability
of a KMC function code does not imply the availability of the corresponding KM
function code.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4501)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4501)
Ben Kaduk [Fri, 13 Oct 2017 00:20:07 +0000 (19:20 -0500)]
Skip ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf for no-tls1_2
The second set of tests in that configuration uses the AES-SHA256
ciphers, which are only available for TLS 1.2. Thus, when TLS 1.2
is disabled, there are no ciphers available and the handshake fails
with an internal error. Apply the same treatment as for
13-fragmentation.conf, which uses the same ciphers.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4526)
Add an ENGINE to EVP_PKEY structure which can be used for cryptographic
operations: this will typically be used by an HSM key to redirect calls
to a custom EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4503)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 27 Sep 2017 10:13:47 +0000 (11:13 +0100)]
Ensure we test all parameters for BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
RSA_setup_blinding() calls BN_BLINDING_create_param() which later calls
BN_mod_exp() as follows:
BN_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx)
ret->mod will have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set, but ret->e does not. In
BN_mod_exp() we only test the third param for the existence of this flag.
We should test all the inputs.
Thanks to Samuel Weiser (samuel.weiser@iaik.tugraz.at) for reporting this
issue.
This typically only happens once at key load, so this is unlikely to be
exploitable in any real scenario.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4477)
Mouse [Mon, 9 Oct 2017 02:47:02 +0000 (22:47 -0400)]
Fix parameter name, for common aesthetics and to silence IDE warnings.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4494)
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 25 Nov 2016 16:05:30 +0000 (17:05 +0100)]
Test mac-then-encrypt
Verify that the encrypt-then-mac negotiation is handled
correctly. Additionally, when compiled with no-asm, this test ensures
coverage for the constant-time MAC copying code in
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac. The proxy-based CBC padding test covers that as
well but it's nevertheless better to have an explicit handshake test
for mac-then-encrypt.
Bernd Edlinger [Mon, 2 Oct 2017 15:24:17 +0000 (17:24 +0200)]
Fix the return type of felem_is_zero_int which should be int.
Change argument type of xxxelem_is_zero_int to const void*
to avoid the need of type casts.
Fixes #4413
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4450)
David Benjamin [Mon, 18 Sep 2017 20:51:56 +0000 (16:51 -0400)]
Guard against DoS in name constraints handling.
This guards against the name constraints check consuming large amounts
of CPU time when certificates in the presented chain contain an
excessive number of names (specifically subject email names or subject
alternative DNS names) and/or name constraints.
Name constraints checking compares the names presented in a certificate
against the name constraints included in a certificate higher up in the
chain using two nested for loops.
Move the name constraints check so that it happens after signature
verification so peers cannot exploit this using a chain with invalid
signatures. Also impose a hard limit on the number of name constraints
check loop iterations to further mitigate the issue.
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4411)
David Benjamin [Mon, 18 Sep 2017 15:58:24 +0000 (11:58 -0400)]
Allow DH_set0_key with only private key.
The pub_key field for DH isn't actually used in DH_compute_key at all.
(Note the peer public key is passed in as as BIGNUM.) It's mostly there
so the caller may extract it from DH_generate_key. It doesn't
particularly need to be present if filling in a DH from external
parameters.
The check in DH_set0_key conflicts with adding OpenSSL 1.1.0 to Node.
Their public API is a thin wrapper over the old OpenSSL one:
https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#crypto_class_diffiehellman
They have separate setPrivateKey and setPublicKey methods, so the public
key may be set last or not at all. In 1.0.2, either worked fine since
operations on DH objects generally didn't use the public key. (Like
with OpenSSL, Node's setPublicKey method is also largely a no-op, but so
it goes.) In 1.1.0, DH_set0_key prevents create a private-key-only DH
object.
Fix 'key' option in s_server can be in ENGINE keyform
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4405)
David Benjamin [Mon, 18 Sep 2017 19:58:41 +0000 (15:58 -0400)]
Fix overflow in c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING.
c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING takes length as a long but uses it as an int. Check
bounds before doing so. Previously, excessively large inputs to the
function could write a single byte outside the target buffer. (This is
unreachable as asn1_ex_c2i already uses int for the length.)
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4385)
Christian Heimes [Thu, 14 Sep 2017 07:28:39 +0000 (09:28 +0200)]
Provide getters for min/max proto version
OpenSSL 1.1.0 made SSL_CTX and SSL structs opaque and introduced a new
API to set the minimum and maximum protocol version for SSL_CTX with
TLS_method(). Add getters to introspect the configured versions:
int SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_get_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_get_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
NOTE: The getters do not resolv the version in case when the minimum or
maxium version are configured as '0' (meaning auto-select lowest and
highst version number).
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <christian@python.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(cherry picked from commit 3edabd3ccb7aac89af5a63cfb2378e33a8be05d7)
Updated for new manual page location and TLS 1.3.
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4376)
Benjamin Kaduk [Tue, 9 May 2017 23:39:50 +0000 (18:39 -0500)]
Error out when forcing an unsupported TLS version
If the result of a SSL_{CTX_,}set_{min,max}_proto_version() call
leaves the min and max version identical, and support for that version
is compiled out of the library, return an error. Such an object has
no hope of successfully completing a handshake, and this error may
be easier to decipher than the resulting handshake failure.
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Sep 2017 10:20:27 +0000 (11:20 +0100)]
Allow an endpoint to read the alert data before closing the socket
If an alert gets sent and then we close the connection immediately with
data still in the input buffer then a TCP-RST gets sent. Some OSs
immediately abandon data in their input buffer if a TCP-RST is received -
meaning the alert data itself gets ditched. Sending a TCP-FIN before the
TCP-RST seems to avoid this.
This was causing test failures in MSYS2 builds.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4333)
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 30 Aug 2017 23:09:48 +0000 (01:09 +0200)]
crypto/cryptlib.c: mask more capability bits upon FXSR bit flip.
OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod discusses possibility to disable operations on
XMM register bank. This formally means that this flag has to be checked
in combination with other flags. But it customarily isn't. But instead
of chasing all the cases we can flip more bits together with FXSR one.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4303)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 31 Aug 2017 09:35:25 +0000 (11:35 +0200)]
util/mkdef.pl: handle line terminators correctly
When parsing the header files, mkdef.pl didn't clear the line
terminator properly. In most cases, this didn't matter, but there
were moments when this caused parsing errors (such as CRLFs in certain
cases).
Fixes #4267
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4304)
Rich Salz [Wed, 23 Aug 2017 16:06:41 +0000 (12:06 -0400)]
Tweak wording to be more clear.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4234)
(cherry picked from commit a130950df92abf7dd787b000403da02af8f41c2d)
David von Oheimb [Wed, 16 Aug 2017 18:00:05 +0000 (14:00 -0400)]
Fix OCSP_basic_verify() cert chain construction in case bs->certs is NULL
Now the certs arg is not any more neglected when building the signer cert chain.
Added case to test/recipes/80-test_ocsp.t proving fix for 3-level CA hierarchy.
See also http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=4620
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4124)
Todd Short [Thu, 13 Jul 2017 14:47:16 +0000 (10:47 -0400)]
Reorder extensions to put SigAlgs last
WebSphere application server cannot handle having an empty
extension (e.g. EMS/EtM) as the last extension in a client hello.
This moves the SigAlgs extension last (before any padding) for TLSv1.2
to avoid this issue.
Force the padding extension to a minimum length of 1.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3927)
Xiaoyin Liu [Sat, 5 Aug 2017 06:31:04 +0000 (02:31 -0400)]
Add missing HTML tag in www_body in s_server.c
In the generated HTML document, the `<pre>` tag is not closed. This patch
also has a trivial code-style improvement, unrelated to the bug fix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4088)
Xiaoyin Liu [Fri, 4 Aug 2017 05:10:41 +0000 (01:10 -0400)]
Fix typo in files in crypto folder
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #4093
(cherry picked from commit c9a41d7dd631a69b73bea8af714a3a8b872b8309)
Remove the obsolete misleading comment and code related to it.
The comment "The following should not return 1, otherwise, things
are very strange" is from the very first commit of OpenSSL. The
really meaning of the comment is if the identical session can be
found from internal cache after calling get_session_cb but not
found before calling get_session_cb, it is just strange.
The value 1 was originated from the old doc of SSLeay, reversed
from the actual return value of SSL_CTX_add_session().
Anyway either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() should not
interrupt the session resumption process. So the checking of
return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() is not necessary.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4014)