Doxyfile \
kqueue.c epoll_sub.c epoll.c select.c poll.c signal.c \
evport.c devpoll.c win32select.c event_rpcgen.py \
- event_iocp.c buffer_iocp.c iocp-internal.h \
+ event_iocp.c buffer_iocp.c iocp-internal.h arc4random.c \
sample/Makefile.am sample/Makefile.in sample/event-test.c \
sample/signal-test.c sample/time-test.c \
test/Makefile.am test/Makefile.in test/bench.c test/regress.c \
CORE_SRC = event.c evthread.c buffer.c \
bufferevent.c bufferevent_sock.c bufferevent_filter.c \
bufferevent_pair.c listener.c bufferevent_ratelim.c \
- evmap.c log.c evutil.c strlcpy.c $(SYS_SRC)
+ evmap.c log.c evutil.c evutil_rand.c strlcpy.c $(SYS_SRC)
EXTRA_SRC = event_tagging.c http.c evdns.c evrpc.c
--- /dev/null
+/* Portable arc4random.c based on arc4random.c from OpenBSD.
+ * Portable version by Chris Davis, adapted for Libevent by Nick Mathewson
+ *
+ * Note that in Libevent, this file isn't compiled directly. Instead,
+ * it's included from evutil_rand.c
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Arc4 random number generator for OpenBSD.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from section 17.1 of Applied Cryptography,
+ * second edition, which describes a stream cipher allegedly
+ * compatible with RSA Labs "RC4" cipher (the actual description of
+ * which is a trade secret). The same algorithm is used as a stream
+ * cipher called "arcfour" in Tatu Ylonen's ssh package.
+ *
+ * Here the stream cipher has been modified always to include the time
+ * when initializing the state. That makes it impossible to
+ * regenerate the same random sequence twice, so this can't be used
+ * for encryption, but will generate good random numbers.
+ *
+ * RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Laboratories.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
+#define ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NO_INCLUDES
+#ifdef WIN32
+#include <wincrypt.h>
+#else
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Add platform entropy 32 bytes (256 bits) at a time. */
+#define ADD_ENTROPY 32
+
+/* Re-seed from the platform RNG after generating this many bytes. */
+#define BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED 1600000
+
+struct arc4_stream {
+ unsigned char i;
+ unsigned char j;
+ unsigned char s[256];
+};
+
+static int rs_initialized;
+static struct arc4_stream rs;
+static pid_t arc4_stir_pid;
+static int arc4_count;
+static int arc4_seeded_ok;
+
+static inline unsigned char arc4_getbyte(void);
+
+static inline void
+arc4_init(void)
+{
+ int n;
+
+ for (n = 0; n < 256; n++)
+ rs.s[n] = n;
+ rs.i = 0;
+ rs.j = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void
+arc4_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
+{
+ int n;
+ unsigned char si;
+
+ rs.i--;
+ for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) {
+ rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
+ si = rs.s[rs.i];
+ rs.j = (rs.j + si + dat[n % datlen]);
+ rs.s[rs.i] = rs.s[rs.j];
+ rs.s[rs.j] = si;
+ }
+ rs.j = rs.i;
+}
+
+#ifndef WIN32
+static ssize_t
+read_all(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ size_t numread = 0;
+ ssize_t result;
+
+ while (numread < count) {
+ result = read(fd, buf+numread, count-numread);
+ if (result<0)
+ return -1;
+ else if (result == 0)
+ break;
+ numread += result;
+ }
+
+ return (ssize_t)numread;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */
+static int
+arc4_seed(void)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
+
+ /* local variables */
+#ifdef WIN32
+ static int provider_set = 0;
+ static HCRYPTPROV provider;
+#else
+ static const char *filenames[] = {
+ "/dev/srandom", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", NULL
+ };
+ int fd, i;
+ size_t n;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+ if (!provider_set) {
+ if (!CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
+ CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
+ if ((unsigned long)GetLastError() != (unsigned long)NTE_BAD_KEYSET)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ provider_set = 1;
+ }
+ if (!CryptGenRandom(provider, sizeof(buf), buf))
+ return -1;
+ arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
+ return 0;
+#else
+ for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) {
+ fd = open(filenames[i], O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (fd<0)
+ continue;
+ n = read_all(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ close(fd);
+ if (n != sizeof(buf))
+ return -1;
+ arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+arc4_stir(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!rs_initialized) {
+ arc4_init();
+ rs_initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ arc4_seed();
+
+ /*
+ * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in
+ * "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4" by
+ * Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir.
+ * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
+ *
+ * Ilya Mironov's "(Not So) Random Shuffles of RC4" suggests that
+ * we drop at least 2*256 bytes, with 12*256 as a conservative
+ * value.
+ *
+ * RFC4345 says to drop 6*256.
+ *
+ * At least some versions of this code drop 4*256, in a mistaken
+ * belief that "words" in the Fluhrer/Mantin/Shamir paper refers
+ * to processor words.
+ *
+ * We add another sect to the cargo cult, and choose 12*256.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 12*256; i++)
+ (void)arc4_getbyte();
+ arc4_count = BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED;
+}
+
+static void
+arc4_stir_if_needed(void)
+{
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ if (arc4_count <= 0 || !rs_initialized || arc4_stir_pid != pid)
+ {
+ arc4_stir_pid = pid;
+ arc4_stir();
+ }
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char
+arc4_getbyte(void)
+{
+ unsigned char si, sj;
+
+ rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
+ si = rs.s[rs.i];
+ rs.j = (rs.j + si);
+ sj = rs.s[rs.j];
+ rs.s[rs.i] = sj;
+ rs.s[rs.j] = si;
+ return (rs.s[(si + sj) & 0xff]);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int
+arc4_getword(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val;
+
+ val = arc4_getbyte() << 24;
+ val |= arc4_getbyte() << 16;
+ val |= arc4_getbyte() << 8;
+ val |= arc4_getbyte();
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOSTIR
+ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT int
+arc4random_stir(void)
+{
+ int val;
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ val = arc4_stir();
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+ return val;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOADDRANDOM
+ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
+arc4random_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
+{
+ int j;
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ if (!rs_initialized)
+ arc4_stir();
+ for (j = 0; j < datlen; j += 256) {
+ /* arc4_addrandom() ignores all but the first 256 bytes of
+ * its input. We want to make sure to look at ALL the
+ * data in 'dat', just in case the user is doing something
+ * crazy like passing us all the files in /var/log. */
+ arc4_addrandom(dat + j, datlen - j);
+ }
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NORANDOM
+ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT unsigned int
+arc4random(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val;
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ arc4_count -= 4;
+ arc4_stir_if_needed();
+ val = arc4_getword();
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+ return val;
+}
+#endif
+
+ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
+arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf = _buf;
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ arc4_stir_if_needed();
+ while (n--) {
+ if (--arc4_count <= 0)
+ arc4_stir();
+ buf[n] = arc4_getbyte();
+ }
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOUNIFORM
+/*
+ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
+ * avoiding "modulo bias".
+ *
+ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
+ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
+ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
+ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
+ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
+ */
+ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT unsigned int
+arc4random_uniform(unsigned int upper_bound)
+{
+ unsigned int r, min;
+
+ if (upper_bound < 2)
+ return 0;
+
+#if (UINT_MAX > 0xffffffffUL)
+ min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound;
+#else
+ /* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */
+ if (upper_bound > 0x80000000)
+ min = 1 + ~upper_bound; /* 2**32 - upper_bound */
+ else {
+ /* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */
+ min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
+ * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
+ * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
+ * to re-roll.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ r = arc4random();
+ if (r >= min)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return r % upper_bound;
+}
+#endif
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(long)
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_arc4random" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE(DNS_USE_ARC4RANDOM_FOR_ID, 1, [Define if we should use arc4random to generate dns transation IDs])
-elif test "x$ac_cv_func_clock_gettime" = "xyes"; then
- AC_DEFINE(DNS_USE_CPU_CLOCK_FOR_ID, 1, [Define if we should use clock_gettime to generate dns transation IDs])
-else
- AC_DEFINE(DNS_USE_GETTIMEOFDAY_FOR_ID, 1, [Define if s no secure id variant is available])
-fi
-
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for F_SETFD in fcntl.h)
AC_EGREP_CPP(yes,
[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "event-config.h"
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_FTIME_FOR_ID
-#include <sys/timeb.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _EVENT_DNS_USE_CPU_CLOCK_FOR_ID
-#ifndef _EVENT_DNS_USE_GETTIMEOFDAY_FOR_ID
-#ifndef _EVENT_DNS_USE_OPENSSL_FOR_ID
-#ifndef _EVENT_DNS_USE_FTIME_FOR_ID
-#ifndef _EVENT_DNS_USE_ARC4RANDOM_FOR_ID
-#error Must configure at least one id generation method.
-#error Please see the documentation.
-#endif
-#endif
-#endif
-#endif
-#endif
-
-/* #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200507 */
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-/* for strtok_r */
-#define _REENTRANT
-
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_CPU_CLOCK_FOR_ID
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_OPENSSL_FOR_ID
-#error Multiple id options selected
-#endif
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_GETTIMEOFDAY_FOR_ID
-#error Multiple id options selected
-#endif
-#include <time.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_OPENSSL_FOR_ID
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_GETTIMEOFDAY_FOR_ID
-#error Multiple id options selected
-#endif
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#endif
-
#ifndef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
#define _FORTIFY_SOURCE 3
#endif
#undef GET8
}
-static u16
-default_transaction_id_fn(void)
-{
- u16 trans_id;
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_CPU_CLOCK_FOR_ID
- struct timespec ts;
- static int clkid = -1;
- if (clkid == -1) {
- clkid = CLOCK_REALTIME;
-#ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) != -1)
- clkid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC;
-#endif
- }
- if (clock_gettime(clkid, &ts) == -1)
- event_err(1, "clock_gettime");
- trans_id = ts.tv_nsec & 0xffff;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_FTIME_FOR_ID
- struct _timeb tb;
- _ftime(&tb);
- trans_id = tb.millitm & 0xffff;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_GETTIMEOFDAY_FOR_ID
- struct timeval tv;
- evutil_gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
- trans_id = tv.tv_usec & 0xffff;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_OPENSSL_FOR_ID
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((u8 *) &trans_id, 2) == -1) {
- /* in the case that the RAND call fails we used to back */
- /* down to using gettimeofday. */
- /*
- struct timeval tv;
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
- trans_id = tv.tv_usec & 0xffff;
- */
- event_errx("RAND_pseudo_bytes failed!");
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _EVENT_DNS_USE_ARC4RANDOM_FOR_ID
- trans_id = arc4random() & 0xffff;
-#endif
-
- return trans_id;
-}
-
-static ev_uint16_t (*trans_id_function)(void) = default_transaction_id_fn;
-
-static void
-default_random_bytes_fn(char *buf, size_t n)
-{
- unsigned i;
- for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2) {
- u16 tid = trans_id_function();
- buf[i] = (tid >> 8) & 0xff;
- if (i+1<n)
- buf[i+1] = tid & 0xff;
- }
-}
-
-static void (*rand_bytes_function)(char *buf, size_t n) =
- default_random_bytes_fn;
-
-static u16
-trans_id_from_random_bytes_fn(void)
-{
- u16 tid;
- rand_bytes_function((char*) &tid, sizeof(tid));
- return tid;
-}
void
evdns_set_transaction_id_fn(ev_uint16_t (*fn)(void))
{
- if (fn)
- trans_id_function = fn;
- else
- trans_id_function = default_transaction_id_fn;
- rand_bytes_function = default_random_bytes_fn;
}
void
evdns_set_random_bytes_fn(void (*fn)(char *, size_t))
{
- rand_bytes_function = fn;
- trans_id_function = trans_id_from_random_bytes_fn;
}
/* Try to choose a strong transaction id which isn't already in flight */
transaction_id_pick(struct evdns_base *base) {
ASSERT_LOCKED(base);
for (;;) {
- u16 trans_id = trans_id_function();
+ u16 trans_id;
+ evutil_secure_rng_get_bytes(&trans_id, sizeof(trans_id));
if (trans_id == 0xffff) continue;
/* now check to see if that id is already inflight */
unsigned i;
char randbits[(sizeof(namebuf)+7)/8];
strlcpy(namebuf, name, sizeof(namebuf));
- rand_bytes_function(randbits, (name_len+7)/8);
+ evutil_secure_rng_get_bytes(randbits, (name_len+7)/8);
for (i = 0; i < name_len; ++i) {
if (EVUTIL_ISALPHA(namebuf[i])) {
if ((randbits[i >> 3] & (1<<(i & 7))))
{
struct evdns_base *base;
+ if (evutil_secure_rng_init() < 0) {
+ log(EVDNS_LOG_WARN, "Unable to seed random number generator; "
+ "DNS can't run.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
/* Give the evutil library a hook into its evdns-enabled
* functionality. We can't just call evdns_getaddrinfo directly or
* else libevent-core will depend on libevent-extras. */
_evutil_weakrand(void)
{
#ifdef WIN32
- return rand();
+ return rand();
#else
- return random();
+ return random();
#endif
}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2010 Niels Provos and Nick Mathewson
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* This file has our secure PRNG code. On platforms that have arc4random(),
+ * we just use that. Otherwise, we include arc4random.c as a bunch of static
+ * functions, and wrap it lightly. We don't expose the arc4random*() APIs
+ * because A) they aren't in our namespace, and B) it's not nice to name your
+ * APIs after their implementations. We keep them in a separate file
+ * so that other people can rip it out and use it for whatever.
+ */
+
+#include "event-config.h"
+
+#include "util-internal.h"
+#include "evthread-internal.h"
+
+#ifdef _EVENT_HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+evutil_secure_rng_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#else /* !_EVENT_HAVE_ARC4RANDOM { */
+
+#ifdef _EVENT_ssize_t
+#define ssize_t _EVENT_SSIZE_t
+#endif
+#define ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT static
+#define _ARC4_LOCK() EVLOCK_LOCK(arc4rand_lock, 0)
+#define _ARC4_UNLOCK() EVLOCK_UNLOCK(arc4rand_lock, 0)
+static void *arc4rand_lock;
+
+#define ARC4RANDOM_NOSTIR
+#define ARC4RANDOM_NORANDOM
+#define ARC4RANDOM_NOUNIFORM
+
+#include "./arc4random.c"
+
+int
+evutil_secure_rng_init(void)
+{
+ int val;
+ if (!arc4rand_lock) {
+ EVTHREAD_ALLOC_LOCK(arc4rand_lock, 0);
+ }
+
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ if (!arc4_seeded_ok)
+ arc4_stir();
+ val = arc4_seeded_ok ? 0 : -1;
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+ return val;
+}
+
+#endif /* } !_EVENT_HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+void
+evutil_secure_rng_get_bytes(void *buf, size_t n)
+{
+ arc4random_buf(buf, n);
+}
+
+void
+evutil_secure_rng_add_bytes(const char *buf, size_t n)
+{
+ arc4random_addrandom((const unsigned char*)buf, n);
+}
+
* (see http://www.imperialviolet.org/page25.html#e498). Otherwise,
* please continue.
*
- * This code is based on Libevent and you must call event_init before
- * any of the APIs in this file. You must also seed the OpenSSL random
- * source if you are using OpenSSL for ids (see below).
- *
- * This library is designed to be included and shipped with your source
- * code. You statically link with it. You should also test for the
- * existence of strtok_r and define HAVE_STRTOK_R if you have it.
- *
- * The DNS protocol requires a good source of id numbers and these
- * numbers should be unpredictable for spoofing reasons. There are
- * three methods for generating them here and you must define exactly
- * one of them. In increasing order of preference:
- *
- * DNS_USE_GETTIMEOFDAY_FOR_ID:
- * Using the bottom 16 bits of the usec result from gettimeofday. This
- * is a pretty poor solution but should work anywhere.
- * DNS_USE_CPU_CLOCK_FOR_ID:
- * Using the bottom 16 bits of the nsec result from the CPU's time
- * counter. This is better, but may not work everywhere. Requires
- * POSIX realtime support and you'll need to link against -lrt on
- * glibc systems at least.
- * DNS_USE_OPENSSL_FOR_ID:
- * Uses the OpenSSL RAND_bytes call to generate the data. You must
- * have seeded the pool before making any calls to this library.
- *
* The library keeps track of the state of nameservers and will avoid
* them when they go down. Otherwise it will round robin between them.
*
is bad for security.
@param fn the new callback, or NULL to use the default.
+
+ NOTE: This function has no effect in Libevent 2.0.4-alpha and later,
+ since Libevent now provides its own secure RNG.
*/
void evdns_set_transaction_id_fn(ev_uint16_t (*fn)(void));
the same function as passed to evdns_set_transaction_id_fn to generate
bytes two at a time. If a function is provided here, it's also used
to generate transaction IDs.
+
+ NOTE: This function has no effect in Libevent 2.0.4-alpha and later,
+ since Libevent now provides its own secure RNG.
*/
void evdns_set_random_bytes_fn(void (*fn)(char *, size_t));
const char *evutil_gai_strerror(int err);
+/* Generate n bytes of secure pseudorandom data, and store them in buf.
+ *
+ * By default, Libevent uses an ARC4-based random number generator, seeded
+ * using the platform's entropy source (/dev/urandom on Unix-like systems;
+ * CryptGenRandom on Windows).
+ */
+void evutil_secure_rng_get_bytes(void *buf, size_t n);
+
+int evutil_secure_rng_init(void);
+
+void evutil_secure_rng_add_bytes(const char *dat, size_t datlen);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
evdns_close_server_port(port2);
}
+#if 0
static void
dumb_bytes_fn(char *p, size_t n)
{
for(i=0;i<n;++i)
p[i] = (char)(rand() & 7);
}
+#endif
static void
dns_inflight_test(void *arg)
tt_assert(regress_dnsserver(base, &portnum, reissue_table));
+#if 0
/* Make sure that having another (very bad!) RNG doesn't mess us
* up. */
evdns_set_random_bytes_fn(dumb_bytes_fn);
+#endif
dns = evdns_base_new(base, 0);
tt_assert(!evdns_base_nameserver_ip_add(dns, "127.0.0.1:53900"));
projects / libevent / commitdiff