Fix errors in fortuna PRNG reseeding logic that could cause a predictable

session key to be selected by pgp_sym_encrypt() in some cases.  This only
affects non-OpenSSL-using builds.  Marko Kreen

diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
index 1b13337301ca1bcb94892b0bc44c4ffe23d4275e..cf69cee28bc10c06e6418ad052fc320a4142cb66 100644 (file)
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c,v 1.5 2005/10/15 02:49:06 momjian Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c,v 1.6 2006/05/21 20:22:16 tgl Exp $
  */
 
 #include "postgres.h"
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ encrypt_counter(FState * st, uint8 *dst)
  * microseconds.
  */
 static int
-too_often(FState * st)
+enough_time_passed(FState * st)
 {
        int                     ok;
        struct timeval tv;
@@ -227,13 +227,22 @@ too_often(FState * st)
 
        gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
 
+       /* check how much time has passed */
        ok = 0;
-       if (tv.tv_sec != last->tv_sec)
+       if (tv.tv_sec > last->tv_sec + 1)
                ok = 1;
+       else if (tv.tv_sec == last->tv_sec + 1)
+       {
+               if (1000000 + tv.tv_usec - last->tv_usec >= RESEED_INTERVAL)
+                       ok = 1;
+       }
        else if (tv.tv_usec - last->tv_usec >= RESEED_INTERVAL)
                ok = 1;
 
-       memcpy(last, &tv, sizeof(tv));
+       /* reseed will happen, update last_reseed_time */
+       if (ok)
+               memcpy(last, &tv, sizeof(tv));
+
        memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(tv));
 
        return ok;
@@ -372,7 +381,7 @@ extract_data(FState * st, unsigned count, uint8 *dst)
        unsigned        block_nr = 0;
 
        /* Can we reseed? */
-       if (st->pool0_bytes >= POOL0_FILL && !too_often(st))
+       if (st->pool0_bytes >= POOL0_FILL && enough_time_passed(st))
                reseed(st);
 
        /* Is counter initialized? */