From: Bodo Möller Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 14:42:09 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Update X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_0_9_8d~9 X-Git-Url: https://granicus.if.org/sourcecode?a=commitdiff_plain;h=8fdb296cbdf0228b4c08aa5621ca394db5a9ce45;p=openssl Update --- diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index eaa579011e..01642e13e0 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted - as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too since we currently only + as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got + the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- @@ -991,7 +992,18 @@ differing sizes. [Richard Levitte] - Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit + ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" + will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar + ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that + "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the + SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining + changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. + [Bodo Moeller] + + Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]