Do not include a timestamp in the Client/ServerHello Random field.

Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.

This is a forward-port of commits:
  4af793036f6ef4f0a1078e5d7155426a98d50e37
  f4c93b46edb51da71f09eda99e83eaf193a33c08
  3da721dac9382c48812c8eba455528fd59af2eef
  2583270191a8b27eed303c03ece1da97b9b69fd3

While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear.  This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:

    * It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.

    * If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
      handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.

diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 15878c66e16cfc60d615ecd5285396920d171e46..af4fffe67d1c814b37278ec586a81125888d3272 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -269,6 +269,28 @@ static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
        return 1;
        }
 
+/* Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0
+ * on failure, 1 on success. */
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
+       {
+               int send_time = 0;
+               if (len < 4)
+                       return 0;
+               if (server)
+                       send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+               else
+                       send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+               if (send_time)
+                       {
+                       unsigned long Time = time(NULL);
+                       unsigned char *p = result;
+                       l2n(Time, p);
+                       return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len-4);
+                       }
+               else
+                       return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
+       }
+
 static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
        {
        unsigned char *buf;
@@ -359,9 +381,7 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
                p=s->s3->client_random;
-               Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);         /* Time */
-               l2n(Time,p);
-               if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+               if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
                        return -1;
 
                if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index ce7b36aa14083c0a866a6a2a198b4897eb208d32..bf1ef4776648e564b628e96e92588447e2e1377c 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
        unsigned char *buf;
        unsigned char *p,*d;
        int i;
-       unsigned long Time,l;
+       unsigned long l;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
        int j;
        SSL_COMP *comp;
@@ -768,12 +768,8 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
                        i = 1;
 
                if (i)
-                       {
-                       Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
-                       l2n(Time,p);
-                       RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)-4);
-                                       
-                       }
+                       ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
+                                             sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
 
                /* Do the message type and length last */
                d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 02653a4983b4b6222cf5d0f02c0be5e23ee039cc..92181bb4af001143e8cf61437426178671363c7c 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1246,12 +1246,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
         * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
        {
-               unsigned long Time;
                unsigned char *pos;
-               Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
                pos=s->s3->server_random;
-               l2n(Time,pos);
-               if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+               if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
                        {
                        goto f_err;
                        }

diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index c2587120a5511e963db60d713f27cad2365b6580..472e07050a365e3bcb3f7f767a1c26294c8ea173 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -752,6 +752,12 @@ struct ssl_session_st
  * TLS only.)  "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
  * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
 #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
+/* Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
+ * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
+ * that require it.
+ */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
 
 /* Cert related flags */
 /* Many implementations ignore some aspects of the TLS standards such as

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index a4ce8dd32a19e70f8f832e59c94805d3c92be476..ce4c3481cd4ecdd36095ad8e8c439902e1c87b94 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1016,6 +1016,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
 void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
 
 int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
 int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);