From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2011 14:23:09 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: make timing attack protection unconditional
X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL-fips-2_0-rc1~186
X-Git-Url: https://granicus.if.org/sourcecode?a=commitdiff_plain;h=ff7231043f1f348764fdf3463e73cf7ed9d3ce85;p=openssl

make timing attack protection unconditional
---

diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
index 8b407c5470..acdeea83d4 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 			}
 		while (BN_is_zero(k));
 
-#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME
 		/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
 		 * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
 		 * bit-length. */
@@ -159,7 +158,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 		if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
 		if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
 			if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
-#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */
 
 		/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
 		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))