axTLS:
This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring
the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend.
Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS:
Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c
files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and
other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file.
CyaSSL:
CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a
limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the
Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the
NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words:
setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks
too.
Schannel:
Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage
message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about
disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting)
into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are
being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of
switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with
SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK
(http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature
is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark
output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist).
PolarSSL:
Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move
of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this
change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the
POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu
PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then
PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN
trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0.
Generic:
All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the
ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
idn_win32.c http_negotiate_sspi.c cyassl.c http_proxy.c non-ascii.c \
asyn-ares.c asyn-thread.c curl_gssapi.c curl_ntlm.c curl_ntlm_wb.c \
curl_ntlm_core.c curl_ntlm_msgs.c curl_sasl.c curl_schannel.c \
- curl_multibyte.c curl_darwinssl.c
+ curl_multibyte.c curl_darwinssl.c hostcheck.c
HHEADERS = arpa_telnet.h netrc.h file.h timeval.h qssl.h hostip.h \
progress.h formdata.h cookie.h http.h sendf.h ftp.h url.h dict.h \
warnless.h curl_hmac.h polarssl.h curl_rtmp.h curl_gethostname.h \
gopher.h axtls.h cyassl.h http_proxy.h non-ascii.h asyn.h curl_ntlm.h \
curl_gssapi.h curl_ntlm_wb.h curl_ntlm_core.h curl_ntlm_msgs.h \
- curl_sasl.h curl_schannel.h curl_multibyte.h curl_darwinssl.h
+ curl_sasl.h curl_schannel.h curl_multibyte.h curl_darwinssl.h \
+ hostcheck.h
#include "curl_memory.h"
/* The last #include file should be: */
#include "memdebug.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+
/* SSL_read is opied from axTLS compat layer */
static int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num)
int i, ssl_fcn_return;
const uint8_t *ssl_sessionid;
size_t ssl_idsize;
- const char *x509;
+ const char *peer_CN;
+ uint32_t dns_altname_index;
+ const char *dns_altname;
+ int8_t found_subject_alt_names = 0;
+ int8_t found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn = 0;
/* Assuming users will not compile in custom key/cert to axTLS */
uint32_t client_option = SSL_NO_DEFAULT_KEY|SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_LATER;
/* Here, gtls.c does issuer verification. axTLS has no straightforward
* equivalent, so omitting for now.*/
- /* See if common name was set in server certificate */
- x509 = ssl_get_cert_dn(ssl, SSL_X509_CERT_COMMON_NAME);
- if(x509 == NULL)
- infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert\n");
-
/* Here, gtls.c does the following
* 1) x509 hostname checking per RFC2818. axTLS doesn't support this, but
- * it seems useful. Omitting for now.
+ * it seems useful. This is now implemented, by Oscar Koeroo
* 2) checks cert validity based on time. axTLS does this in ssl_verify_cert
* 3) displays a bunch of cert information. axTLS doesn't support most of
* this, but a couple fields are available.
*/
+
+ /* There is no (DNS) Altnames count in the version 1.4.8 API. There is a
+ risk of an inifite loop */
+ for(dns_altname_index = 0; ; dns_altname_index++) {
+ dns_altname = ssl_get_cert_subject_alt_dnsname(ssl, dns_altname_index);
+ if(dns_altname == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ found_subject_alt_names = 1;
+
+ infof(data, "\tComparing subject alt name DNS with hostname: %s <-> %s\n",
+ dns_altname, conn->host.name);
+ if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(dns_altname, conn->host.name)) {
+ found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* RFC2818 checks */
+ if(found_subject_alt_names && !found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn) {
+ /* Break connection ! */
+ Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
+ failf(data, "\tsubjectAltName(s) do not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else if(found_subject_alt_names == 0) {
+ /* Per RFC2818, when no Subject Alt Names were available, examine the peer
+ CN as a legacy fallback */
+ peer_CN = ssl_get_cert_dn(ssl, SSL_X509_CERT_COMMON_NAME);
+ if(peer_CN == NULL) {
+ /* Similar behaviour to the OpenSSL interface */
+ Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
+ failf(data, "unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ /* Break connection ! */
+ Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
+ failf(data, "\tcommon name \"%s\" does not match \"%s\"\n",
+ peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "\tcommon name \"%s\" does not match \"%s\"\n",
+ peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* General housekeeping */
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl = ssl;
}
#endif /* defined(__MAC_10_6) || defined(__IPHONE_5_0) */
+ /* If this is a domain name and not an IP address, then configure SNI.
+ * Also: the verifyhost setting influences SNI usage */
/* If this is a domain name and not an IP address, then configure SNI: */
if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
connssl->connecting_state = connssl->ssl_direction ?
ssl_connect_2_writing : ssl_connect_2_reading;
return CURLE_OK;
- break;
case errSSLServerAuthCompleted:
/* the documentation says we need to call SSLHandshake() again */
case errSSLCertExpired:
failf(data, "SSL certificate problem: OSStatus %d", err);
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
- break;
+
+ case errSSLHostNameMismatch:
+ failf(data, "SSL certificate peer verification failed, the "
+ "certificate did not match \"%s\"\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
default:
failf(data, "Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to %s:%d",
conn->host.name, err);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- break;
}
}
else {
infof(data, "schannel: disable server certificate revocation checks\n");
}
- if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr) ||
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
- Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr6) ||
+ || Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr6)
#endif
- !data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ ) {
schannel_cred.dwFlags |= SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK;
- infof(data, "schannel: using IP address, disable SNI servername "
- "check\n");
+ infof(data, "schannel: using IP address, SNI is being disabled by "
+ "disabling the servername check against the "
+ "subject names in server certificates.\n");
+ }
+
+ if(!data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ schannel_cred.dwFlags |= SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK;
+ infof(data, "schannel: verifyhost setting prevents Schannel from "
+ "comparing the supplied target name with the subject "
+ "names in server certificates. Also disables SNI.\n");
}
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
#include "curl_memory.h"
/* The last #include file should be: */
#include "memdebug.h"
+#include <cyassl/ssl.h>
+#include <cyassl/error.h>
static Curl_recv cyassl_recv;
conn->recv[sockindex] = cyassl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = cyassl_send;
+ /* Enable RFC2818 checks */
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ ret = CyaSSL_check_domain_name(conssl->handle, conn->host.name);
+ if(ret == SSL_FAILURE)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
ret = SSL_connect(conssl->handle);
if(ret != 1) {
char error_buffer[80];
conssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
return CURLE_OK;
}
-
- if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
+ else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
conssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
return CURLE_OK;
}
-
- failf(data, "SSL_connect failed with error %d: %s", detail,
+ /* There is no easy way to override only the CN matching.
+ * This will enable the override of both mismatching SubjectAltNames
+ * as also mismatching CN fields */
+ else if(DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH == detail) {
+#if 1
+ failf(data, "\tsubject alt name(s) or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
+ conn->host.dispname);
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+#else
+ /* When the CyaSSL_check_domain_name() is used and you desire to continue
+ * on a DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH, i.e. 'data->set.ssl.verifyhost == 0',
+ * CyaSSL version 2.4.0 will fail with an INCOMPLETE_DATA error. The only
+ * way to do this is currently to switch the CyaSSL_check_domain_name()
+ * in and out based on the 'data->set.ssl.verifyhost' value. */
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ failf(data,
+ "\tsubject alt name(s) or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
+ conn->host.dispname);
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data,
+ "\tsubject alt name(s) and/or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
+ conn->host.dispname);
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "SSL_connect failed with error %d: %s", detail,
ERR_error_string(detail, error_buffer));
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
}
conssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
--- /dev/null
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+#include "rawstr.h"
+
+/*
+ * Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
+ * E.g.
+ * "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com".
+ *
+ * We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3.
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+ */
+
+int Curl_hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
+{
+ const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
+ int wildcard_enabled;
+ size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
+ pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
+ if(pattern_wildcard == NULL)
+ return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
+ match. */
+ wildcard_enabled = 1;
+ pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
+ if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end+1, '.') == NULL ||
+ pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
+ Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
+ wildcard_enabled = 0;
+ }
+ if(!wildcard_enabled)
+ return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
+ if(hostname_label_end == NULL ||
+ !Curl_raw_equal(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end))
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ /* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most
+ label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label
+ of the pattern. */
+ if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern)
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
+ suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard+1);
+ return Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
+ Curl_raw_nequal(pattern_wildcard+1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
+ suffixlen) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
+{
+ if(!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
+ !hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
+ return 0;
+
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(hostname, match_pattern)) /* trivial case */
+ return 1;
+
+ if(Curl_hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == CURL_HOST_MATCH)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef __HOSTCHECK_H
+#define __HOSTCHECK_H
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+#include <curl/curl.h>
+
+#define CURL_HOST_NOMATCH 0
+#define CURL_HOST_MATCH 1
+int Curl_hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern);
+int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname);
+
+#endif
infof(data, "PolarSSL re-using session\n");
}
+/* PolarSSL SVN revision r1316 to r1317, matching <1.2.0 is to cover Ubuntu's
+ 1.1.4 version and the like */
+#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01020000
ssl_set_session(&connssl->ssl, 1, 600,
&connssl->ssn);
+#else
+ ssl_set_session(&connssl->ssl,
+ &connssl->ssn);
+#endif
ssl_set_ca_chain(&connssl->ssl,
&connssl->cacert,
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
+/* PolarSSL SVN revision r1316 to r1317, matching <1.2.0 is to cover Ubuntu's
+ 1.1.4 version and the like */
+#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01020000
if(conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl.peer_cert) {
+#else
+ if(ssl_get_peer_cert(&(connssl->ssl))) {
+#endif
/* If the session was resumed, there will be no peer certs */
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+/* PolarSSL SVN revision r1316 to r1317, matching <1.2.0 is to cover Ubuntu's
+ 1.1.4 version and the like */
+#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01020000
if(x509parse_cert_info(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (char *)"* ",
conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl.peer_cert) != -1)
+#else
+ if(x509parse_cert_info(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (char *)"* ",
+ ssl_get_peer_cert(&(connssl->ssl))) != -1)
+#endif
infof(data, "Dumping cert info:\n%s\n", buffer);
}
#include "select.h"
#include "sslgen.h"
#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */
#include <curl/mprintf.h>
/* ====================================================== */
-/*
- * Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
- * E.g.
- * "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com".
- *
- * We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3.
- * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
- */
-#define HOST_NOMATCH 0
-#define HOST_MATCH 1
-
-static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
-{
- const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
- int wildcard_enabled;
- size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
- pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
- if(pattern_wildcard == NULL) {
- return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ? HOST_MATCH : HOST_NOMATCH;
- }
- /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
- match. */
- wildcard_enabled = 1;
- pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
- if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end+1, '.') == NULL ||
- pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
- Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
- wildcard_enabled = 0;
- }
- if(!wildcard_enabled) {
- return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ? HOST_MATCH : HOST_NOMATCH;
- }
- hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
- if(hostname_label_end == NULL ||
- !Curl_raw_equal(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end)) {
- return HOST_NOMATCH;
- }
- /* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most
- label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label
- of the pattern. */
- if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern) {
- return HOST_NOMATCH;
- }
- prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
- suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard+1);
- return Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
- Curl_raw_nequal(pattern_wildcard+1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
- suffixlen) ?
- HOST_MATCH : HOST_NOMATCH;
-}
-
-static int
-cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
-{
- if(!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
- !hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
- return 0;
-
- if(Curl_raw_equal(hostname, match_pattern)) /* trivial case */
- return 1;
-
- if(hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == HOST_MATCH)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
/* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
string and we cannot match it. */
- cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
+ Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
matched = 1;
else
matched = 0;
"SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
- else if(!cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
+ else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
"target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
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