trunk patch: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=
1356115&view=rev
http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=
1356813
2.4.x patch: http://people.apache.org/~jorton/httpd-pr52774.patch
+1: jorton, covener, druggeri, jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@
1359687 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-
ffa450edef68
possible XSS for a site where untrusted users can upload files to
a location with MultiViews enabled. [Niels Heinen <heinenn google.com>]
+ *) mod_rewrite: Add "AllowAnyURI" option. PR 52774. [Joe Orton]
+
*) htdbm, htpasswd: Don't crash if crypt() fails (e.g. with FIPS enabled).
[Paul Wouters <pwouters redhat.com>, Joe Orton]
2.4.x patch: trunk patch works
+1: jorton, covener, jim
- * mod_rewrite: add "AllowAnyURI" option.
- trunk patch: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=1356115&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1356813
- 2.4.x patch: http://people.apache.org/~jorton/httpd-pr52774.patch
- +1: jorton, covener, druggeri, jim
-
PATCHES PROPOSED TO BACKPORT FROM TRUNK:
[ New proposals should be added at the end of the list ]
later.</p>
</dd>
+ <dt><code>AllowAnyURI</code></dt>
+ <dd>
+
+ <p>When <directive module="mod_rewrite">RewriteRule</directive>
+ is used in <code>VirtualHost</code> or server context with
+ version 2.2.22 or later of httpd, <module>mod_rewrite</module>
+ will only process the rewrite rules if the request URI is a <a
+ href="./directive-dict.html#Syntax">URL-path</a>. This avoids
+ some security issues where particular rules could allow
+ "surprising" pattern expansions (see <a
+ href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-3368">CVE-2011-3368</a>
+ and <a
+ href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-4317">CVE-2011-4317</a>).
+ To lift the restriction on matching a URL-path, the
+ <code>AllowAnyURI</code> option can be enabled, and
+ <module>mod_rewrite</module> will apply the rule set to any
+ request URI string, regardless of whether that string matches
+ the URL-path grammar required by the HTTP specification.</p>
+
+ <note type="warning">
+ <title>Security Warning</title>
+
+ <p>Enabling this option will make the server vulnerable to
+ security issues if used with rewrite rules which are not
+ carefully authored. It is <strong>strongly recommended</strong>
+ that this option is not used. In particular, beware of input
+ strings containing the '<code>@</code>' character which could
+ change the interpretation of the transformed URI, as per the
+ above CVE names.</p>
+ </note>
+ </dd>
+
</dl>
</usage>
#define OPTION_INHERIT 1<<1
#define OPTION_INHERIT_BEFORE 1<<2
#define OPTION_NOSLASH 1<<3
+#define OPTION_ANYURI 1<<4
#ifndef RAND_MAX
#define RAND_MAX 32767
"LimitInternalRecursion directive and will be "
"ignored.");
}
+ else if (!strcasecmp(w, "allowanyuri")) {
+ options |= OPTION_ANYURI;
+ }
else {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "RewriteOptions: unknown option '",
w, "'", NULL);
return DECLINED;
}
- if ((r->unparsed_uri[0] == '*' && r->unparsed_uri[1] == '\0')
- || !r->uri || r->uri[0] != '/') {
+ /* Unless the anyuri option is set, ensure that the input to the
+ * first rule really is a URL-path, avoiding security issues with
+ * poorly configured rules. See CVE-2011-3368, CVE-2011-4317. */
+ if ((dconf->options & OPTION_ANYURI) == 0
+ && ((r->unparsed_uri[0] == '*' && r->unparsed_uri[1] == '\0')
+ || !r->uri || r->uri[0] != '/')) {
+ rewritelog((r, 8, NULL, "Declining, request-URI '%s' is not a URL-path. "
+ "Consult the manual entry for the RewriteOptions directive "
+ "for options and caveats about matching other strings.",
+ r->uri));
return DECLINED;
}