const char *username; /* username from startup packet */
+ char cbind_flag;
bool ssl_in_use;
const char *tls_finished_message;
size_t tls_finished_len;
* Read gs2-cbind-flag. (For details see also RFC 5802 Section 6 "Channel
* Binding".)
*/
+ state->cbind_flag = *input;
switch (*input)
{
case 'n':
char *b64_message;
int b64_message_len;
+ Assert(state->cbind_flag == 'p');
+
/*
* Fetch data appropriate for channel binding type
*/
/*
* If we are not using channel binding, the binding data is expected
* to always be "biws", which is "n,," base64-encoded, or "eSws",
- * which is "y,,".
+ * which is "y,,". We also have to check whether the flag is the same
+ * one that the client originally sent.
*/
- if (strcmp(channel_binding, "biws") != 0 &&
- strcmp(channel_binding, "eSws") != 0)
+ if (!(strcmp(channel_binding, "biws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'n') &&
+ !(strcmp(channel_binding, "eSws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'y'))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
(errmsg("unexpected SCRAM channel-binding attribute in client-final-message"))));
/*
* Construct client-final-message-without-proof. We need to remember it
* for verifying the server proof in the final step of authentication.
+ *
+ * The channel binding flag handling (p/y/n) must be consistent with
+ * build_client_first_message(), because the server will check that it's
+ * the same flag both times.
*/
if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA256_PLUS_NAME) == 0)
{