* server/mpm_unix.c (dummy_connection): Use a TLS 1.0 close_notify

  alert if the chosen listener is configured for https; not perfect
  but better than sending an HTTP request.  Adjust comments.

git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1327036 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

diff --git a/server/mpm_unix.c b/server/mpm_unix.c
index 87df8f57a95804460b373b6d5e387983bf268d5e..d99e3856df54ebff033e97872c356c335675efc3 100644 (file)
--- a/server/mpm_unix.c
+++ b/server/mpm_unix.c
@@ -501,14 +501,14 @@ static apr_status_t pod_signal_internal(ap_pod_t *pod)
     return rv;
 }
 
-/* This function connects to the server, then immediately closes the connection.
- * This permits the MPM to skip the poll when there is only one listening
- * socket, because it provides a alternate way to unblock an accept() when
- * the pod is used.
- */
+/* This function connects to the server and sends enough data to
+ * ensure the child wakes up and processes a new connection.  This
+ * permits the MPM to skip the poll when there is only one listening
+ * socket, because it provides a alternate way to unblock an accept()
+ * when the pod is used.  */
 static apr_status_t dummy_connection(ap_pod_t *pod)
 {
-    char *srequest;
+    const char *data;
     apr_status_t rv;
     apr_socket_t *sock;
     apr_pool_t *p;
@@ -574,24 +574,37 @@ static apr_status_t dummy_connection(ap_pod_t *pod)
         return rv;
     }
 
-    /* Create the request string. We include a User-Agent so that
-     * adminstrators can track down the cause of the odd-looking
-     * requests in their logs.
-     */
-    srequest = apr_pstrcat(p, "OPTIONS * HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: ",
+    if (lp->protocol && strcasecmp(lp->protocol, "https") == 0) {
+        /* Send a TLS 1.0 close_notify alert.  This is perhaps the
+         * "least wrong" way to open and cleanly terminate an SSL
+         * connection.  It should "work" without noisy error logs if
+         * the server actually expects SSLv3/TLSv1.  With
+         * SSLv23_server_method() OpenSSL's SSL_accept() fails
+         * ungracefully on receipt of this message, since it requires
+         * an 11-byte ClientHello message and this is to short. */
+        static const unsigned char tls10_close_notify[7] = {
+            '\x15',         /* TLSPlainText.type = Alert (21) */
+            '\x03', '\x01', /* TLSPlainText.version = {3, 1} */
+            '\x00', '\x02', /* TLSPlainText.length = 2 */
+            '\x01',         /* Alert.level = warning (1) */
+            '\x00'          /* Alert.description = close_notify (0) */
+        };
+        data = (const char *)tls10_close_notify;
+        len = sizeof(tls10_close_notify);
+    }
+    else /* ... XXX other request types here? */ {
+        /* Create an HTTP request string.  We include a User-Agent so
+         * that adminstrators can track down the cause of the
+         * odd-looking requests in their logs.  A complete request is
+         * used since kernel-level filtering may require that much
+         * data before returning from accept(). */
+        data = apr_pstrcat(p, "OPTIONS * HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: ",
                            ap_get_server_description(),
                            " (internal dummy connection)\r\n\r\n", NULL);
+        len = strlen(data);
+    }
 
-    /* Since some operating systems support buffering of data or entire
-     * requests in the kernel, we send a simple request, to make sure
-     * the server pops out of a blocking accept().
-     */
-    /* XXX: This is HTTP specific. We should look at the Protocol for each
-     * listener, and send the correct type of request to trigger any Accept
-     * Filters.
-     */
-    len = strlen(srequest);
-    apr_socket_send(sock, srequest, &len);
+    apr_socket_send(sock, data, &len);
     apr_socket_close(sock);
     apr_pool_destroy(p);