Andy Polyakov [Fri, 8 Nov 2013 22:00:35 +0000 (23:00 +0100)]
engines/ccgost/gost89.h: make word32 defintion unconditional.
Original definition depended on __LONG_MAX__ that is not guaranteed to
be present. As we don't support platforms with int narrower that 32 bits
it's appropriate to make defition inconditional.
Based on a suggested workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771):
if the TLS Client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less
that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512.
To enable it use an unused extension number (for example 0x4242) using
e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_wtf=0x4242
DTLS/SCTP requires DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks to be protected with
SCTP-AUTH. It is checked if this has been activated successfully for
the local and remote peer. Due to a bug, however, the
gauth_number_of_chunks field of the authchunks struct is missing on
FreeBSD, and was therefore not considered in the OpenSSL implementation.
This patch sets the corresponding pointer for the check correctly
whether or not this bug is present.
(cherry picked from commit f596e3c491035fe80db5fc0c3ff6b647662b0003)
With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key. Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
(cherry picked from commit 9fb523adce6fd6015b68da2ca8e4ac4900ac2be2)
Piotr Sikora [Fri, 1 Nov 2013 21:35:46 +0000 (21:35 +0000)]
Fix SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
Don't require a public key in tls1_set_ec_id if compression status is
not needed. This fixes a bug where SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE wouldn't work.
(cherry picked from commit 5ff68e8f6dac3b0d8997b8bc379f9111c2bab74f)
Lubomir Rintel [Mon, 21 Oct 2013 09:03:02 +0000 (11:03 +0200)]
POD: Fix list termination
This fixes problems in POD list formatting: extra or missing =back
sequences.
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod around line 90: =back without =over
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod around line 73: =back without =over
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod around line 82: =back without =over
doc/crypto/evp.pod around line 40: '=item' outside of any '=over'
crypto/des/des.pod around line 184: You forgot a '=back' before '=head1'
Lubomir Rintel [Mon, 21 Oct 2013 09:03:01 +0000 (11:03 +0200)]
POD: Fix item numbering
Newer pod2man considers =item [1-9] part of a numbered list, while =item
0 starts an unnumbered list. Add a zero effect formatting mark to override
this.
doc/apps/smime.pod around line 315: Expected text after =item, not a
number
...
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 12 Oct 2013 20:10:28 +0000 (22:10 +0200)]
evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha*.c: limit multi-block fragmentation to 1KB.
Excessive fragmentation put additional burden (of addtional MAC
calculations) on the other size and limiting fragments it to 1KB
limits the overhead to ~6%.
Bodo Moeller [Tue, 17 Sep 2013 07:48:23 +0000 (09:48 +0200)]
Move the change note for partial chain verification: this is code from
the main branch (http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=19322) later added
to the 1.0.2 branch (http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=23113), and
thus not a change "between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0".
Bodo Moeller [Mon, 16 Sep 2013 10:59:21 +0000 (12:59 +0200)]
Fix overly lenient comparisons:
- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
which could be misused.)
- EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
equality (not an error).
projects / openssl / log