All protocols except for CURLPROTO_FILE/CURLPROTO_SMB and their TLS
counterpart were allowed for redirect. This vastly broadens the
exploitation surface in case of a vulnerability such as SSRF [1], where
libcurl-based clients are forced to make requests to arbitrary hosts.
For instance, CURLPROTO_GOPHER can be used to smuggle any TCP-based
protocol by URL-encoding a payload in the URI. Gopher will open a TCP
connection and send the payload.
Only HTTP/HTTPS and FTP are allowed. All other protocols have to be
explicitly enabled for redirects through CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS.
[1]: https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/server-side-request-forgery-vulnerability/
Signed-off-by: Linos Giannopoulos <lgian@skroutz.gr>
Closes #4094
define since we internally only use the lower 16 bits for the passed
in bitmask to not conflict with the private bits */
set->allowed_protocols = CURLPROTO_ALL;
- set->redir_protocols = CURLPROTO_ALL & /* All except FILE, SCP and SMB */
- ~(CURLPROTO_FILE | CURLPROTO_SCP | CURLPROTO_SMB |
- CURLPROTO_SMBS);
+ set->redir_protocols = CURLPROTO_HTTP | CURLPROTO_HTTPS | CURLPROTO_FTP;
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
/*