Adam Langley [Tue, 23 Apr 2013 19:12:36 +0000 (15:12 -0400)]
RT3065: ec_private_key_dont_crash
This change saves several EC routines from crashing when an EC_KEY is
missing a public key. The public key is optional in the EC private key
format and, without this patch, running the following through `openssl
ec` causes a crash:
Emilia Kasper [Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:18:07 +0000 (13:18 +0200)]
define inline for Visual Studio
In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a7370c775dc9fd6198dbacd1706cf242b)
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-2970 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Adam Langley [Fri, 6 Jun 2014 21:47:07 +0000 (14:47 -0700)]
Remove some duplicate DTLS code.
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.
Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:54:28 +0000 (23:54 +0100)]
Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.
Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.
Adam Langley [Fri, 6 Jun 2014 21:44:20 +0000 (14:44 -0700)]
Fix return code for truncated DTLS fragment.
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Adam Langley [Fri, 6 Jun 2014 21:30:33 +0000 (14:30 -0700)]
Fix memory leak from zero-length DTLS fragments.
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.
This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Fri, 6 Jun 2014 21:25:52 +0000 (14:25 -0700)]
Fix DTLS handshake message size checks.
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.
In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.
Fixes CVE-2014-3506
Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Adam Langley [Fri, 6 Jun 2014 21:19:21 +0000 (14:19 -0700)]
Avoid double free when processing DTLS packets.
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.
Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
We can't rename ssleay_rand_bytes to md_rand_bytes_lock as this will cause
an error code discrepancy. Instead keep ssleay_rand_bytes and add an
extra parameter: since ssleay_rand_bytes is not part of the public API
this wont cause any binary compatibility issues. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org >
Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.
By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test". Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961c4fbd27577fb519d9aea2dc788742715)
Tim Hudson [Mon, 21 Jul 2014 10:03:50 +0000 (20:03 +1000)]
Minor documentation update removing "really" and a
statement of opinion rather than a fact.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8d133e4b6f1ed1b7ad3c1a6d2c62f460e26c050)
PR#3456 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d48e78f0cf22aaddb563f4bcfccf25b1a45ac8a4)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 10 Jul 2014 22:47:31 +0000 (23:47 +0100)]
Fixed valgrind complaint due to BN_consttime_swap reading uninitialised data.
This is actually ok for this function, but initialised to zero anyway if
PURIFY defined.
This does have the impact of masking any *real* unitialised data reads in bn though.
Viktor Dukhovni [Mon, 7 Jul 2014 09:11:38 +0000 (19:11 +1000)]
Update API to use (char *) for email addresses and hostnames
Reduces number of silly casts in OpenSSL code and likely most
applications. Consistent with (char *) for "peername" value from
X509_check_host() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername().