From: Todd C. Miller Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1999 15:20:48 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Add BUGS section X-Git-Tag: SUDO_1_6_0~128 X-Git-Url: https://granicus.if.org/sourcecode?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b7a10e7403a16bc690b675c764fb0ed02c180f70;p=sudo Add BUGS section --- diff --git a/sudo.cat b/sudo.cat index 00b7a5f43..d4c5a3f49 100644 --- a/sudo.cat +++ b/sudo.cat @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ OOOOPPPPTTTTIIIIOOOONNNNSSSS -1/Aug/1999 1.6 1 +17/Aug/1999 1.6 1 @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ RRRREEEETTTTUUUURRRRNNNN VVVVAAAALLLLUUUUEEEES -1/Aug/1999 1.6 2 +17/Aug/1999 1.6 2 @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ SSSSEEEECCCCUUUURRRRIIIITTTTYYYY NNNNOOOOTTTTE -1/Aug/1999 1.6 3 +17/Aug/1999 1.6 3 @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ AAAAUUUUTTTTHHHHOOOORRRRSSSS See the HISTORY file in the ssssuuuuddddoooo distribution for a short history of ssssuuuuddddoooo. +BBBBUUUUGGGGSSSS Please send all bugs, comments, and changes to sudo- bugs@courtesan.com. Be sure to include the version of ssssuuuuddddoooo you are using and the platform you are running it on. @@ -255,11 +256,10 @@ CCCCAAAAVVVVEEEEAAAATTTTSSSS shell regardless of any '!' elements in the user specification. - Running shell scripts via ssssuuuuddddoooo can expose the same kernel -1/Aug/1999 1.6 4 +17/Aug/1999 1.6 4 @@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ CCCCAAAAVVVVEEEEAAAATTTTSSSS SUDO(8) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS SUDO(8) + Running shell scripts via ssssuuuuddddoooo can expose the same kernel bugs that make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating systems. @@ -324,7 +325,6 @@ SSSSEEEEEEEE AAAALLLLSSSSOOOO - -1/Aug/1999 1.6 5 +17/Aug/1999 1.6 5 diff --git a/sudo.html b/sudo.html index 27e3175ab..7204aa2f0 100644 --- a/sudo.html +++ b/sudo.html @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
  • FILES
  • ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
  • AUTHORS +
  • BUGS
  • DISCLAIMER
  • CAVEATS
  • SEE ALSO @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@

    NAME

    -sudo - execute a command as the superuser +sudo - execute a command as another user


    @@ -44,22 +45,28 @@ sudo - execute a command as the superuser

    DESCRIPTION

    -sudo allows a permitted user to execute a command -as the superuser (real and effective uid and gid are set to 0 and root's group as set in the passwd file respectively). +sudo allows a permitted user to execute a command as the superuser or another user, as specified in the sudoers file. The +real and effective uid and gid are set to match those of the target user as +specified in the passwd file (the group vector is also initialized when the +target user is not root).

    sudo determines who is an authorized user by consulting the file /etc/sudoers. By giving sudo the -v flag a user can update the time stamp without running a command. The password prompt itself will also time out if the user's password is not -entered with N minutes (again, this is defined at installation time and +entered with N minutes (again, this is defined at configure time and defaults to 5 minutes).

    -If an unauthorized user executes sudo, mail will be sent from the user to the local authorities (defined at -installation time). +If a user that is not listed in the sudoers file tries to run a command via sudo, mail is sent to the proper authorities, as defined at configure time +(defaults to root). Note that the mail will not be sent if an unauthorized +user tries to run sudo with the -l or -v flags. This allows users to determine for themselves whether or not they +are allowed to use sudo.

    -sudo was designed to log via the 4.3 BSD syslog(3) facility but can -log to a file instead if so desired (or to both syslog and a file). +sudo can log both successful an unsuccessful attempts (as well as errors) to +syslog(3), a log file, or both. By default sudo +will log via syslog(3) but this is changeable at configure +time.


    @@ -83,7 +90,7 @@ The -h (help) option causes sudo to print
    -v

    -If given the -v (validate) option, sudo will update the user's timestamp file, prompting for the user's password if +If given the -v (validate) option, sudo will update the user's timestamp, prompting for the user's password if necessary. This extends the sudo timeout to for another N minutes (where N is defined at installation time and defaults to 5 minutes) but does not run a command. @@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ The -r (realm) option is only available if sudo-p

    The -p (prompt) option allows you to override the default password prompt and use a -custom one. If the password prompt contains the %u escape, %u will be replaced by the user's login name. Similarly, %h will be replaced by the local hostname. +custom one. If the password prompt contains the %u escape, %u will be replaced with the user's login name. Similarly, %h will be replaced with the local hostname.

    -u

    @@ -127,7 +134,7 @@ environment variable if it is set or the shell as specified in

    -H

    The -H (HOME) option sets the HOME environment variable to the homedir of the target user (root by default) as -specified in passwd(5). +specified in passwd(5). By default, sudo does not modify HOME.

    --

    @@ -141,13 +148,12 @@ conjunction with the -s flag.

    sudo quits with an exit value of 1 if there is a configuration/permission problem or if sudo cannot execute the given command. In the latter case the error string is -printed to stderr via perror(3). If sudo cannot stat(2) one or more entries in the user's PATH the -error is printed on stderr via perror(3). (If the directory -does not exist or if it is not really a directory, the entry is ignored and -no error is printed.) This should not happen under normal circumstances. -The most common reason for stat(3) to return ``permission -denied'' is if you are running an automounter and one of the directories in -your PATH is on a machine that is currently unreachable. +printed to stderr. If sudo cannot stat(2) one or more entries in the user's +PATH an error is printed on stderr. (If the directory does not exist or if it is +not really a directory, the entry is ignored and no error is printed.) This +should not happen under normal circumstances. The most common reason for +stat(2) to return ``permission denied'' is if you are running +an automounter and one of the directories in your PATH is on a machine that is currently unreachable.


    @@ -164,7 +170,7 @@ to all commands executed. sudo will also remove the IFS<

    To prevent command spoofing, sudo checks ``.'' and ``'' (both denoting current directory) last when searching for a command in the user's PATH (if one or both are in the PATH). Note, -however, that the actual PATH environment variable is not modified and is passed unchanged to the program that sudo executes. +however, that the actual PATH environment variable is not modified and is passed unchanged to the program that sudo executes.

    For security reasons, if your OS supports shared libraries and does not @@ -173,29 +179,30 @@ you should either use a linker option that disables this behavior or link sudo will check the ownership of its timestamp directory (/var/run/sudo or /tmp/.odus by default) and ignore the directory's contents if it is not owned by root -and only read, writable, and executable by root. On systems that allow -users to give files away to root (via chown), if the timestamp directory is -located in a directory writable by anyone (ie: /tmp), it is possible for a user to create the timestamp directory before sudo -is run. However, because sudo checks the ownership and mode of the directory, the only damage that can be -done is to ``hide'' files by putting them in the timestamp dir. This is -unlikely to happen since once the timestamp dir is owned by root and -inaccessible by any other user the user placing files there would be unable -to get them back out. To get around this issue you can use a directory that -is not world-writable for the timestamps (/var/adm/sudo for instance) or create /tmp/.odus with the appropriate owner (root) and +and only writable by root. On systems that allow non-root users to give +away files via chown(2), if the timestamp directory is located +in a directory writable by anyone (ie: /tmp), it is possible for a user to create the timestamp directory before sudo is run. However, because sudo checks the ownership and mode of the directory and its contents, the only +damage that can be done is to ``hide'' files by putting them in the +timestamp dir. This is unlikely to happen since once the timestamp dir is +owned by root and inaccessible by any other user the user placing files +there would be unable to get them back out. To get around this issue you +can use a directory that is not world-writable for the timestamps (/var/adm/sudo for instance) or create /tmp/.odus with the appropriate owner (root) and permissions (0700) in the system startup files.

    -sudo will not honor timestamp files set far in the future. Timestamp files with -a date greater than current_time + 2 * TIMEOUT +sudo will not honor timestamps set far in the future. Timestamps with a date +greater than current_time + 2 * TIMEOUT will be ignored and sudo will log and complain. This is done to keep a user -from creating his/her own timestamp file with a bogus date on system that -allow users to give away files. +from creating his/her own timestamp with a bogus date on system that allow +users to give away files.


    FILES

    -

     /etc/sudoers           file of authorized users.
    +
     /etc/sudoers           List of who can run what
    + /var/run/sudo          Directory containing timestamps
    + /tmp/.odus             Same as above if no /var/run exists
     


    @@ -205,9 +212,10 @@ allow users to give away files. SHELL Used to determine shell to run with -s option USER Set to the target user (root unless the -u option is specified) - HOME In -s mode, set to homedir of root (or runas user) - if built with the SHELL_SETS_HOME option - SUDO_PROMPT Replaces the default password prompt + HOME In -s or -H mode (or if sudo was configured with + the --enable-shell-sets-home option), set to + homedir of the target user. + SUDO_PROMPT Used as the default password prompt SUDO_COMMAND Set to the command run by sudo SUDO_USER Set to the login of the user who invoked sudo SUDO_UID Set to the uid of the user who invoked sudo @@ -227,18 +235,21 @@ Many people have worked on sudo over the years, this version co

    See the HISTORY file in the sudo distribution for a short history of sudo. +

    +


    +

    BUGS

    Please send all bugs, comments, and changes to sudo-bugs@courtesan.com. +HREF="mailto:sudo-bugs@courtesan.com.">sudo-bugs@courtesan.com. Be sure +to include the version of sudo you are using and the platform you are running it on.


    DISCLAIMER

    -This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT -ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or -FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the LICENSE file distributed with -sudo for more details. +Sudo is provided ``AS IS'' and any express or implied warranties, including, but +not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a +particular purpose are disclaimed. See the LICENSE file distributed with sudo for complete details.


    diff --git a/sudo.man b/sudo.man index 7399e44cc..c071564f1 100644 --- a/sudo.man +++ b/sudo.man @@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ ''' $RCSfile$$Revision$$Date$ ''' ''' $Log$ -''' Revision 1.34 1999/08/01 16:26:16 millert -''' regen +''' Revision 1.35 1999/08/17 15:20:48 millert +''' Add BUGS section ''' ''' .de Sh @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ .nr % 0 .rr F .\} -.TH SUDO 8 "1.6" "1/Aug/1999" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS" +.TH SUDO 8 "1.6" "17/Aug/1999" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS" .UC .if n .hy 0 .if n .na @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ version consists of code written primarily by: .Ve See the HISTORY file in the \fBsudo\fR distribution for a short history of \fBsudo\fR. -.PP +.SH "BUGS" Please send all bugs, comments, and changes to sudo-bugs@courtesan.com. Be sure to include the version of \fBsudo\fR you are using and the platform you are running it on. @@ -435,6 +435,8 @@ that make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating systems. .IX Header "AUTHORS" +.IX Header "BUGS" + .IX Header "DISCLAIMER" .IX Header "CAVEATS" diff --git a/sudo.pod b/sudo.pod index 5c4761e52..9c0eaa9d5 100644 --- a/sudo.pod +++ b/sudo.pod @@ -251,6 +251,8 @@ version consists of code written primarily by: See the HISTORY file in the B distribution for a short history of B. +=head1 BUGS + Please send all bugs, comments, and changes to sudo-bugs@courtesan.com. Be sure to include the version of B you are using and the platform you are running it on.