Treat a zero length passed to ssleay_rand_add a no op: the existing logic
zeroes the md value which is very bad. OpenSSL itself never does this
internally and the actual call doesn't make sense as it would be passing
zero bytes of entropy.
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3)
Don't try and verify signatures if key is NULL (CVE-2013-0166)
Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.
(cherry picked from commit 66e8211c0b1347970096e04b18aa52567c325200)
Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including
sensible defaults based on bits of security.
The "parameters" which can be selected include: ciphersuites,
curves, key sizes, certificate signature algorithms, supported
signature algorithms, DH parameters, SSL/TLS version, session tickets
and compression.
In some cases prohibiting the use of a parameters will mean they are
not advertised to the peer: for example cipher suites and ECC curves.
In other cases it will abort the handshake: e.g DH parameters or the
peer key size.
Add auto DH parameter support. This is roughly equivalent to the
ECDH auto curve selection but for DH. An application can just call
SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 1);
and appropriate DH parameters will be used based on the size of the
server key.
Unlike ECDH there is no way a peer can indicate the range of DH parameters
it supports. Some peers cannot handle DH keys larger that 1024 bits for
example. In this case if you call:
SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 2);
Only 1024 bit DH parameters will be used.
If the server key is 7680 bits or more in size then 8192 bit DH parameters
will be used: these will be *very* slow.
The old export ciphersuites aren't supported but those are very
insecure anyway.
Don't clear verification errors from the error queue unless
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR is set.
If errors occur during verification and SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR
is set return 2 so applications can issue warnings.
(cherry picked from commit 2dd6976f6d02f98b30c376951ac38f780a86b3b5)
Some CMS SignedData structure use a signature algorithm OID such
as SHA1WithRSA instead of the RSA algorithm OID. Workaround this
case by tolerating the signature if we recognise the OID.
Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29)
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 7 Mar 2014 09:30:37 +0000 (10:30 +0100)]
SPARC T4 assembly pack: treat zero input length in CBC.
The problem is that OpenSSH calls EVP_Cipher, which is not as
protective as EVP_CipherUpdate. Formally speaking we ought to
do more checks in *_cipher methods, including rejecting
lengths not divisible by block size (unless ciphertext stealing
is in place). But for now I implement check for zero length in
low-level based on precedent.
Add option to set an alternative to the default hmacWithSHA1 PRF
for PKCS#8 private key encryptions. This is used automatically
by PKCS8_encrypt if the nid specified is a PRF.
Although the memory allocated by compression methods is fixed and
cannot grow over time it can cause warnings in some leak checking
tools. The function SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() will free
and zero the list of supported compression methods. This should
*only* be called in a single threaded context when an application
is shutting down to avoid interfering with existing contexts
attempting to look up compression methods.
(cherry picked from commit 976c58302b13d085edb3ab822f5eac4b2f1bff95)
Not all platforms define BN_ULLONG. Define SCTS_TIMESTAMP as a type
which should work on all platforms.
(cherry picked from commit 6634416732b94627eba1c47de3c3a6321a5458f0)
New flags to build certificate chains. The can be used to rearrange
the chain so all an application needs to do is add all certificates
in arbitrary order and then build the chain to check and correct them.
The flag SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING hasn't done anything since OpenSSL
0.9.7h but deleting it will break source compatibility with any software
that references it. Restore it but #define to zero.
(cherry picked from commit b17d6b8d1d49fa4732deff17cfd1833616af0d9c)
Kurt Roeckx [Mon, 23 Dec 2013 18:45:26 +0000 (19:45 +0100)]
Use defaults bits in req when not given
If you use "-newkey rsa" it's supposed to read the default number of bits from the
config file. However the value isn't used to generate the key, but it does
print it's generating such a key. The set_keygen_ctx() doesn't call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits() and you end up with the default set in
pkey_rsa_init() (1024). Afterwards the number of bits gets read from the config
file, but nothing is done with that anymore.
We now read the config first and use the value from the config file when no size
is given.
Scott Schaefer [Mon, 23 Dec 2013 18:01:38 +0000 (19:01 +0100)]
Document pkcs12 -password behavior
apps/pkcs12.c accepts -password as an argument. The document author
almost certainly meant to write "-password, -passin".
However, that is not correct, either. Actually the code treats
-password as equivalent to -passin, EXCEPT when -export is also
specified, in which case -password as equivalent to -passout.
Include TA in checks/callback with partial chains.
When a chain is complete and ends in a trusted root checks are also
performed on the TA and the callback notified with ok==1. For
consistency do the same for chains where the TA is not self signed.
projects / openssl / log