From: Dr. Stephen Henson Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2014 20:56:34 +0000 (+0100) Subject: update CHANGES X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_2-beta2~257 X-Git-Url: https://granicus.if.org/sourcecode?a=commitdiff_plain;h=13738d5fa162c48ecf80e625660767ebf9f729f9;p=openssl update CHANGES --- diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 8f01731293..c63fa17b9d 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -2,39 +2,12 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ - Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx] - - *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension - can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or - server. - - Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to - Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for - preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) - [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] - - *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL - ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" - by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: - http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 - - Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this - flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) - [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] + Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] - *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 - - Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the - TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and - less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it - is at least 512 bytes long. - - [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] - *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] @@ -307,6 +280,35 @@ certificates. [Steve Henson] + Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] + + *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension + can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or + server. + + Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to + Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for + preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) + [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL + ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" + by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: + http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 + + Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this + flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) + [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] + + *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 + + Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the + TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and + less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it + is at least 512 bytes long. + + [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] + Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid