]> granicus.if.org Git - openssl/commitdiff
RT2679: Fix error if keysize too short
authorAnnie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>
Mon, 8 Sep 2014 20:50:03 +0000 (16:50 -0400)
committerRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Thu, 20 Nov 2014 18:45:25 +0000 (13:45 -0500)
In keygen, return KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL not INVALID_KEYBITS.

** I also increased the minimum from 256 to 512, which is now
documented in CHANGES file. **

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CHANGES
crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 0f66f8d36d7644c58bab837de35210d833462efa..066c279046be9c058263b98c94d4bf87f647da49 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz],
+     done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case.
+     [Annie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>]
+
   *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator,
      bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator.
      [Felix Laurie von Massenbach <felix@erbridge.co.uk>]
index 96d1d05735b3d7c0116319adf5699f7d91461723..651127846e63af505e6bba693c4ad9b0320e2088 100644 (file)
@@ -504,9 +504,9 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
                return 1;
 
                case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
-               if (p1 < 256)
+               if (p1 < 512)
                        {
-                       RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
                        return -2;
                        }
                rctx->nbits = p1;