OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
-
- *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
- can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
- server.
-
- Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
- Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
- preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
- [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
- ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
- by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
-
- Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
- flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
- [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
[Steve Henson]
- *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
-
- Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
- TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
- less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
- is at least 512 bytes long.
-
- [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
-
*) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
[Steve Henson]
certificates.
[Steve Henson]
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
+
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+ [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
*) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid