Optimize AXFR disabled case

When disable-axfr=yes or client ACLs don't allow the AXFR to go through,
skip all backend launching activities (possibly expensive for pipe- and
remotebackend users).
Same for IXFR.

diff --git a/pdns/tcpreceiver.cc b/pdns/tcpreceiver.cc
index de2e8c1280229249065834d8d039fe29f8bb7386..95dbcd7b841f553f2187941c6d6c2954a577eb90 100644 (file)
--- a/pdns/tcpreceiver.cc
+++ b/pdns/tcpreceiver.cc
@@ -521,38 +521,13 @@ namespace {
 /** do the actual zone transfer. Return 0 in case of error, 1 in case of success */
 int TCPNameserver::doAXFR(const string &target, shared_ptr<DNSPacket> q, int outsock)
 {
-  bool noAXFRBecauseOfNSEC3Narrow=false;
-  NSEC3PARAMRecordContent ns3pr;
-  bool narrow;
-  bool NSEC3Zone=false;
-  
-  DNSSECKeeper dk;
-  dk.clearCaches(target);
-  bool securedZone = dk.isSecuredZone(target);
-  bool presignedZone = dk.isPresigned(target);
-
-  if(dk.getNSEC3PARAM(target, &ns3pr, &narrow)) {
-    NSEC3Zone=true;
-    if(narrow) {
-      L<<Logger::Error<<"Not doing AXFR of an NSEC3 narrow zone '"<<target<<"' for "<<q->getRemote()<<endl;
-      noAXFRBecauseOfNSEC3Narrow=true;
-    }
-  }
-
   shared_ptr<DNSPacket> outpacket= getFreshAXFRPacket(q);
   if(q->d_dnssecOk)
     outpacket->d_dnssecOk=true; // RFC 5936, 2.2.5 'SHOULD'
-  
-  if(noAXFRBecauseOfNSEC3Narrow) {
-    L<<Logger::Error<<"AXFR of domain '"<<target<<"' denied to "<<q->getRemote()<<endl;
-    outpacket->setRcode(RCode::Refused); 
-    // FIXME: should actually figure out if we are auth over a zone, and send out 9 if we aren't
-    sendPacket(outpacket,outsock);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  
+
   L<<Logger::Error<<"AXFR of domain '"<<target<<"' initiated by "<<q->getRemote()<<endl;
 
+  // determine if zone exists and AXFR is allowed using existing backend before spawning a new backend.
   SOAData sd;
   {
     Lock l(&s_plock);
@@ -562,14 +537,15 @@ int TCPNameserver::doAXFR(const string &target, shared_ptr<DNSPacket> q, int out
       s_P=new PacketHandler;
     }
 
-    if(!s_P->getBackend()->getSOAUncached(target, sd) || !canDoAXFR(q)) {
+    // canDoAXFR does all the ACL checks, and has the if(disable-axfr) shortcut, call it first.
+    if(!canDoAXFR(q) || !s_P->getBackend()->getSOAUncached(target, sd)) {
       L<<Logger::Error<<"AXFR of domain '"<<target<<"' failed: not authoritative"<<endl;
       outpacket->setRcode(9); // 'NOTAUTH'
       sendPacket(outpacket,outsock);
       return 0;
     }
   }
- 
+
   UeberBackend db;
   if(!db.getSOAUncached(target, sd)) {
     L<<Logger::Error<<"AXFR of domain '"<<target<<"' failed: not authoritative in second instance"<<endl;
@@ -578,6 +554,31 @@ int TCPNameserver::doAXFR(const string &target, shared_ptr<DNSPacket> q, int out
     return 0;
   }
 
+  DNSSECKeeper dk;
+  dk.clearCaches(target);
+  bool securedZone = dk.isSecuredZone(target);
+  bool presignedZone = dk.isPresigned(target);
+
+  bool noAXFRBecauseOfNSEC3Narrow=false;
+  NSEC3PARAMRecordContent ns3pr;
+  bool narrow;
+  bool NSEC3Zone=false;
+  if(dk.getNSEC3PARAM(target, &ns3pr, &narrow)) {
+    NSEC3Zone=true;
+    if(narrow) {
+      L<<Logger::Error<<"Not doing AXFR of an NSEC3 narrow zone '"<<target<<"' for "<<q->getRemote()<<endl;
+      noAXFRBecauseOfNSEC3Narrow=true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(noAXFRBecauseOfNSEC3Narrow) {
+    L<<Logger::Error<<"AXFR of domain '"<<target<<"' denied to "<<q->getRemote()<<endl;
+    outpacket->setRcode(RCode::Refused);
+    // FIXME: should actually figure out if we are auth over a zone, and send out 9 if we aren't
+    sendPacket(outpacket,outsock);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   TSIGRecordContent trc;
   string tsigkeyname, tsigsecret;
 
@@ -932,22 +933,6 @@ int TCPNameserver::doIXFR(shared_ptr<DNSPacket> q, int outsock)
   if(q->d_dnssecOk)
     outpacket->d_dnssecOk=true; // RFC 5936, 2.2.5 'SHOULD'
 
-  DNSSECKeeper dk;
-  NSEC3PARAMRecordContent ns3pr;
-  bool narrow;
-
-  dk.clearCaches(q->qdomain);
-  bool securedZone = dk.isSecuredZone(q->qdomain);
-  if(dk.getNSEC3PARAM(q->qdomain, &ns3pr, &narrow)) {
-    if(narrow) {
-      L<<Logger::Error<<"Not doing IXFR of an NSEC3 narrow zone."<<endl;
-      L<<Logger::Error<<"IXFR of domain '"<<q->qdomain<<"' denied to "<<q->getRemote()<<endl;
-      outpacket->setRcode(RCode::Refused);
-      sendPacket(outpacket,outsock);
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
   uint32_t serial = 0;
   MOADNSParser mdp(q->getString());
   for(MOADNSParser::answers_t::const_iterator i=mdp.d_answers.begin(); i != mdp.d_answers.end(); ++i) {
@@ -973,6 +958,7 @@ int TCPNameserver::doIXFR(shared_ptr<DNSPacket> q, int outsock)
 
   L<<Logger::Error<<"IXFR of domain '"<<q->qdomain<<"' initiated by "<<q->getRemote()<<" with serial "<<serial<<endl;
 
+  // determine if zone exists and AXFR is allowed using existing backend before spawning a new backend.
   SOAData sd;
   {
     Lock l(&s_plock);
@@ -982,7 +968,8 @@ int TCPNameserver::doIXFR(shared_ptr<DNSPacket> q, int outsock)
       s_P=new PacketHandler;
     }
 
-    if(!s_P->getBackend()->getSOAUncached(q->qdomain, sd) || !canDoAXFR(q)) {
+    // canDoAXFR does all the ACL checks, and has the if(disable-axfr) shortcut, call it first.
+    if(!canDoAXFR(q) || !s_P->getBackend()->getSOAUncached(q->qdomain, sd)) {
       L<<Logger::Error<<"IXFR of domain '"<<q->qdomain<<"' failed: not authoritative"<<endl;
       outpacket->setRcode(9); // 'NOTAUTH'
       sendPacket(outpacket,outsock);
@@ -990,6 +977,22 @@ int TCPNameserver::doIXFR(shared_ptr<DNSPacket> q, int outsock)
     }
   }
 
+  DNSSECKeeper dk;
+  NSEC3PARAMRecordContent ns3pr;
+  bool narrow;
+
+  dk.clearCaches(q->qdomain);
+  bool securedZone = dk.isSecuredZone(q->qdomain);
+  if(dk.getNSEC3PARAM(q->qdomain, &ns3pr, &narrow)) {
+    if(narrow) {
+      L<<Logger::Error<<"Not doing IXFR of an NSEC3 narrow zone."<<endl;
+      L<<Logger::Error<<"IXFR of domain '"<<q->qdomain<<"' denied to "<<q->getRemote()<<endl;
+      outpacket->setRcode(RCode::Refused);
+      sendPacket(outpacket,outsock);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
   string target = q->qdomain;
 
   UeberBackend db;