functions.
This extends the previous patch that forbade SETting these variables inside
security-definer functions. RESET is equally a security hole, since it
would allow regaining privileges of the caller; furthermore it can trigger
Assert failures and perhaps other internal errors, since the code is not
expecting these variables to change in such contexts. The previous patch
did not cover this case because assign hooks don't really have enough
information, so move the responsibility for preventing this into guc.c.
Problem discovered by Heikki Linnakangas.
Security: no CVE assigned yet, extends CVE-2007-6600
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/commands/variable.c,v 1.114.2.3 2008/01/03 21:24:26 tgl Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/commands/variable.c,v 1.114.2.4 2009/09/03 22:08:45 tgl Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/* not a saved ID, so look it up */
HeapTuple roleTup;
- if (InSecurityDefinerContext())
- {
- /*
- * Disallow SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION inside a security definer
- * context. We need to do this because when we exit the context,
- * GUC won't be notified, leaving things out of sync. Note that
- * this test is positioned so that restoring a previously saved
- * setting isn't prevented.
- */
- if (source >= PGC_S_INTERACTIVE)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
- errmsg("cannot set session authorization within security-definer function")));
- return NULL;
- }
-
if (!IsTransactionState())
{
/*
}
}
- if (roleid == InvalidOid && InSecurityDefinerContext())
- {
- /*
- * Disallow SET ROLE inside a security definer context. We need to do
- * this because when we exit the context, GUC won't be notified,
- * leaving things out of sync. Note that this test is arranged so
- * that restoring a previously saved setting isn't prevented.
- *
- * XXX it would be nice to allow this case in future, with the
- * behavior being that the SET ROLE's effects end when the security
- * definer context is exited.
- */
- if (source >= PGC_S_INTERACTIVE)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
- errmsg("cannot set role within security-definer function")));
- return NULL;
- }
-
if (roleid == InvalidOid &&
strcmp(actual_rolename, "none") != 0)
{
* Written by Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>.
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c,v 1.299.2.4 2008/05/26 18:54:50 tgl Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c,v 1.299.2.5 2009/09/03 22:08:45 tgl Exp $
*
*--------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
{"role", PGC_USERSET, UNGROUPED,
gettext_noop("Sets the current role."),
NULL,
- GUC_IS_NAME | GUC_NO_SHOW_ALL | GUC_NO_RESET_ALL | GUC_NOT_IN_SAMPLE | GUC_DISALLOW_IN_FILE
+ GUC_IS_NAME | GUC_NO_SHOW_ALL | GUC_NO_RESET_ALL | GUC_NOT_IN_SAMPLE | GUC_DISALLOW_IN_FILE | GUC_NOT_WHILE_SEC_DEF
},
&role_string,
"none", assign_role, show_role
{"session_authorization", PGC_USERSET, UNGROUPED,
gettext_noop("Sets the session user name."),
NULL,
- GUC_IS_NAME | GUC_REPORT | GUC_NO_SHOW_ALL | GUC_NO_RESET_ALL | GUC_NOT_IN_SAMPLE | GUC_DISALLOW_IN_FILE
+ GUC_IS_NAME | GUC_REPORT | GUC_NO_SHOW_ALL | GUC_NO_RESET_ALL | GUC_NOT_IN_SAMPLE | GUC_DISALLOW_IN_FILE | GUC_NOT_WHILE_SEC_DEF
},
&session_authorization_string,
NULL, assign_session_authorization, show_session_authorization
break;
}
+ /*
+ * Disallow changing GUC_NOT_WHILE_SEC_DEF values if we are inside a
+ * security-definer function. We can reject this regardless of
+ * the context or source, mainly because sources that it might be
+ * reasonable to override for won't be seen while inside a function.
+ *
+ * Note: variables marked GUC_NOT_WHILE_SEC_DEF should probably be marked
+ * GUC_NO_RESET_ALL as well, because ResetAllOptions() doesn't check this.
+ *
+ * Note: this flag is currently used for "session_authorization" and
+ * "role". We need to prohibit this because when we exit the sec-def
+ * context, GUC won't be notified, leaving things out of sync.
+ *
+ * XXX it would be nice to allow these cases in future, with the behavior
+ * being that the SET's effects end when the security definer context is
+ * exited.
+ */
+ if ((record->flags & GUC_NOT_WHILE_SEC_DEF) && InSecurityDefinerContext())
+ {
+ ereport(elevel,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+ errmsg("cannot set parameter \"%s\" within security-definer function",
+ name)));
+ return false;
+ }
+
/*
* Should we set reset/stacked values? (If so, the behavior is not
* transactional.)
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2005, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/include/utils/guc_tables.h,v 1.20.2.1 2006/02/12 22:32:57 tgl Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/include/utils/guc_tables.h,v 1.20.2.2 2009/09/03 22:08:45 tgl Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#define GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY 0x0100 /* show only to superusers */
#define GUC_IS_NAME 0x0200 /* limit string to NAMEDATALEN-1 */
+#define GUC_NOT_WHILE_SEC_DEF 0x8000 /* can't change inside sec-def func */
+
/* bit values in status field */
#define GUC_HAVE_TENTATIVE 0x0001 /* tentative value is defined */
#define GUC_HAVE_LOCAL 0x0002 /* a SET LOCAL has been executed */
projects / postgresql / commitdiff