#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+ unsigned char *tlsa_record;
+ int tlsa_witness;
#endif
};
#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY 109
#define SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST 110
#define SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS 111
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSA_RECORD 112
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSA_RECORD 113
+#define SSL_CTRL_PULL_TLSA_RECORD 114
#define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
#define SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, plst) \
SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS,0,plst)
+#define SSL_set_tlsa_record(s,tlsa) \
+ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSA_RECORD,0,(void *)tlsa)
+#define SSL_pull_tlsa_record(s,host,port) \
+ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_PULL_TLSA_RECORD,port,host)
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int client);
const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
#endif
+void *SSL_get_tlsa_record_byname(const char *name,int port,int type);
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
return(1);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+/*
+ * return value:
+ * -1: format or digest error
+ * 0: match
+ * 1: no match
+ */
+int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int len, selector, matching_type;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (reclen<3) return -1;
+
+ selector = tlsa_record[1];
+ matching_type = tlsa_record[2];
+ tlsa_record += 3;
+ reclen -= 3;
+
+ switch (matching_type) {
+ case 0: /* exact match */
+ if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
+ ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL);
+ return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
+ }
+ else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert);
+
+ if (key == NULL) return -1;
+ if (key->length != reclen) return 1;
+
+ return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+
+ case 1: /* SHA256 */
+ case 2: /* SHA512 */
+ md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512();
+
+ if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1;
+
+ if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
+ ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
+ }
+ else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
+ ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
+ }
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth);
+ unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage, witness_usage=0x100;
+ const unsigned char *tlsa_record = s->tlsa_record;
+ int tlsa_ret = -1;
+
+ if (s->verify_callback) ok = s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
+
+ if (tlsa_record == NULL) return ok;
+
+ if (tlsa_record == (void*)-1) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; /* temporary code? */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while ((reclen = *(unsigned int *)tlsa_record)) {
+ tlsa_record += sizeof(unsigned int);
+
+ /*
+ * tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field
+ * tlsa_record[1] Selector field
+ * tlsa_record[2] Matching Type Field
+ * tlsa_record+3 Certificate Association data
+ */
+ certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0];
+
+ if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) {
+ tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen);
+ if (tlsa_ret==0) {
+ s->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage;
+ break;
+ }
+ else if (tlsa_ret==-1)
+ s->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */
+ }
+
+ tlsa_record += reclen;
+ }
+
+ if (depth==0) {
+ switch (s->tlsa_witness&0xff) { /* witnessed usage */
+ case 0: /* CA constraint */
+ if (s->tlsa_witness<0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ return 0;
+ case 1: /* service certificate constraint */
+ if (tlsa_ret!=0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ return 0;
+ case 2: /* trust anchor assertion */
+ if ((s->tlsa_witness>>8)>0 && ctx->error==X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+ break;
+ case 3: /* domain-issued certificate */
+ if (tlsa_ret==0)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* override all errors? */
+ break;
+ default:/* there were TLSA records, but something phishy happened */
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ return ok;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * returning 1 makes verify procedure traverse the whole chain,
+ * not actually approve it...
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback);
+ s->tlsa_witness = -1;
+#else
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+#endif
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
projects / openssl / commitdiff