]> granicus.if.org Git - apache/commitdiff
fix a few spelling errors
authorJeff Trawick <trawick@apache.org>
Mon, 3 Feb 2014 13:50:14 +0000 (13:50 +0000)
committerJeff Trawick <trawick@apache.org>
Mon, 3 Feb 2014 13:50:14 +0000 (13:50 +0000)
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1563894 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
modules/ssl/ssl_private.h

index 0bb37a318522f45d0d58ab32d701895e4c40b886..2b75fb497e70c7d87ed96113bbe586cdedadb3d3 100644 (file)
@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r)
              * cause us to end up in a different virtual host as the one that
              * was used for the handshake causing different SSL parameters to
              * be applied as SSLProtocol, SSLCACertificateFile/Path and
-             * SSLCADNRequestFile/Path cannot be renegotioated (SSLCA* due
-             * to current limitiations in Openssl, see
+             * SSLCADNRequestFile/Path cannot be renegotiated (SSLCA* due
+             * to current limitiations in OpenSSL, see
              * http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/200806.mbox/%3C48592955.2090303@velox.ch%3E
              * and
              * http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/201312.mbox/%3CCAKQ1sVNpOrdiBm-UPw1hEdSN7YQXRRjeaT-MCWbW_7mN%3DuFiOw%40mail.gmail.com%3E
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r)
             /*
              * We are using a name based configuration here, but no hostname was
              * provided via SNI. Don't allow that if are requested to do strict
-             * checking. Check wether this strict checking was setup either in the
+             * checking. Check whether this strict checking was setup either in the
              * server config we used for handshaking or in our current server.
              * This should avoid insecure configuration by accident.
              */
@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ void ssl_callback_Info(const SSL *ssl, int where, int rc)
         }
     }
     /* If the first handshake is complete, change state to reject any
-     * subsequent client-initated renegotiation. */
+     * subsequent client-initiated renegotiation. */
     else if ((where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) && scr->reneg_state == RENEG_INIT) {
         scr->reneg_state = RENEG_REJECT;
     }
@@ -2033,7 +2033,7 @@ static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s)
          * vhost we have just switched to. Again, we have to make sure
          * that we're not overwriting a session id context which was
          * possibly set in ssl_hook_Access(), before triggering
-         * a renegotation.
+         * a renegotiation.
          */
         if (SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) == 0) {
             unsigned char *sid_ctx =
index f6d465346cd92227e2433e2c0726d205f81e4538..3d8f5835c113969b09fad7edd25d2a40c42ebec1 100644 (file)
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ typedef struct {
         RENEG_INIT = 0, /* Before initial handshake */
         RENEG_REJECT, /* After initial handshake; any client-initiated
                        * renegotiation should be rejected */
-        RENEG_ALLOW, /* A server-initated renegotiation is taking
+        RENEG_ALLOW, /* A server-initiated renegotiation is taking
                       * place (as dictated by configuration) */
         RENEG_ABORT /* Renegotiation initiated by client, abort the
                      * connection */