SECURITY: CVE-2015-3185 (cve.mitre.org)

Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.

Submitted by: breser

git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

diff --git a/include/ap_mmn.h b/include/ap_mmn.h
index 2821f97cfca9b0372db9171268dcc30bb2b86cf0..b8d7da88bba4fe96e821c293a6bd4cabe15a0030 100644 (file)
--- a/include/ap_mmn.h
+++ b/include/ap_mmn.h
@@ -482,6 +482,8 @@
  * 20150222.0 (2.5.0-dev)  ssl pre_handshake hook now indicates proxy|client
  * 20150222.1 (2.5.0-dev)  Add keep_alive_timeout_set to server_rec
  * 20150222.2 (2.5.0-dev)  Add response code 418 as per RFC2324/RFC7168
+ * 20150222.3 (2.5.0-dev)  Add ap_some_authn_required, ap_force_authn hook.
+ *                         Deprecate broken ap_some_auth_required.
  */
 
 #define MODULE_MAGIC_COOKIE 0x41503235UL /* "AP25" */
@@ -489,7 +491,7 @@
 #ifndef MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MAJOR
 #define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MAJOR 20150222
 #endif
-#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MINOR 2                 /* 0...n */
+#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MINOR 3                 /* 0...n */
 
 /**
  * Determine if the server's current MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER is at least a

diff --git a/include/http_request.h b/include/http_request.h
index 2317826f3a0beb483108bc6c42ae0a152c737555..97591e3e3ee38256b00544a37f700adbbb41ac76 100644 (file)
--- a/include/http_request.h
+++ b/include/http_request.h
@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_internal_fast_redirect(request_rec *sub_req, request_rec *r)
  * is required for the current request
  * @param r The current request
  * @return 1 if authentication is required, 0 otherwise
+ * @bug Behavior changed in 2.4.x refactoring, API no longer usable
+ * @deprecated @see ap_some_authn_required()
+ *
  */
 AP_DECLARE(int) ap_some_auth_required(request_rec *r);
 
@@ -541,6 +544,16 @@ AP_DECLARE_HOOK(void,insert_filter,(request_rec *r))
  */
 AP_DECLARE_HOOK(int,post_perdir_config,(request_rec *r))
 
+/**
+ * This hook allows a module to force authn to be required when
+ * processing a request.
+ * This hook should be registered with ap_hook_force_authn().
+ * @param r The current request
+ * @return OK (force authn), DECLINED (let later modules decide)
+ * @ingroup hooks
+ */
+AP_DECLARE_HOOK(int,force_authn,(request_rec *r))
+
 /**
  * This hook allows modules to handle/emulate the apr_stat() calls
  * needed for directory walk.
@@ -587,6 +600,17 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_bucket *) ap_bucket_eor_make(apr_bucket *b, request_rec *r);
 AP_DECLARE(apr_bucket *) ap_bucket_eor_create(apr_bucket_alloc_t *list,
                                               request_rec *r);
 
+/**
+ * Can be used within any handler to determine if any authentication
+ * is required for the current request.  Note that if used with an
+ * access_checker hook, an access_checker_ex hook or an authz provider; the
+ * caller should take steps to avoid a loop since this function is
+ * implemented by calling these hooks.
+ * @param r The current request
+ * @return TRUE if authentication is required, FALSE otherwise
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_some_authn_required(request_rec *r);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

diff --git a/server/request.c b/server/request.c
index 736c4c444ee81af3ad718eccf065d07b1bcca787..fa84c1ab3252975ce00d0edb22ab6bdcb09114d7 100644 (file)
--- a/server/request.c
+++ b/server/request.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ APR_HOOK_STRUCT(
     APR_HOOK_LINK(create_request)
     APR_HOOK_LINK(post_perdir_config)
     APR_HOOK_LINK(dirwalk_stat)
+    APR_HOOK_LINK(force_authn)
 )
 
 AP_IMPLEMENT_HOOK_RUN_FIRST(int,translate_name,
@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ AP_IMPLEMENT_HOOK_RUN_ALL(int, post_perdir_config,
 AP_IMPLEMENT_HOOK_RUN_FIRST(apr_status_t,dirwalk_stat,
                             (apr_finfo_t *finfo, request_rec *r, apr_int32_t wanted),
                             (finfo, r, wanted), AP_DECLINED)
+AP_IMPLEMENT_HOOK_RUN_FIRST(int,force_authn,
+                            (request_rec *r), (r), DECLINED)
 
 static int auth_internal_per_conf = 0;
 static int auth_internal_per_conf_hooks = 0;
@@ -118,6 +121,39 @@ static int decl_die(int status, const char *phase, request_rec *r)
     }
 }
 
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_some_authn_required(request_rec *r)
+{
+    int access_status;
+
+    switch (ap_satisfies(r)) {
+    case SATISFY_ALL:
+    case SATISFY_NOSPEC:
+        if ((access_status = ap_run_access_checker(r)) != OK) {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        access_status = ap_run_access_checker_ex(r);
+        if (access_status == DECLINED) {
+            return TRUE;
+        }
+
+        break;
+    case SATISFY_ANY:
+        if ((access_status = ap_run_access_checker(r)) == OK) {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        access_status = ap_run_access_checker_ex(r);
+        if (access_status == DECLINED) {
+            return TRUE;
+        }
+
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
 /* This is the master logic for processing requests.  Do NOT duplicate
  * this logic elsewhere, or the security model will be broken by future
  * API changes.  Each phase must be individually optimized to pick up
@@ -236,15 +272,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_process_request_internal(request_rec *r)
             }
 
             access_status = ap_run_access_checker_ex(r);
-            if (access_status == OK) {
-                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
-                              "request authorized without authentication by "
-                              "access_checker_ex hook: %s", r->uri);
-            }
-            else if (access_status != DECLINED) {
-                return decl_die(access_status, "check access", r);
-            }
-            else {
+            if (access_status == DECLINED
+                || (access_status == OK && ap_run_force_authn(r) == OK)) {
                 if ((access_status = ap_run_check_user_id(r)) != OK) {
                     return decl_die(access_status, "check user", r);
                 }
@@ -262,6 +291,14 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_process_request_internal(request_rec *r)
                     return decl_die(access_status, "check authorization", r);
                 }
             }
+            else if (access_status == OK) {
+                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
+                              "request authorized without authentication by "
+                              "access_checker_ex hook: %s", r->uri);
+            }
+            else {
+                return decl_die(access_status, "check access", r);
+            }
             break;
         case SATISFY_ANY:
             if ((access_status = ap_run_access_checker(r)) == OK) {
@@ -273,15 +310,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_process_request_internal(request_rec *r)
             }
 
             access_status = ap_run_access_checker_ex(r);
-            if (access_status == OK) {
-                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
-                              "request authorized without authentication by "
-                              "access_checker_ex hook: %s", r->uri);
-            }
-            else if (access_status != DECLINED) {
-                return decl_die(access_status, "check access", r);
-            }
-            else {
+            if (access_status == DECLINED
+                || (access_status == OK && ap_run_force_authn(r) == OK)) {
                 if ((access_status = ap_run_check_user_id(r)) != OK) {
                     return decl_die(access_status, "check user", r);
                 }
@@ -299,6 +329,14 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_process_request_internal(request_rec *r)
                     return decl_die(access_status, "check authorization", r);
                 }
             }
+            else if (access_status == OK) {
+                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
+                              "request authorized without authentication by "
+                              "access_checker_ex hook: %s", r->uri);
+            }
+            else {
+                return decl_die(access_status, "check access", r);
+            }
             break;
         }
     }