Fix portability bugs in use of credentials control messages for peer auth.
authorTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Mon, 30 May 2011 23:16:22 +0000 (19:16 -0400)
committerTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Mon, 30 May 2011 23:16:22 +0000 (19:16 -0400)
Even though our existing code for handling credentials control messages has
been basically unchanged since 2001, it was fundamentally wrong: it did not
ensure proper alignment of the supplied buffer, and it was calculating
buffer sizes and message sizes incorrectly.  This led to failures on
platforms where alignment padding is relevant, for instance FreeBSD on
64-bit platforms, as seen in a recent Debian bug report passed on by
Martin Pitt (http://bugs.debian.org//cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=612888).

Rewrite to do the message-whacking using the macros specified in RFC 2292,
following a suggestion from Theo de Raadt in that thread.  Tested by me
on Debian/kFreeBSD-amd64; since OpenBSD and NetBSD document the identical
CMSG API, it should work there too.

Back-patch to all supported branches.

src/backend/libpq/hba.c
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c

index 8421845b2d3346bcb5ee275f48ccc3d2980ffd3d..10ad1db10bb8a3a2e44e99b4770a147e669bdaa6 100644 (file)
@@ -1453,7 +1453,7 @@ static bool
 ident_unix(int sock, char *ident_user)
 {
 #if defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
-       /* OpenBSD style:  */
+       /* OpenBSD (also Mac OS X) style: use getpeereid() */
        uid_t           uid;
        gid_t           gid;
        struct passwd *pass;
@@ -1512,9 +1512,7 @@ ident_unix(int sock, char *ident_user)
 
        return true;
 #elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS))
-       struct msghdr msg;
-
-/* Credentials structure */
+       /* Assorted BSDen: use a credentials control message */
 #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED)
        typedef struct cmsgcred Cred;
 
@@ -1528,36 +1526,35 @@ ident_unix(int sock, char *ident_user)
 
 #define cruid sc_uid
 #endif
-       Cred       *cred;
-
-       /* Compute size without padding */
-       char            cmsgmem[ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + ALIGN(sizeof(Cred))];   /* for NetBSD */
-
-       /* Point to start of first structure */
-       struct cmsghdr *cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) cmsgmem;
 
+       struct msghdr msg;
+       struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+       union
+       {
+               struct cmsghdr  hdr;
+               unsigned char   buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(Cred))];
+       } cmsgbuf;
        struct iovec iov;
        char            buf;
+       Cred       *cred;
        struct passwd *pw;
 
-       memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
-       msg.msg_iov = &iov;
-       msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
-       msg.msg_control = (char *) cmsg;
-       msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgmem);
-       memset(cmsg, 0, sizeof(cmsgmem));
-
        /*
-        * The one character which is received here is not meaningful; its
-        * purposes is only to make sure that recvmsg() blocks long enough for the
-        * other side to send its credentials.
+        * The one character that is received here is not meaningful; its purpose
+        * is only to make sure that recvmsg() blocks long enough for the other
+        * side to send its credentials.
         */
        iov.iov_base = &buf;
        iov.iov_len = 1;
 
-       if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0 ||
-               cmsg->cmsg_len < sizeof(cmsgmem) ||
-               cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDS)
+       memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+       msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+       msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+       msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
+       msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+       memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+
+       if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0)
        {
                ereport(LOG,
                                (errcode_for_socket_access(),
@@ -1565,6 +1562,19 @@ ident_unix(int sock, char *ident_user)
                return false;
        }
 
+       cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+       if (msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC) ||
+               cmsg == NULL ||
+               cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(Cred)) ||
+               cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET ||
+               cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDS)
+       {
+               ereport(LOG,
+                               (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+                                errmsg("could not get peer credentials: incorrect control message")));
+               return false;
+       }
+
        cred = (Cred *) CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
 
        pw = getpwuid(cred->cruid);
index e93b5930d12ffb8af00fe92359394d21ea2414f8..94c398c8701827cfcfc65694dc40e9d5fc5e6030 100644 (file)
@@ -709,11 +709,12 @@ pg_local_sendauth(PGconn *conn)
        struct msghdr msg;
 
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED
-       /* Prevent padding */
-       char            cmsgmem[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + sizeof(struct cmsgcred)];
-
-       /* Point to start of first structure */
-       struct cmsghdr *cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) cmsgmem;
+       struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+       union
+       {
+               struct cmsghdr  hdr;
+               unsigned char   buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct cmsgcred))];
+       } cmsgbuf;
 #endif
 
        /*
@@ -729,11 +730,12 @@ pg_local_sendauth(PGconn *conn)
        msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
 
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED
-       /* Create control header, FreeBSD */
-       msg.msg_control = cmsg;
-       msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgmem);
-       memset(cmsg, 0, sizeof(cmsgmem));
-       cmsg->cmsg_len = sizeof(cmsgmem);
+       /* FreeBSD needs us to set up a message that will be filled in by kernel */
+       memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+       msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
+       msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+       cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+       cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct cmsgcred));
        cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
        cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_CREDS;
 #endif