#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
int protverr = 1;
- PACKET pkt, cipher_suite, compression;
+ /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
+ PACKET pkt, session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
+ int is_v2_record;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
goto f_err;
}
+ is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
+
/* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
- if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ if (is_v2_record) {
unsigned int version;
unsigned int mt;
/*-
goto f_err;
}
- if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /* Parse the message and load client random. */
+ if (is_v2_record) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
*/
unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
+ PACKET challenge;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipher_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &session_id_len)
goto f_err;
}
- if (cipher_len == 0) {
- /* we need at least one cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &cipher_suite, cipher_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, PACKET_data(&cipher_suite),
- cipher_len, &(ciphers), 1) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Ignore any session id. We don't allow resumption in a backwards
- * compatible ClientHello
- */
- if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, session_id_len)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
+ /* No extensions. */
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- s->hit = 0;
-
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
/* Load the client random */
- i = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
+ challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
+ challenge_len;
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(&pkt,
- s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i,
- i)
- || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, challenge_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
+ s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+ challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
+
+ PACKET_null_init(&compression);
+ PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
+ /* We're never DTLS here but just play safe and initialize. */
+ PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
} else {
- /* If we get here we've got SSLv3+ in an SSLv3+ record */
- PACKET session_id;
- unsigned int cookie_len;
- /* load the client random and get the session-id */
+ /* Regular ClientHello. */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- /*
- * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
- * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
- * cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
-
- if (!PACKET_peek_1(&pkt, &cookie_len)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
-
- if (cookie_len == 0)
+ /*
+ * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
+ * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
+ * So check cookie length...
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
return 1;
+ }
}
- s->hit = 0;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &cipher_suites)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &compression)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Could be empty. */
+ extensions = pkt;
+ }
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
+ * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
+ *
+ * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+ * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+ * ignore resumption requests with flag
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+ * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
+ * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+ * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+ * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
+ * ignored.
+ */
+ if (is_v2_record ||
+ (s->new_session &&
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
/*
- * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
- * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
- * ignore resumption requests with flag
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
- * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
- * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
- * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
- * ignored.
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
- if ((s->new_session
- && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ /* previous session */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else if (i == -1) {
+ goto err;
} else {
- /*
- * TODO(openssl-team): ssl_get_prev_session passes a non-const
- * 'unsigned char*' session id to a user callback. Grab a copy of
- * the data?
- */
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &pkt, PACKET_data(&session_id),
- PACKET_remaining(&session_id));
- /*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
- */
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
- /* previous session */
- s->hit = 1;
- } else if (i == -1)
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
- else {
- /* i == 0 */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
- }
}
+ }
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- PACKET cookie;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &cookie)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookie);
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ size_t cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookie);
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
+ /* Get cookie */
/*
- * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
- * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
- * does not cause an overflow.
+ * TODO(openssl-team): rcvd_cookie appears unused outside this
+ * function. Remove the field?
*/
- if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
- /* too much data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
- /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
- && cookie_len > 0) {
- /* Get cookie */
- /*
- * TODO(openssl-team): rcvd_cookie appears unused outside this
- * function. Remove the field?
- */
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
- cookie_len) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
- }
- /* default verification */
- else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
- ret = -2;
- }
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Select version to use */
- if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
- } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ /* default verification */
+ else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
}
+ /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
+ ret = -2;
}
-
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &cipher_suite)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Select version to use */
+ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
+ } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
+ }
- if (PACKET_remaining(&cipher_suite) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&cipher_suites) == 0) {
+ /* we need at least one cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, PACKET_data(&cipher_suite),
- PACKET_remaining(&cipher_suite),
- &(ciphers), 0) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, PACKET_data(&cipher_suites),
+ PACKET_remaining(&cipher_suites),
+ &(ciphers), is_v2_record) == NULL) {
+ /* TODO(openssl-team): make this alert correctly. */
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if (s->hit) {
- j = 0;
- id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+ if (s->hit) {
+ j = 0;
+ id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
-#endif
- if (c->id == id) {
- j = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
- * attack:
- * CVE-2010-4180.
- */
-#if 0
- if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
- && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
- /*
- * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
- * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
- * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
- * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
- * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
- */
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
- s->session->cipher = c;
- j = 1;
- }
- }
+ fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
- if (j == 0) {
- /*
- * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
- * to reuse it
- */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
+ if (c->id == id) {
+ j = 1;
+ break;
}
}
-
- /* compression */
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &compression)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (j == 0) {
/*
- * TODO(openssl-team):
- * SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT and SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH are used
- * interchangeably. Pick one.
+ * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+ * to reuse it
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
+ }
- complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
- for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
- if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
- break;
- }
-
- if (j >= complen) {
- /* no compress */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
+ for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
+ if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
+ break;
}
+ if (j >= complen) {
+ /* no compress */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &pkt)) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
projects / openssl / commitdiff