Rashmica Gupta [Tue, 7 May 2019 02:42:59 +0000 (12:42 +1000)]
crypto/ppccap.c: Fix which hwcap value used to check for HWCAP_ARCH_3_00
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8889)
This change allows to pass the authentication tag after specifying
the AAD in CCM mode. This is already true for the other two supported
AEAD modes (GCM and OCB) and it seems appropriate to match the
behavior.
GCM and OCB also support to set the tag at any point before the call
to `EVP_*Final`, but this won't work for CCM due to a restriction
imposed by section 2.6 of RFC3610: The tag must be set before
actually decrypting data.
This commit also adds a test case for setting the tag after supplying
plaintext length and AAD.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7243)
Test: use keywords instead of magic numbers for 'rsa_pss_saltlen'
Since commit 137096a7ead it is possible to specify keywords instead
of negative magic numbers for the salt length. This commit replaces
the remaining occurrences of `rsa_pss_saltlen:-3` in the test recipes
by `rsa_pss_saltlen:max`.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8860)
Wojciech Kaluza [Sun, 21 Apr 2019 11:39:20 +0000 (12:39 +0100)]
Allow setting RCFLAGS as Configure option or environment variable
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8803)
Wojciech Kaluza [Sun, 21 Apr 2019 11:14:34 +0000 (12:14 +0100)]
Add RCFLAGS variable in Windows build file, and use it
- Allow user-defined RCFLAGS
- Pass RCFLAGS to RC
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8803)
Pauli [Wed, 24 Apr 2019 01:24:11 +0000 (11:24 +1000)]
Statistically test BN_rand_range().
Add a Chi^2 goodness of fit test to empirically provide a degree of confidence
in the uniformity of the output of the random range generation function.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8818)
Enforce a strict output length check in CRYPTO_ccm128_tag
Return error if the output tag buffer size doesn't match
the tag size exactly. This prevents the caller from
using that portion of the tag buffer that remains
uninitialized after an otherwise succesfull call to
CRYPTO_ccm128_tag.
Bug found by OSS-Fuzz.
Fix suggested by Kurt Roeckx.
Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8810)
Jakub Jelen [Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:09:45 +0000 (16:09 +0200)]
doc: Get rid of unrelated reference to DSA_new()
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8786)
Richard Levitte [Tue, 23 Apr 2019 07:41:19 +0000 (09:41 +0200)]
Configure: make disabling stuff easier and safer
Disabling one thing may mean having to disable other things as well.
We already have a process to auto-disable things through cascading,
but that was under-used.
Making the cascading mechanism available through a function to be
called to disable stuff makes it more automatic, and helps us when we
forget how different disabling options affect others.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8812)
Richard Levitte [Tue, 23 Apr 2019 07:24:38 +0000 (09:24 +0200)]
Configure: merge all of %user and %useradd into %config earlier
This came about with the realisation that upper case CFLAGS, LDFLAGS
and so on aren't treated much after that, and this makes figuring out
user added flags significantly easier, just look in %config.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8812)
Check if num is 0 before trying to malloc memory. Otherwise for client hellos without extensions SSL_client_hello_get1_extensions_present will return MALLOC_FAILURE.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8756)
Richard Levitte [Mon, 15 Apr 2019 11:15:55 +0000 (13:15 +0200)]
asn1parse: avoid double free
|str| was used for multiple conflicting purposes. When using
'-strictpem', it's used to uniquely hold a reference to the loaded
payload. However, when using '-strparse', |str| was re-used to hold
the position from where to start parsing.
So when '-strparse' and '-strictpem' are were together, |str| ended up
pointing into data pointed at by |at|, and was yet being freed, with
the result that the payload it held a reference to became a memory
leak, and there was a double free conflict when both |str| and |at|
were being freed.
The situation is resolved by always having |buf| hold the pointer to
the file data, and always and only use |str| to hold the position to
start parsing from. Now, we only need to free |buf| properly and not
|str|.
Fixes #8752
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8753)
Further harmonisation of manual page HISTORY sections
A couple of minor tweaks to match the style introduced in #7854:
- BIO_connect: remove line break to make more grep friendly
- SSL_CTX_new: harmoise the format of the HISTORY section
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 938e82f622eb04ebbfe534c79d234d0f6a0df035)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8736)
Update various man pages to place HISTORY section after SEE ALSO
SEE ALSO before HISTORY is the more common pattern in OpenSSL manual
pages and seems to be the prevalent order based on sampling my system
manual pages.
Fixes #8631
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5c4bbbe54e112b976155004b3d702e47ce7d9d9)
Add a check for history section location to find-doc-nits
Check that the HISTORY section is located after the SEE ALSO section,
this is a much more frequent order in OpenSSL manual pages (and UNIX
manual pages in general).
Also check that SEE ALSO comes after EXAMPLES, so that the tool can
ensure the correct manual section sequence.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 573ac8f2228241771f727ecd8ff10f54073536d3)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8736)
Make check_example_location() in find-doc-nits generic
Change to check_section_location(), a generic function to ensure that
section SECTION appears before section BEFORE in the man pages.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 95f92d57755a9bfc83135a585da69d497f7293d9)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8736)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8736)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8736)
Don't use coordinate blinding when scalar is group order
This happens in ec_key_simple_check_key and EC_GROUP_check.
Since the the group order is not a secret scalar, it is
unnecessary to use coordinate blinding.
Fixes: #8731 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8734)
Fixed linux_x86_icc compiler errors in EC code related to __uint128_t/__int128_t
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8697)
Jakub Wilk [Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:00:20 +0000 (12:00 +0200)]
Fix typos
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8714)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 4 Apr 2019 23:22:14 +0000 (01:22 +0200)]
EVP_*Update: ensure that input NULL with length 0 isn't passed
Even with custome ciphers, the combination in == NULL && inl == 0
should not be passed down to the backend cipher function. The reason
is that these are the values passed by EVP_*Final, and some of the
backend cipher functions do check for these to see if a "final" call
is made.
Fixes #8675
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8676)
Richard Levitte [Mon, 1 Apr 2019 04:40:33 +0000 (06:40 +0200)]
Rework DSO API conditions and configuration option
'no-dso' is meaningless, as it doesn't get any macro defined.
Therefore, we remove all checks of OPENSSL_NO_DSO. However, there may
be some odd platforms with no DSO scheme. For those, we generate the
internal macro DSO_NONE aand use it.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8622)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 8 Apr 2019 10:22:37 +0000 (11:22 +0100)]
Fix crash in X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject
If using a custom X509_LOOKUP_METHOD then calls to
X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject may crash due to an incorrectly initialised
X509_OBJECT being passed to the callback get_by_subject function.
Fixes #8673
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8698)
Dan Campbell [Thu, 4 Apr 2019 21:15:33 +0000 (15:15 -0600)]
s_client starttls: fix handling of multiline reply
Fixes #8645
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8654)
It was assumed that the config functionality returned a boolean.
However, it may return a negative number on error, so we need to take
that into account.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8679)
Tomas Mraz [Thu, 21 Mar 2019 12:17:29 +0000 (13:17 +0100)]
Use AI_ADDRCONFIG hint with getaddrinfo if available.
This prevents failure of openssl s_server socket binding to wildcard
address on hosts with disabled IPv6.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8550)
rand_win.c: loosen version requirements for BCryptGenRandom
BCryptGenRandom() is available for Windows Vista and newer versions, see
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptgenrandom
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8639)
Soujyu Tanaka [Wed, 27 Mar 2019 08:30:47 +0000 (17:30 +0900)]
For the lack of GetModuleHandleEx(), we use DSO route for WinCE.
Revert win32_pathbyaddr() which is used in DSO_dsobyaddr().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)
Soujyu Tanaka [Wed, 27 Mar 2019 07:21:58 +0000 (16:21 +0900)]
Circumvent a problem of lacking GetEnvironmentVariable() in WindowsCE.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)
Soujyu Tanaka [Wed, 27 Mar 2019 07:15:31 +0000 (16:15 +0900)]
Avoid linking error for InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount().
Replace it with InitializeCriticalSection()
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)
Soujyu Tanaka [Wed, 27 Mar 2019 06:55:32 +0000 (15:55 +0900)]
Avoid linking error on WCE700 for _InterlockedExchangeAdd().
This implementation is referenced to https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_69_0/boost/detail/interlocked.hpp
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)
Jake Massimo [Wed, 27 Mar 2019 04:13:08 +0000 (04:13 +0000)]
Increase rounds of Miller-Rabin testing DH_check
DH_check is used to test the validity of Diffie-Hellman parameter sets (p, q, g). Among the tests performed are primality tests on p and q, for this BN_is_prime_ex is called with the rounds of Miller-Rabin set as default. This will therefore use the average case error estimates derived from the function BN_prime_checks_for_size based on the bit size of the number tested.
However, these bounds are only accurate on testing random input. Within this testing scenario, where we are checking the validity of a DH parameter set, we can not assert that these parameters are randomly generated. Thus we must treat them as if they are adversarial in nature and increase the rounds of Miller-Rabin performed.
Generally, each round of Miller-Rabin can declare a composite number prime with probability at most (1/4), thus 64 rounds is sufficient in thwarting known generation techniques (even in safe prime settings - see https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/032 for full analysis). The choice of 64 rounds is also consistent with SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 as used in srp_Verify_N_and_g in openssl/apps/s_client.c.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8593)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 26 Mar 2019 15:25:15 +0000 (15:25 +0000)]
Tolerate 0 byte input length for Update functions
We treat that as automatic success. Other EVP_*Update functions already do
this (e.g. EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptUpdate etc). EVP_EncodeUpdate is
a bit of an anomoly. That treats 0 byte input length as an error.
Fixes #8576
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8587)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8421)
Bernd Edlinger [Wed, 20 Mar 2019 21:02:58 +0000 (22:02 +0100)]
Modify the RSA_private_decrypt functions to check the padding in
constant time with a memory access pattern that does not depend
on secret information.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8543)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8526)
Reorganized signature-scheme detection in 'apps/s_cb.c:security_callback_debug' callback-function.
So far, it only handled hash-and-algorithm pairs from TLS1.2,
now it also handles 'schemes' defined in TLS1.3 like 0x0807=ed25519 or
0x0809=rsa_pss_pss_sha256
Now it prints information in one of these formats:
Richard Levitte [Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:18:13 +0000 (10:18 +0100)]
OPENSSL_config(): restore error agnosticism
Great effort has been made to make initialization more configurable.
However, the behavior of OPENSSL_config() was lost in the process,
having it suddenly generate errors it didn't previously, which is not
how it's documented to behave.
A simple setting of default flags fixes this problem.
Fixes #8528
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8533)
Shane Lontis [Tue, 19 Mar 2019 22:13:55 +0000 (08:13 +1000)]
Updated doc for BN_clear, BN_CTX_end when param is NULL
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8532)
Vitezslav Cizek [Tue, 5 Mar 2019 21:52:33 +0000 (22:52 +0100)]
apps/speed.c: properly address NO_EC2M on systems without SIGALRM
The ecdh_c array is allocated of the same size as ecdh_choices,
whose size depends on whether the support for binary curves is enabled
or not. (The same goes for ecdsa_c).
On systems without SIGALRM, ecdh_c is indexed by predefined constants
intended for representing the index of the ciphers in the ecdh_choices
array.
However, in case of NO_EC2M some of the #defined constants won't match
and would actually access the ecdh_c out-of-bounds.
Use enum instead of a macro to define the curve indexes so they're
within the bounds of the ecdh_c array.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8422)
Vitezslav Cizek [Tue, 5 Mar 2019 16:14:33 +0000 (17:14 +0100)]
apps/speed.c: skip binary curves when compiling with OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
openssl speed doesn't take into account that the library could be
compiled without the support for the binary curves and happily uses
them, which results in EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() errors.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8422)
The indentation in the Configure file is currently very strange when
viewed in an editor with a tab width of four spaces, because it has
mixed tab-and-whitespace indentation, which was apparently done with
a tab width of eight spaces.
This commit converts all tabs to spaces using expand(1) with default
settings. To verify that there are only whitespace changes, use
git show --ignore-space-change <this commit>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8512)
Hua Zhang [Wed, 13 Mar 2019 06:28:44 +0000 (14:28 +0800)]
Fix compiling error for mips32r6 and mips64r6
There are some compiling errors for mips32r6 and mips64r6:
crypto/bn/bn-mips.S:56: Error: opcode not supported on this processor: mips2 (mips2) `mulu $1,$12,$7'
crypto/mips_arch.h: Assembler messages:
crypto/mips_arch.h:15: Error: junk at end of line, first unrecognized character is `&'
Signed-off-by: Hua Zhang <hua.zhang1974@hotmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8464)
Shane Lontis [Mon, 18 Mar 2019 23:58:09 +0000 (09:58 +1000)]
Added NULL check to BN_clear() & BN_CTX_end()
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8518)
Daniel Axtens [Sun, 17 Mar 2019 23:22:44 +0000 (10:22 +1100)]
PPC assembly pack: fix copy-paste error in CTR mode
There are two copy-paste errors in handling CTR mode. When dealing
with a 2 or 3 block tail, the code branches to the CBC decryption exit
path, rather than to the CTR exit path.
This can lead to data corruption: in the Linux kernel we have a copy
of this file, and the bug leads to corruption of the IV, which leads
to data corruption when we call the encryption function again later to
encrypt subsequent blocks.
Originally reported to the Linux kernel by Ondrej Mosnáček <omosnacek@gmail.com>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8510)
Shane Lontis [Mon, 18 Mar 2019 00:39:07 +0000 (10:39 +1000)]
coverity fixes for bntest.c
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8508)
VMS: only use the high precision on VMS v8.4 and up
Fixes #8487
Amends #7230
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8488)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 12 Mar 2019 10:21:39 +0000 (10:21 +0000)]
Fix memory leaks in pkread.c demo file
Also make various changes to bring the file into line with current coding
style.
Fixes #8456
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8457)
Shane Lontis [Wed, 6 Mar 2019 02:57:09 +0000 (12:57 +1000)]
fix truncation of integers on 32bit AIX
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8417)
A. Schulze [Sat, 9 Mar 2019 18:05:31 +0000 (19:05 +0100)]
Fix two spelling errors
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8447)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 6 Mar 2019 11:51:28 +0000 (11:51 +0000)]
Add a test for underflow in ecp_nistp521.c
The previous commit fixed an underflow that may occur in ecp_nistp521.c.
This commit adds a test for that condition. It is heavily based on an
original test harness by Billy Brumley.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Mar 2019 13:26:45 +0000 (13:26 +0000)]
Avoid an underflow in ecp_nistp521.c
The function felem_diff_128_64 in ecp_nistp521.c substracts the number |in|
from |out| mod p. In order to avoid underflow it first adds 32p mod p
(which is equivalent to 0 mod p) to |out|. The comments and variable naming
suggest that the original author intended to add 64p mod p. In fact it
has been shown that with certain unusual co-ordinates it is possible to
cause an underflow in this function when only adding 32p mod p while
performing a point double operation. By changing this to 64p mod p the
underflow is avoided.
It turns out to be quite difficult to construct points that satisfy the
underflow criteria although this has been done and the underflow
demonstrated. However none of these points are actually on the curve.
Finding points that satisfy the underflow criteria and are also *on* the
curve is considered significantly more difficult. For this reason we do
not believe that this issue is currently practically exploitable and
therefore no CVE has been assigned.
This only impacts builds using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 Configure
option.
With thanks to Bo-Yin Yang, Billy Brumley and Dr Liu for their significant
help in investigating this issue.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:41:27 +0000 (15:41 +0000)]
Update ChaCha20-Poly1305 documentation
Correctly describe the maximum IV length.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:51:07 +0000 (14:51 +0000)]
Test an overlong ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000 (14:39 +0000)]
Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected.
Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
CVE-2019-1543
Fixes #8345
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 1 Mar 2019 15:40:20 +0000 (15:40 +0000)]
Don't write the tick_identity to the session
Sessions must be immutable once they can be shared with multiple threads.
We were breaking that rule by writing the ticket index into it during the
handshake. This can lead to incorrect behaviour, including failed
connections in multi-threaded environments.
Reported by David Benjamin.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8383)
Vitezslav Cizek [Thu, 28 Feb 2019 12:47:18 +0000 (13:47 +0100)]
openssl_strerror_r: Fix handling of GNU strerror_r
GNU strerror_r may return either a pointer to a string that the function
stores in buf, or a pointer to some (immutable) static string in which case
buf is unused.
In such a case we need to set buf manually.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8371)
projects / openssl / log