CHANGES: harmonize with 1.0.0 and 1.0.1.

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 12b985a2d06ef2802dd9b667cfb02d6e411683e3..5421f3dbb04fd1515e08ad10978ffd6c6f623b5c 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -282,7 +282,16 @@
      whose return value is often ignored. 
      [Steve Henson]
   
- Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.1  [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1  [14 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+     STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
      and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
@@ -565,7 +574,18 @@
        Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
      [Steve Henson]
 
- Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
      client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to