From: Sami Kerola <kerolasa@iki.fi>
Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2012 16:19:15 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: smatch scan: fix various warningss found using smatch
X-Git-Tag: cronie1.4.11~10
X-Git-Url: https://granicus.if.org/sourcecode?a=commitdiff_plain;h=5cf2a3c05aa96daeb3ceaac67c3ba43a889916d6;p=cronie

smatch scan: fix various warningss found using smatch

entry.c:396 load_entry() info: redundant null check on e->pwd calling free()
entry.c:398 load_entry() info: redundant null check on e->cmd calling free()

/usr/include/bits/fcntl.h:48:10: warning: preprocessor token O_NOFOLLOW redefined
macros.h:136:9: this was the original definition

security.c:98:44: warning: non-ANSI function declaration of function 'cron_restore_default_security_context'
crontab.c:439:29: warning: non-ANSI function declaration of function 'tmp_path'

Signed-off-by: Sami Kerola <kerolasa@iki.fi>
---

diff --git a/src/crontab.c b/src/crontab.c
index bfff182..5703a3b 100644
--- a/src/crontab.c
+++ b/src/crontab.c
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static void check_error(const char *msg) {
 	fprintf(stderr, "\"%s\":%d: %s\n", Filename, LineNumber - 1, msg);
 }
 
-static const char *tmp_path() {
+static const char *tmp_path(void) {
 	const char *tmpdir = NULL;
 
 	if ((getuid() == geteuid()) && (getgid() == getegid())) {
diff --git a/src/entry.c b/src/entry.c
index 0b482b9..e9142f5 100644
--- a/src/entry.c
+++ b/src/entry.c
@@ -392,10 +392,8 @@ entry *load_entry(FILE * file, void (*error_func) (), struct passwd *pw,
   eof:
 	if (e->envp)
 		env_free(e->envp);
-	if (e->pwd)
-		free(e->pwd);
-	if (e->cmd)
-		free(e->cmd);
+	free(e->pwd);
+	free(e->cmd);
 	free(e);
 	while (ch != '\n' && !feof(file))
 		ch = get_char(file);
diff --git a/src/macros.h b/src/macros.h
index 215753a..6c7ca6d 100644
--- a/src/macros.h
+++ b/src/macros.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
 #include <limits.h>
 #endif
+
 	/* these are really immutable, and are
 	 *   defined for symbolic convenience only
 	 * TRUE, FALSE, and ERR must be distinct
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@
  * we will just have to live without it.  In order for this to be an
  * issue an attacker would have to subvert group CRON_GROUP.
  */
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #ifndef O_NOFOLLOW
 #define O_NOFOLLOW	0
 #endif
diff --git a/src/security.c b/src/security.c
index b483134..c5fbc5e 100644
--- a/src/security.c
+++ b/src/security.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static int cron_get_job_range(user * u, security_context_t * ucontextp,
 	char **jobenv);
 #endif
 
-void cron_restore_default_security_context() {
+void cron_restore_default_security_context(void) {
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	setexeccon(NULL);
 #endif