+++ /dev/null
-
-OpenSSL ASN1 Revision
-=====================
-
-This document describes some of the issues relating to the new ASN1 code.
-
-Previous OpenSSL ASN1 problems
-=============================
-
-OK why did the OpenSSL ASN1 code need revising in the first place? Well
-there are lots of reasons some of which are included below...
-
-1. The code is difficult to read and write. For every single ASN1 structure
-(e.g. SEQUENCE) four functions need to be written for new, free, encode and
-decode operations. This is a very painful and error prone operation. Very few
-people have ever written any OpenSSL ASN1 and those that have usually wish
-they hadn't.
-
-2. Partly because of 1. the code is bloated and takes up a disproportionate
-amount of space. The SEQUENCE encoder is particularly bad: it essentially
-contains two copies of the same operation, one to compute the SEQUENCE length
-and the other to encode it.
-
-3. The code is memory based: that is it expects to be able to read the whole
-structure from memory. This is fine for small structures but if you have a
-(say) 1Gb PKCS#7 signedData structure it isn't such a good idea...
-
-4. The code for the ASN1 IMPLICIT tag is evil. It is handled by temporarily
-changing the tag to the expected one, attempting to read it, then changing it
-back again. This means that decode buffers have to be writable even though they
-are ultimately unchanged. This gets in the way of constification.
-
-5. The handling of EXPLICIT isn't much better. It adds a chunk of code into
-the decoder and encoder for every EXPLICIT tag.
-
-6. APPLICATION and PRIVATE tags aren't even supported at all.
-
-7. Even IMPLICIT isn't complete: there is no support for implicitly tagged
-types that are not OPTIONAL.
-
-8. Much of the code assumes that a tag will fit in a single octet. This is
-only true if the tag is 30 or less (mercifully tags over 30 are rare).
-
-9. The ASN1 CHOICE type has to be largely handled manually, there aren't any
-macros that properly support it.
-
-10. Encoders have no concept of OPTIONAL and have no error checking. If the
-passed structure contains a NULL in a mandatory field it will not be encoded,
-resulting in an invalid structure.
-
-11. It is tricky to add ASN1 encoders and decoders to external applications.
-
-Template model
-==============
-
-One of the major problems with revision is the sheer volume of the ASN1 code.
-Attempts to change (for example) the IMPLICIT behaviour would result in a
-modification of *every* single decode function.
-
-I decided to adopt a template based approach. I'm using the term 'template'
-in a manner similar to SNACC templates: it has nothing to do with C++
-templates.
-
-A template is a description of an ASN1 module as several constant C structures.
-It describes in a machine readable way exactly how the ASN1 structure should
-behave. If this template contains enough detail then it is possible to write
-versions of new, free, encode, decode (and possibly others operations) that
-operate on templates.
-
-Instead of having to write code to handle each operation only a single
-template needs to be written. If new operations are needed (such as a 'print'
-operation) only a single new template based function needs to be written
-which will then automatically handle all existing templates.
-
-Plans for revision
-==================
-
-The revision will consist of the following steps. Other than the first two
-these can be handled in any order.
-
-o Design and write template new, free, encode and decode operations, initially
-memory based. *DONE*
-
-o Convert existing ASN1 code to template form. *IN PROGRESS*
-
-o Convert an existing ASN1 compiler (probably SNACC) to output templates
-in OpenSSL form.
-
-o Add support for BIO based ASN1 encoders and decoders to handle large
-structures, initially blocking I/O.
-
-o Add support for non blocking I/O: this is quite a bit harder than blocking
-I/O.
-
-o Add new ASN1 structures, such as OCSP, CRMF, S/MIME v3 (CMS), attribute
-certificates etc etc.
-
-Description of major changes
-============================
-
-The BOOLEAN type now takes three values. 0xff is TRUE, 0 is FALSE and -1 is
-absent. The meaning of absent depends on the context. If for example the
-boolean type is DEFAULT FALSE (as in the case of the critical flag for
-certificate extensions) then -1 is FALSE, if DEFAULT TRUE then -1 is TRUE.
-Usually the value will only ever be read via an API which will hide this from
-an application.
-
-There is an evil bug in the old ASN1 code that mishandles OPTIONAL with
-SEQUENCE OF or SET OF. These are both implemented as a STACK structure. The
-old code would omit the structure if the STACK was NULL (which is fine) or if
-it had zero elements (which is NOT OK). This causes problems because an empty
-SEQUENCE OF or SET OF will result in an empty STACK when it is decoded but when
-it is encoded it will be omitted resulting in different encodings. The new code
-only omits the encoding if the STACK is NULL, if it contains zero elements it
-is encoded and empty. There is an additional problem though: because an empty
-STACK was omitted, sometimes the corresponding *_new() function would
-initialize the STACK to empty so an application could immediately use it, if
-this is done with the new code (i.e. a NULL) it wont work. Therefore a new
-STACK should be allocated first. One instance of this is the X509_CRL list of
-revoked certificates: a helper function X509_CRL_add0_revoked() has been added
-for this purpose.
-
-The X509_ATTRIBUTE structure used to have an element called 'set' which took
-the value 1 if the attribute value was a SET OF or 0 if it was a single. Due
-to the behaviour of CHOICE in the new code this has been changed to a field
-called 'single' which is 0 for a SET OF and 1 for single. The old field has
-been deleted to deliberately break source compatibility. Since this structure
-is normally accessed via higher level functions this shouldn't break too much.
-
-The X509_REQ_INFO certificate request info structure no longer has a field
-called 'req_kludge'. This used to be set to 1 if the attributes field was
-(incorrectly) omitted. You can check to see if the field is omitted now by
-checking if the attributes field is NULL. Similarly if you need to omit
-the field then free attributes and set it to NULL.
-
-The top level 'detached' field in the PKCS7 structure is no longer set when
-a PKCS#7 structure is read in. PKCS7_is_detached() should be called instead.
-The behaviour of PKCS7_get_detached() is unaffected.
-
-The values of 'type' in the GENERAL_NAME structure have changed. This is
-because the old code use the ASN1 initial octet as the selector. The new
-code uses the index in the ASN1_CHOICE template.
-
-The DIST_POINT_NAME structure has changed to be a true CHOICE type.
-
-typedef struct DIST_POINT_NAME_st {
-int type;
-union {
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *fullname;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *relativename;
-} name;
-} DIST_POINT_NAME;
-
-This means that name.fullname or name.relativename should be set
-and type reflects the option. That is if name.fullname is set then
-type is 0 and if name.relativename is set type is 1.
-
-With the old code using the i2d functions would typically involve:
-
-unsigned char *buf, *p;
-int len;
-/* Find length of encoding */
-len = i2d_SOMETHING(x, NULL);
-/* Allocate buffer */
-buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
-if(buf == NULL) {
- /* Malloc error */
-}
-/* Use temp variable because &p gets updated to point to end of
- * encoding.
- */
-p = buf;
-i2d_SOMETHING(x, &p);
-
-
-Using the new i2d you can also do:
-
-unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-int len;
-len = i2d_SOMETHING(x, &buf);
-if(len < 0) {
- /* Malloc error */
-}
-
-and it will automatically allocate and populate a buffer with the
-encoding. After this call 'buf' will point to the start of the
-encoding which is len bytes long.
Standards related to OpenSSL
============================
-[Please, this is currently a draft. I made a first try at finding
- documents that describe parts of what OpenSSL implements. There are
- big gaps, and I've most certainly done something wrong. Please
- correct whatever is... Also, this note should be removed when this
- file is reaching a somewhat correct state. -- Richard Levitte]
+This is a work in progress. These are documents that describe things that
+are implemented (in whole or at least great parts) in OpenSSL.
+To search for RFCs, you can start at http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html
-All pointers in here will be either URL's or blobs of text borrowed
-from miscellaneous indexes, like rfc-index.txt (index of RFCs),
-1id-index.txt (index of Internet drafts) and the like.
+To search for internet-drafts, you can start at http://www.ietf.org/id-info/
-To find the latest possible RFCs, it's recommended to either browse
-ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/ or go to http://www.rfc-editor.org/ and
-use the search mechanism found there.
-To find the latest possible Internet drafts, it's recommended to
-browse ftp://ftp.isi.edu/internet-drafts/.
-To find the latest possible PKCS, it's recommended to browse
-http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/.
+Many PKCS standards are now RFC's; PKCS#11 is now at Oasis and can be
+found at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=pkcs11
-Implemented:
-------------
+Implemented
+-----------
-These are documents that describe things that are implemented (in
-whole or at least great parts) in OpenSSL.
+PKCS#8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard
-1319 The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm. B. Kaliski. April 1992.
- (Format: TXT=25661 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+PKCS#12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard, version 1.0.
-1320 The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm. R. Rivest. April 1992. (Format:
- TXT=32407 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+1319 The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm
-1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. R. Rivest. April 1992. (Format:
- TXT=35222 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+1320 The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm
-2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. T. Dierks, C. Allen. January 1999.
- (Format: TXT=170401 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
-2268 A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm. R. Rivest.
- January 1998. (Format: TXT=19048 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1
-2315 PKCS 7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5. B. Kaliski.
- March 1998. (Format: TXT=69679 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+2268 A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm
-PKCS#8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard
-
-PKCS#12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard, version 1.0.
+2315 PKCS 7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5
2560 X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate
- Status Protocol - OCSP. M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin,
- C. Adams. June 1999. (Format: TXT=43243 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED
- STANDARD)
+ Status Protocol - OCSP
2712 Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security
- (TLS). A. Medvinsky, M. Hur. October 1999. (Format: TXT=13763 bytes)
- (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
-
-2898 PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0.
- B. Kaliski. September 2000. (Format: TXT=68692 bytes) (Status:
- INFORMATIONAL)
+ (TLS)
-2986 PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7.
- M. Nystrom, B. Kaliski. November 2000. (Format: TXT=27794 bytes)
- (Obsoletes RFC2314) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+2898 PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0
-3174 US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1). D. Eastlake 3rd, P. Jones.
- September 2001. (Format: TXT=35525 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+2986 PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7
3161 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)
- C. Adams, P. Cain, D. Pinkas, R. Zuccherato. August 2001
- (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+
+3174 US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)
3268 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport
- Layer Security (TLS). P. Chown. June 2002. (Format: TXT=13530 bytes)
- (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Layer Security (TLS)
3279 Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- Profile. L. Bassham, W. Polk, R. Housley. April 2002. (Format:
- TXT=53833 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Profile
3280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
- Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. R. Housley, W. Polk, W.
- Ford, D. Solo. April 2002. (Format: TXT=295556 bytes) (Obsoletes
- RFC2459) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
- Specifications Version 2.1. J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski. February 2003.
- (Format: TXT=143173 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2437) (Status:
- INFORMATIONAL)
+ Specifications Version 2.1
-3713 A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm. M. Matsui,
- J. Nakajima, S. Moriai. April 2004. (Format: TXT=25031 bytes)
- (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+3713 A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm
3820 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Proxy Certificate
- Profile. S. Tuecke, V. Welch, D. Engert, L. Pearlman, M. Thompson.
- June 2004. (Format: TXT=86374 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Profile
4132 Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security
- (TLS). S. Moriai, A. Kato, M. Kanda. July 2005. (Format: TXT=13590
- bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ (TLS)
-4162 Addition of SEED Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS).
- H.J. Lee, J.H. Yoon, J.I. Lee. August 2005. (Format: TXT=10578 bytes)
- (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+4162 Addition of SEED Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)
-4269 The SEED Encryption Algorithm. H.J. Lee, S.J. Lee, J.H. Yoon,
- D.H. Cheon, J.I. Lee. December 2005. (Format: TXT=34390 bytes)
- (Obsoletes RFC4009) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+4269 The SEED Encryption Algorithm
-Related:
---------
+Related
+-------
These are documents that are close to OpenSSL, for example the
STARTTLS documents.
1421 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message
- Encryption and Authentication Procedures. J. Linn. February 1993.
- (Format: TXT=103894 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC1113) (Status: PROPOSED
- STANDARD)
+ Encryption and Authentication Procedures
1422 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II:
- Certificate-Based Key Management. S. Kent. February 1993. (Format:
- TXT=86085 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC1114) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Certificate-Based Key Management
1423 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III:
- Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers. D. Balenson. February 1993.
- (Format: TXT=33277 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC1115) (Status: PROPOSED
- STANDARD)
+ Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers
1424 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key
- Certification and Related Services. B. Kaliski. February 1993.
- (Format: TXT=17537 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Certification and Related Services
-2025 The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM). C. Adams. October
- 1996. (Format: TXT=101692 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2025 The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM)
2510 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
- Protocols. C. Adams, S. Farrell. March 1999. (Format: TXT=158178
- bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Protocols
-2511 Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format. M. Myers, C.
- Adams, D. Solo, D. Kemp. March 1999. (Format: TXT=48278 bytes)
- (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2511 Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format
2527 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and
- Certification Practices Framework. S. Chokhani, W. Ford. March 1999.
- (Format: TXT=91860 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+ Certification Practices Framework
-2538 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS). D. Eastlake
- 3rd, O. Gudmundsson. March 1999. (Format: TXT=19857 bytes) (Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2538 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS)
-2539 Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS).
- D. Eastlake 3rd. March 1999. (Format: TXT=21049 bytes) (Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2539 Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS)
2559 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols -
- LDAPv2. S. Boeyen, T. Howes, P. Richard. April 1999. (Format:
- TXT=22889 bytes) (Updates RFC1778) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ LDAPv2
2585 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols:
- FTP and HTTP. R. Housley, P. Hoffman. May 1999. (Format: TXT=14813
- bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ FTP and HTTP
-2587 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema. S.
- Boeyen, T. Howes, P. Richard. June 1999. (Format: TXT=15102 bytes)
- (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2587 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema
-2595 Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP. C. Newman. June 1999.
- (Format: TXT=32440 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2595 Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP
-2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method. E. Rescorla. June 1999.
- (Format: TXT=25932 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method
-2632 S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling. B. Ramsdell, Ed.. June
- 1999. (Format: TXT=27925 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2632 S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling
-2716 PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol. B. Aboba, D. Simon. October
- 1999. (Format: TXT=50108 bytes) (Status: EXPERIMENTAL)
+2716 PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol
-2773 Encryption using KEA and SKIPJACK. R. Housley, P. Yee, W. Nace.
- February 2000. (Format: TXT=20008 bytes) (Updates RFC0959) (Status:
- EXPERIMENTAL)
+2797 Certificate Management Messages over CMS
-2797 Certificate Management Messages over CMS. M. Myers, X. Liu, J.
- Schaad, J. Weinstein. April 2000. (Format: TXT=103357 bytes) (Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD)
+2817 Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1
-2817 Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1. R. Khare, S. Lawrence. May
- 2000. (Format: TXT=27598 bytes) (Updates RFC2616) (Status: PROPOSED
- STANDARD)
+2818 HTTP Over TLS
-2818 HTTP Over TLS. E. Rescorla. May 2000. (Format: TXT=15170 bytes)
- (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+2984 Use of the CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm in CMS
-2876 Use of the KEA and SKIPJACK Algorithms in CMS. J. Pawling. July
- 2000. (Format: TXT=29265 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
-
-2984 Use of the CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm in CMS. C. Adams.
- October 2000. (Format: TXT=11591 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
-
-2985 PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0.
- M. Nystrom, B. Kaliski. November 2000. (Format: TXT=70703 bytes)
- (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+2985 PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0
3029 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data Validation and
- Certification Server Protocols. C. Adams, P. Sylvester, M. Zolotarev,
- R. Zuccherato. February 2001. (Format: TXT=107347 bytes) (Status:
- EXPERIMENTAL)
+ Certification Server Protocols
3039 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates
- Profile. S. Santesson, W. Polk, P. Barzin, M. Nystrom. January 2001.
- (Format: TXT=67619 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Profile
-3058 Use of the IDEA Encryption Algorithm in CMS. S. Teiwes, P.
- Hartmann, D. Kuenzi. February 2001. (Format: TXT=17257 bytes)
- (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+3058 Use of the IDEA Encryption Algorithm in CMS
3161 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol
- (TSP). C. Adams, P. Cain, D. Pinkas, R. Zuccherato. August 2001.
- (Format: TXT=54585 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ (TSP)
-3185 Reuse of CMS Content Encryption Keys. S. Farrell, S. Turner.
- October 2001. (Format: TXT=20404 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+3185 Reuse of CMS Content Encryption Keys
3207 SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer
- Security. P. Hoffman. February 2002. (Format: TXT=18679 bytes)
- (Obsoletes RFC2487) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Security
-3217 Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. R. Housley. December 2001.
- (Format: TXT=19855 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
+3217 Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping
3274 Compressed Data Content Type for Cryptographic Message Syntax
- (CMS). P. Gutmann. June 2002. (Format: TXT=11276 bytes) (Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ (CMS)
3278 Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in
- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). S. Blake-Wilson, D. Brown, P.
- Lambert. April 2002. (Format: TXT=33779 bytes) (Status:
- INFORMATIONAL)
+ Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
-3281 An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization. S.
- Farrell, R. Housley. April 2002. (Format: TXT=90580 bytes) (Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD)
+3281 An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization
-3369 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). R. Housley. August 2002.
- (Format: TXT=113975 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2630, RFC3211) (Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD)
+3369 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
-3370 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms. R. Housley. August
- 2002. (Format: TXT=51001 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2630, RFC3211) (Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD)
+3370 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms
-3377 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Technical
- Specification. J. Hodges, R. Morgan. September 2002. (Format:
- TXT=9981 bytes) (Updates RFC2251, RFC2252, RFC2253, RFC2254, RFC2255,
- RFC2256, RFC2829, RFC2830) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
-
-3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. J. Schaad,
- R. Housley. September 2002. (Format: TXT=73072 bytes) (Status:
- INFORMATIONAL)
+3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
3436 Transport Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission
- Protocol. A. Jungmaier, E. Rescorla, M. Tuexen. December 2002.
- (Format: TXT=16333 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
+ Protocol
3657 Use of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic
- Message Syntax (CMS). S. Moriai, A. Kato. January 2004.
- (Format: TXT=26282 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
-
-"Securing FTP with TLS", 01/27/2000, <draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-05.txt>
-
-
-To be implemented:
-------------------
-
-These are documents that describe things that are planed to be
-implemented in the hopefully short future.
-
+ Message Syntax (CMS)
projects / openssl / commitdiff