Follow up to r1705672.

Backport changes that somehow missed the backport process.

git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1705784 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

diff --git a/docs/manual/mod/core.xml b/docs/manual/mod/core.xml
index 1620ccbbc1dbb119c2bcceca488e460a878da739..03fd555f12c5cfa4596ffdbfe57fc974d6f23509 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/manual/mod/core.xml
+++ b/docs/manual/mod/core.xml
@@ -3634,7 +3634,7 @@ On Windows, from Apache 2.3.3 and later.</compatibility>
 
 <directivesynopsis>
     <name>ProtocolsHonorOrder</name>
-    <description>Protocols available for a server/virtual host</description>
+    <description>Determines if order of Protocols determines precedence during negotiation</description>
     <syntax>ProtocolsHonorOrder On|Off</syntax>
     <default>ProtocolsHonorOrder On</default>
     <contextlist><context>server config</context><context>virtual host</context></contextlist>

diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c
index cbbb8f8e9ca9d7e07ca8be5f13e3d91c8ab1008a..1df43e7163c30e7513b481a7076fe9a81bf990b0 100644 (file)
--- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c
+++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c
@@ -1427,7 +1427,6 @@ static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_input(ap_filter_t *f,
         const unsigned char *next_proto = NULL;
         unsigned next_proto_len = 0;
         const char *protocol;
-        int n;
 
         SSL_get0_alpn_selected(inctx->ssl, &next_proto, &next_proto_len);
         if (next_proto && next_proto_len) {

diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
index 037a2321a6b61801fb1d7a2212fb9347e96a1a22..caaa19778dfb8a44d22c806431bf62a48a067513 100644 (file)
--- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
+++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
@@ -202,12 +202,10 @@ int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r)
                  * selected by the SNI.
                  */
                 ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server, APLOGNO(02032)
-                            "Hostname %s provided via SNI and hostname %s provided"
-                            " via HTTP are different", servername, r->hostname);
-                if (r->connection->keepalives > 0) {
-                    return HTTP_MISDIRECTED_REQUEST;
-                }
-                return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+                             "Hostname %s provided via SNI and hostname %s provided"
+                             " via HTTP select a different server",
+                             servername, r->hostname);
+                return HTTP_MISDIRECTED_REQUEST;
             }
         }
         else if (((sc->strict_sni_vhost_check == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE)
@@ -2168,7 +2166,7 @@ int ssl_callback_alpn_select(SSL *ssl,
     }
 
     if (inlen == 0) {
-        // someone tries to trick us?
+        /* someone tries to trick us? */
         ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(02837)
                       "ALPN client protocol list empty");
         return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
@@ -2178,7 +2176,7 @@ int ssl_callback_alpn_select(SSL *ssl,
     for (i = 0; i < inlen; /**/) {
         unsigned int plen = in[i++];
         if (plen + i > inlen) {
-            // someone tries to trick us?
+            /* someone tries to trick us? */
             ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(02838)
                           "ALPN protocol identifier too long");
             return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;

diff --git a/server/core.c b/server/core.c
index de54dc5a42cd508b7b3bc44dc24841343df8e86e..37484b66e6783c34d5e9ae1e772bc0f0c1aece01 100644 (file)
--- a/server/core.c
+++ b/server/core.c
@@ -423,7 +423,6 @@ static void *merge_core_dir_configs(apr_pool_t *a, void *basev, void *newv)
 static void *create_core_server_config(apr_pool_t *a, server_rec *s)
 {
     core_server_config *conf;
-    const char **np;
     int is_virtual = s->is_virtual;
 
     conf = (core_server_config *)apr_pcalloc(a, sizeof(core_server_config));

diff --git a/server/util.c b/server/util.c
index 0bc04b18cc3d14fb0a207d07d5c26b1447b533a6..916213c380172eacec2a0b224bf4c3b9bcbe5a03 100644 (file)
--- a/server/util.c
+++ b/server/util.c
@@ -1453,25 +1453,25 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_weak(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line,
 
 /* Grab a list of tokens of the format 1#token (from RFC7230) */
 AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p,
-                                                    const char *str_in,
-                                                    apr_array_header_t **tokens,
-                                                    int skip_invalid)
+                                                const char *str_in,
+                                                apr_array_header_t **tokens,
+                                                int skip_invalid)
 {
     int in_leading_space = 1;
     int in_trailing_space = 0;
     int string_end = 0;
     const char *tok_begin;
     const char *cur;
-    
+
     if (!str_in) {
         return NULL;
     }
-    
+
     tok_begin = cur = str_in;
-    
+
     while (!string_end) {
         const unsigned char c = (unsigned char)*cur;
-        
+
         if (!TEST_CHAR(c, T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP) && c != '\0') {
             /* Non-separator character; we are finished with leading
              * whitespace. We must never have encountered any trailing
@@ -1502,12 +1502,12 @@ AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p,
                     *tokens = apr_array_make(p, 4, sizeof(char *));
                 }
                 APR_ARRAY_PUSH(*tokens, char *) =
-                apr_pstrmemdup((*tokens)->pool, tok_begin,
-                               (cur - tok_begin) - in_trailing_space);
+                    apr_pstrmemdup((*tokens)->pool, tok_begin,
+                                   (cur - tok_begin) - in_trailing_space);
             }
             /* We're allowed to have null elements, just don't add them to the
              * array */
-            
+
             tok_begin = cur + 1;
             in_leading_space = 1;
             in_trailing_space = 0;
@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p,
                 if(!temp) {
                     temp = ap_strchr_c(cur, '\0');
                 }
-                
+
                 /* Act like we haven't seen a token so we reset */
                 cur = temp - 1;
                 in_leading_space = 1;
@@ -1533,13 +1533,13 @@ AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p,
                                     "'\\x%.2x'", (unsigned int)c);
             }
         }
-        
+
         ++cur;
     }
-    
+
     return NULL;
 }
-    
+
 /* Retrieve a token, spacing over it and returning a pointer to
  * the first non-white byte afterwards.  Note that these tokens
  * are delimited by semis and commas; and can also be delimited