Secure Unix-domain sockets of "make check" temporary clusters.

Any OS user able to access the socket can connect as the bootstrap
superuser and in turn execute arbitrary code as the OS user running the
test.  Protect against that by placing the socket in the temporary data
directory, which has mode 0700 thanks to initdb.  Back-patch to 8.4 (all
supported versions).  The hazard remains wherever the temporary cluster
accepts TCP connections, notably on Windows.

Attempts to run "make check" from a directory with a long name will now
fail.  An alternative not sharing that problem was to place the socket
in a subdirectory of /tmp, but that is only secure if /tmp is sticky.
The PG_REGRESS_SOCK_DIR environment variable is available as a
workaround when testing from long directory paths.

As a convenient side effect, this lets testing proceed smoothly in
builds that override DEFAULT_PGSOCKET_DIR.  Popular non-default values
like /var/run/postgresql are often unwritable to the build user.

Security: CVE-2014-0067

diff --git a/contrib/pg_upgrade/test.sh b/contrib/pg_upgrade/test.sh
index 28130f16010720104aae2b73c55334905a73b86d..88f1dc3486664d5efb0b62db4a03528754308fe5 100644 (file)
--- a/contrib/pg_upgrade/test.sh
+++ b/contrib/pg_upgrade/test.sh
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ case $testhost in
        *)              LISTEN_ADDRESSES="" ;;
 esac
 
-POSTMASTER_OPTS="-F -c listen_addresses=$LISTEN_ADDRESSES"
-
 temp_root=$PWD/tmp_check
 
 if [ "$1" = '--install' ]; then
@@ -79,9 +77,14 @@ PGSERVICE="";         unset PGSERVICE
 PGSSLMODE="";         unset PGSSLMODE
 PGREQUIRESSL="";      unset PGREQUIRESSL
 PGCONNECT_TIMEOUT=""; unset PGCONNECT_TIMEOUT
-PGHOST="";            unset PGHOST
 PGHOSTADDR="";        unset PGHOSTADDR
 
+# Select a socket directory, similarly to pg_regress.c
+PGHOST=${PG_REGRESS_SOCK_DIR-$PGDATA}
+export PGHOST
+
+POSTMASTER_OPTS="-F -c listen_addresses=$LISTEN_ADDRESSES -k \"$PGHOST\""
+
 logdir=$PWD/log
 rm -rf "$logdir"
 mkdir "$logdir"

diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/regress.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/regress.sgml
index 466b492d25e19f23918987fe784bc009548e2481..98602eccfd8e315270ab64dabf3533dc918d5388 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/src/sgml/regress.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/regress.sgml
@@ -58,21 +58,14 @@ gmake check
 
   <warning>
    <para>
-    This test method starts a temporary server, which is configured to accept
-    any connection originating on the local machine.  Any local user can gain
-    database superuser privileges when connecting to this server, and could
-    in principle exploit all privileges of the operating-system user running
-    the tests.  Therefore, it is not recommended that you use <literal>gmake
-    check</> on machines shared with untrusted users.  Instead, run the tests
-    after completing the installation, as described in the next section.
-   </para>
-
-   <para>
-    On Unix-like machines, this danger can be avoided if the temporary
-    server's socket file is made inaccessible to other users, for example
-    by running the tests in a protected chroot.  On Windows, the temporary
-    server opens a locally-accessible TCP socket, so filesystem protections
-    cannot help.
+    On systems lacking Unix-domain sockets, notably Windows, this test method
+    starts a temporary server configured to accept any connection originating
+    on the local machine.  Any local user can gain database superuser
+    privileges when connecting to this server, and could in principle exploit
+    all privileges of the operating-system user running the tests.  Therefore,
+    it is not recommended that you use <literal>gmake check</> on an affected
+    system shared with untrusted users.  Instead, run the tests after
+    completing the installation, as described in the next section.
    </para>
   </warning>
 
@@ -111,6 +104,17 @@ gmake MAX_CONNECTIONS=10 check
 </screen>
     runs no more than ten tests concurrently.
    </para>
+
+   <para>
+    To protect your operating system user account, the test driver places the
+    server's socket in a relative subdirectory inaccessible to other users.
+    Since most systems constrain the length of socket paths well
+    below <literal>_POSIX_PATH_MAX</>, testing may fail to start from a
+    directory with a long name.  Work around this problem by pointing
+    the <envar>PG_REGRESS_SOCK_DIR</> environment variable to a substitute
+    socket directory having a shorter path.  On a multi-user system, give that
+    directory mode <literal>0700</>.
+   </para>
   </sect2>
 
   <sect2>

diff --git a/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c b/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
index a6466ebddff660f229a7f7d3ea25af41e656a520..118562bc0a2db379b562b6db070163bc9f6291c6 100644 (file)
--- a/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
+++ b/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ static const char *progname;
 static char *logfilename;
 static FILE *logfile;
 static char *difffilename;
+static char *sockdir;
 
 static _resultmap *resultmap = NULL;
 
@@ -759,8 +760,7 @@ initialize_environment(void)
                 * the wrong postmaster, or otherwise behave in nondefault ways. (Note
                 * we also use psql's -X switch consistently, so that ~/.psqlrc files
                 * won't mess things up.)  Also, set PGPORT to the temp port, and set
-                * or unset PGHOST depending on whether we are using TCP or Unix
-                * sockets.
+                * PGHOST depending on whether we are using TCP or Unix sockets.
                 */
                unsetenv("PGDATABASE");
                unsetenv("PGUSER");
@@ -772,7 +772,24 @@ initialize_environment(void)
                if (hostname != NULL)
                        doputenv("PGHOST", hostname);
                else
-                       unsetenv("PGHOST");
+               {
+                       sockdir = getenv("PG_REGRESS_SOCK_DIR");
+                       if (!sockdir)
+                       {
+                               /*
+                                * Since initdb creates the data directory with secure
+                                * permissions, we place the socket there.  This ensures no
+                                * other OS user can open our socket to exploit our use of
+                                * trust authentication.  Compared to using the compiled-in
+                                * DEFAULT_PGSOCKET_DIR, this also permits testing to work in
+                                * builds that relocate it to a directory not writable to the
+                                * build/test user.
+                                */
+                               sockdir = malloc(strlen(temp_install) + sizeof("/data"));
+                               sprintf(sockdir, "%s/data", temp_install);
+                       }
+                       doputenv("PGHOST", sockdir);
+               }
                unsetenv("PGHOSTADDR");
                if (port != -1)
                {
@@ -2246,10 +2263,11 @@ regression_main(int argc, char *argv[], init_function ifunc, test_function tfunc
                 */
                header(_("starting postmaster"));
                snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
-                                SYSTEMQUOTE "\"%s/postgres\" -D \"%s/data\" -F%s -c \"listen_addresses=%s\" > \"%s/log/postmaster.log\" 2>&1" SYSTEMQUOTE,
-                                bindir, temp_install,
-                                debug ? " -d 5" : "",
-                                hostname ? hostname : "",
+                                SYSTEMQUOTE "\"%s/postgres\" -D \"%s/data\" -F%s "
+                                "-c \"listen_addresses=%s\" -k \"%s\" "
+                                "> \"%s/log/postmaster.log\" 2>&1" SYSTEMQUOTE,
+                                bindir, temp_install, debug ? " -d 5" : "",
+                                hostname ? hostname : "", sockdir ? sockdir : "",
                                 outputdir);
                postmaster_pid = spawn_process(buf);
                if (postmaster_pid == INVALID_PID)