From: Eike Rathke Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2015 16:45:41 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Allow short and long key ID user input in pgp_getkeybystr() X-Git-Url: https://granicus.if.org/sourcecode?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7efa208b10a4815b59c54a67b1e3a6777e7f3019;p=neomutt Allow short and long key ID user input in pgp_getkeybystr() The following did not work, e.g. when leaving a key list, and at the "Sign as" or "Encrypt to" prompt attempting to enter a key ID: * set pgp_long_ids=no * enter a long key ID, with or without leading 0x * set pgp_long_ids=yes * enter a short key ID without leading 0x Specifically entering a long key ID should always be possible as evil32.com has shown. This also cleans up the logic used to determine the matching condition, which was quite convoluted.. it even slightly speeds up the loop as less string operations are involved in the inner condition. This only changes how the result obtained from the pgp_* command line interface is filtered. --- diff --git a/pgp.c b/pgp.c index c0a5d8fa8..c8ac07fdb 100644 --- a/pgp.c +++ b/pgp.c @@ -117,11 +117,32 @@ int pgp_use_gpg_agent (void) return 1; } -char *pgp_keyid(pgp_key_t k) +static pgp_key_t _pgp_parent(pgp_key_t k) { if((k->flags & KEYFLAG_SUBKEY) && k->parent && option(OPTPGPIGNORESUB)) k = k->parent; + return k; +} + +char *pgp_long_keyid(pgp_key_t k) +{ + k = _pgp_parent(k); + + return k->keyid; +} + +char *pgp_short_keyid(pgp_key_t k) +{ + k = _pgp_parent(k); + + return k->keyid + 8; +} + +char *pgp_keyid(pgp_key_t k) +{ + k = _pgp_parent(k); + return _pgp_keyid(k); } diff --git a/pgp.h b/pgp.h index 2d98e14ed..7b60e1b3f 100644 --- a/pgp.h +++ b/pgp.h @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ const char *pgp_micalg (const char *fname); char *_pgp_keyid (pgp_key_t); char *pgp_keyid (pgp_key_t); +char *pgp_short_keyid (pgp_key_t); +char *pgp_long_keyid (pgp_key_t); int mutt_check_pgp (HEADER * h); diff --git a/pgpkey.c b/pgpkey.c index dcc8c76cb..26be753b6 100644 --- a/pgpkey.c +++ b/pgpkey.c @@ -932,6 +932,7 @@ pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, pgp_ring_t keyring) pgp_uid_t *a; short match; size_t l; + const char *ps, *pl; if ((l = mutt_strlen (p)) && p[l-1] == '!') p[l-1] = 0; @@ -945,6 +946,19 @@ pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, pgp_ring_t keyring) if (!keys) goto out; + /* User input may be short or long key ID, independent of OPTPGPLONGIDS. + * pgp_key_t->keyid should always contain a long key ID without 0x. + * Strip leading "0x" before loops so it doesn't have to be done over and + * over again, and prepare pl and ps to simplify logic in the loop's inner + * condition. + */ + pl = (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) ? p + 2 : p); + ps = (mutt_strlen (pl) == 16 ? pl + 8 : pl); + + /* If ps != pl it means a long ID (or name of 16 characters) was given, do + * not attempt to match short IDs then. Also, it is unnecessary to try to + * match pl against long IDs if ps == pl as pl could not be a long ID. */ + for (k = keys; k; k = kn) { kn = k->next; @@ -956,11 +970,10 @@ pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, pgp_ring_t keyring) for (a = k->address; a; a = a->next) { dprint (5, (debugfile, "pgp_getkeybystr: matching \"%s\" against key %s, \"%s\": ", - p, pgp_keyid (k), NONULL (a->addr))); - if (!*p || mutt_strcasecmp (p, pgp_keyid (k)) == 0 || - (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) && !mutt_strcasecmp (p + 2, pgp_keyid (k))) || - (option (OPTPGPLONGIDS) && !mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) && - !mutt_strcasecmp (p + 2, k->keyid + 8)) || + p, pgp_long_keyid (k), NONULL (a->addr))); + if (!*p || + (ps != pl && mutt_strcasecmp (pl, pgp_long_keyid (k)) == 0) || + (ps == pl && mutt_strcasecmp (ps, pgp_short_keyid (k)) == 0) || mutt_stristr (a->addr, p)) { dprint (5, (debugfile, "match.\n"));