}
cipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(usesess);
-
if (cipher == NULL)
goto err;
OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_WDEBUG,
OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG,
OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_SHOWCERTS, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_STATE,
- OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK,
- OPT_PSK_SESS,
+ OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK, OPT_PSK_SESS,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPT_SRPUSER, OPT_SRPPASS, OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, OPT_SRP_LATEUSER,
OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS,
compatible.
A client application wishing to use PSK ciphersuites for TLSv1.2 and below must
-provide a callback function which is called when the client is sending the
-ClientKeyExchange message to the server.
+provide a callback function. This function will be called when the client is
+sending the ClientKeyExchange message to the server.
The purpose of the callback function is to select the PSK identity and
the pre-shared key to use during the connection setup phase.
using either SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback() or
SSL_set_psk_use_session_callback() as appropriate.
-The callback function is given a reference to the SSL connection in B<ssl>.
+The callback function is given a pointer to the SSL connection in B<ssl>.
The first time the callback is called for a connection the B<md> parameter is
NULL. In some circumstances the callback will be called a second time. In that
The memory pointed to by B<*id> remains owned by the application and should
be freed by it as required at any point after the handshake is complete.
-Additionally the callback should store a reference to an SSL_SESSION object in
+Additionally the callback should store a pointer to an SSL_SESSION object in
B<*sess>. This is used as the basis for the PSK, and should, at a minimum, have
the following fields set:
Only the handshake digest associated with the ciphersuite is relevant for the
PSK (the server may go on to negotiate any ciphersuite which is compatible with
-the digest). The application can use any TLSv1.3 ciphersuite. Where B<md> is
-non-NULL the handshake digest for the ciphersuite should be the same.
+the digest). The application can use any TLSv1.3 ciphersuite. If B<md> is
+not NULL the handshake digest for the ciphersuite should be the same.
The ciphersuite can be set via a call to <SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(3)>. The
handshake digest of an SSL_CIPHER object can be checked using
<SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(3)>.
=item The protocol version
-This can be set via a call to L<SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version> and should be
-TLS1_3_VERSION.
+This can be set via a call to L<SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(3)> and should
+be TLS1_3_VERSION.
=back
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-Return values from the SSL_psk_client_cb_func callback are interpreted as
+Return values from the B<SSL_psk_client_cb_func> callback are interpreted as
follows:
On success (callback found a PSK identity and a pre-shared key to use)
Identity hints are not relevant for TLSv1.3. A server application wishing to use
PSK ciphersuites for TLSv1.2 and below may call SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint()
-to set the given B<NULL>-terminated PSK identity hint B<hint> for SSL context
-object B<ctx>. SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() sets the given B<NULL>-terminated PSK
+to set the given B<NUL>-terminated PSK identity hint B<hint> for SSL context
+object B<ctx>. SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() sets the given B<NUL>-terminated PSK
identity hint B<hint> for the SSL connection object B<ssl>. If B<hint> is
B<NULL> the current hint from B<ctx> or B<ssl> is deleted.
received PSK identity and to fetch the pre-shared key used during the
connection setup phase. The callback is set using the functions
SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback() or SSL_set_psk_server_callback(). The callback
-function is given the connection in parameter B<ssl>, B<NULL>-terminated PSK
+function is given the connection in parameter B<ssl>, B<NUL>-terminated PSK
identity sent by the client in parameter B<identity>, and a buffer B<psk> of
length B<max_psk_len> bytes where the pre-shared key is to be stored.
using either SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback() or
SSL_set_psk_use_session_callback() as appropriate.
-The callback function is given a reference to the SSL connection in B<ssl> and
+The callback function is given a pointer to the SSL connection in B<ssl> and
an identity in B<identity> of length B<identity_len>. The callback function
should identify an SSL_SESSION object that provides the PSK details and store it
in B<*sess>. The SSL_SESSION object should, as a minimum, set the master key,
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() return
+B<SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint()> and B<SSL_use_psk_identity_hint()> return
1 on success, 0 otherwise.
Return values from the TLSv1.2 and below server callback are interpreted as
=back
-The SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func callback should return 1 on success or 0 on
+The B<SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func> callback should return 1 on success or 0 on
failure. In the event of failure the connection setup fails.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key() sets the master key value associated with the
SSL_SESSION B<sess>. For example, this could be used to set up a session based
PSK (see L<SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(3)>). The master key of length
-B<len> should be provided at B<in>. A copy of the supplied master key is taken
-by the function, so the caller is responsible for freeing and cleaning any
-memory associated with B<in>. The caller must ensure that the length of the ke
-is suitable for the ciphersuite associated with the SSL_SESSION.
+B<len> should be provided at B<in>. The supplied master key is copied by the
+function, so the caller is responsible for freeing and cleaning any memory
+associated with B<in>. The caller must ensure that the length of the key is
+suitable for the ciphersuite associated with the SSL_SESSION.
=head1 NOTES
const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
{
- int idx = c->algorithm2;
+ int idx = c->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK;
- idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)
return NULL;
return ssl_digest_methods[idx];
memcpy(sess->master_key, in, len);
sess->master_key_length = len;
-
return 1;
}
}
if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
+ /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
if (mdres == NULL) {
- /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
+ /*
+ * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * Ignore it
+ */
goto dopsksess;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request && mdres != handmd) {
/*
- * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so
- * we can't use it.
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
+ * so we can't use it.
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
/*
* Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
- * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations
- * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch.
- * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places
- * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue.
+ * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
+ * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
+ * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
+ * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
+ * issue.
*/
now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
/*
- * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If
- * so we just ignore it.
+ * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
+ * If so we just ignore it.
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
/*
- * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to
- * be mod 2^32.
+ * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
+ * to be mod 2^32.
*/
agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
- if (dores && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
- resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
+ if (dores
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (psksess != NULL && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart,
- binderoffset, NULL, pskbinder,
- psksess, 1, 1) != 1) {
+ if (psksess != NULL
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ pskbinder, psksess, 1, 1) != 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
static int use_session_cb(SSL *ssl, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char **id,
size_t *idlen, SSL_SESSION **sess)
{
- use_session_cb_cnt++;
-
- /* The first call should always have a NULL md */
- if (use_session_cb_cnt == 1 && md != NULL)
- return 0;
+ switch (++use_session_cb_cnt) {
+ case 1:
+ /* The first call should always have a NULL md */
+ if (md != NULL)
+ return 0;
+ break;
- /* The second call should always have an md */
- if (use_session_cb_cnt == 2 && md == NULL)
- return 0;
+ case 2:
+ /* The second call should always have an md */
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ break;
- /* We should only be called a maximum of twice */
- if (use_session_cb_cnt == 3)
+ default:
+ /* We should only be called a maximum of twice */
return 0;
+ }
if (psk != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(psk);
projects / openssl / commitdiff