From: Eike Rathke Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2015 16:50:42 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Allow short and long key ID user input in crypt_getkeybystr() X-Git-Url: https://granicus.if.org/sourcecode?a=commitdiff_plain;h=1c71c8ff73215c47118f5be0714ae4e9a05c3b5d;p=neomutt Allow short and long key ID user input in crypt_getkeybystr() The following did not work, e.g. when leaving a key list, and at the "Sign as" or "Encrypt to" prompt attempting to enter a key ID: * set pgp_long_ids=no * enter a long key ID, with or without leading 0x * set pgp_long_ids=yes * enter a short key ID without leading 0x Specifically entering a long key ID should always be possible as evil32.com has shown. This also cleans up the logic used to determine the matching condition, which was quite convoluted.. it even slightly speeds up the loop as less string operations are involved in the inner condition. This only changes how the result obtained from the crypt_* gpgme interface is filtered. --- diff --git a/crypt-gpgme.c b/crypt-gpgme.c index 4f2af940f..5a1af9990 100644 --- a/crypt-gpgme.c +++ b/crypt-gpgme.c @@ -179,6 +179,34 @@ static const char *crypt_keyid (crypt_key_t *k) return s; } +/* Return the long keyID for the key K. */ +static const char *crypt_long_keyid (crypt_key_t *k) +{ + const char *s = "????????????????"; + + if (k->kobj && k->kobj->subkeys) + { + s = k->kobj->subkeys->keyid; + } + + return s; +} + +/* Return the short keyID for the key K. */ +static const char *crypt_short_keyid (crypt_key_t *k) +{ + const char *s = "????????"; + + if (k->kobj && k->kobj->subkeys) + { + s = k->kobj->subkeys->keyid; + if (strlen (s) == 16) + s += 8; + } + + return s; +} + /* Return the hexstring fingerprint from the key K. */ static const char *crypt_fpr (crypt_key_t *k) { @@ -4171,6 +4199,7 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, crypt_key_t *matches = NULL; crypt_key_t **matches_endp = &matches; crypt_key_t *k; + const char *ps, *pl; mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), p); @@ -4182,6 +4211,19 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, if (!keys) return NULL; + + /* User input may be short or long key ID, independent of OPTPGPLONGIDS. + * crypt_key_t->keyid should always contain a long key ID without 0x. + * Strip leading "0x" before loops so it doesn't have to be done over and + * over again, and prepare pl and ps to simplify logic in the loop's inner + * condition. + */ + pl = (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) ? p + 2 : p); + ps = (mutt_strlen (pl) == 16 ? pl + 8 : pl); + + /* If ps != pl it means a long ID (or name of 16 characters) was given, do + * not attempt to match short IDs then. Also, it is unnecessary to try to + * match pl against long IDs if ps == pl as pl could not be a long ID. */ for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) { @@ -4189,15 +4231,11 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, continue; dprint (5, (debugfile, "crypt_getkeybystr: matching \"%s\" against " - "key %s, \"%s\": ", p, crypt_keyid (k), k->uid)); + "key %s, \"%s\": ", p, crypt_long_keyid (k), k->uid)); if (!*p - || !mutt_strcasecmp (p, crypt_keyid (k)) - || (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) - && !mutt_strcasecmp (p + 2, crypt_keyid (k))) - || (option (OPTPGPLONGIDS) - && !mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) - && !mutt_strcasecmp (p + 2, crypt_keyid (k) + 8)) + || (ps != pl && mutt_strcasecmp (pl, crypt_long_keyid (k)) == 0) + || (ps == pl && mutt_strcasecmp (ps, crypt_short_keyid (k)) == 0) || mutt_stristr (k->uid, p)) { crypt_key_t *tmp;