update references to new RI RFC

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 2f7f79e526debd7fdb6f6e6d980f08c4c7d6ae6c..2e093c110ccc8ee14a6f9c54f289365ef6452e0a 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -880,14 +880,14 @@
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
-     a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
-     Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
-     when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
-     this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
-     receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal 
-     error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
-     expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
-     denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+     a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746.  Some renegotiating
+     TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+     the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+     waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+     received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+     applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+     and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+     only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
@@ -899,10 +899,9 @@
      the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
      [Steve Henson]
 
-  *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03. Re-enable
-     renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
-     SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
-     bad idea. It has been replaced by
+  *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+     as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+     turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
      SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
      SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
      know what you are doing.

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 9d0d563d2d5a40eac36ab9b3517a2c4fc604cdb9..007d4cbf74442ed3c8a94e5e2547770d9ad842d5 100644 (file)
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 1.0:
 
-      o Support for draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt
+      o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension.
       o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
       o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
       o Change default private key format to PKCS#8.

diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
index a878a6af6dc991316406eebf547d11a6659e924e..3e61a36e170f69caff9625547133156e5573c087 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
@@ -234,8 +234,8 @@ these options.
 =head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION
 
 OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as
-described in draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation (FIXME: replace by RFC). This
-counters the prefix attack described in CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere.
+described in RFC5746. This counters the prefix attack described in
+CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere.
 
 The deprecated and highly broken SSLv2 protocol does not support secure
 renegotiation at all: its use is B<strongly> discouraged.