* fe-auth.c
* The front-end (client) authorization routines
*
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2003, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2006, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* NOTE: the error message strings returned by this module must not
* exceed INITIAL_EXPBUFFER_SIZE (currently 256 bytes).
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c,v 1.84 2003/10/25 03:48:47 momjian Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c,v 1.118 2006/07/14 04:59:30 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* INTERFACE ROUTINES
* frontend (client) routines:
- * fe_sendauth send authentication information
- * fe_getauthname get user's name according to the client side
+ * pg_fe_sendauth send authentication information
+ * pg_fe_getauthname get user's name according to the client side
* of the authentication system
- * fe_setauthsvc set frontend authentication service
- * fe_getauthsvc get current frontend authentication service
- *
- *
- *
*/
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#else
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h> /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN on most */
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include "libpq-fe.h"
#include "libpq-int.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
-#include "libpq/crypt.h"
-
-
-/*
- * common definitions for generic fe/be routines
- */
-
-#define STARTUP_MSG 7 /* Initialise a connection */
-#define STARTUP_KRB4_MSG 10 /* krb4 session follows */
-#define STARTUP_KRB5_MSG 11 /* krb5 session follows */
-#define STARTUP_PASSWORD_MSG 14 /* Password follows */
-
-struct authsvc
-{
- const char *name; /* service nickname (for command line) */
- MsgType msgtype; /* startup packet header type */
- int allowed; /* initially allowed (before command line
- * option parsing)? */
-};
-
-/*
- * Command-line parsing routines use this structure to map nicknames
- * onto service types (and the startup packets to use with them).
- *
- * Programs receiving an authentication request use this structure to
- * decide which authentication service types are currently permitted.
- * By default, all authentication systems compiled into the system are
- * allowed. Unauthenticated connections are disallowed unless there
- * isn't any authentication system.
- */
-static const struct authsvc authsvcs[] = {
-#ifdef KRB4
- {"krb4", STARTUP_KRB4_MSG, 1},
- {"kerberos", STARTUP_KRB4_MSG, 1},
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-#ifdef KRB5
- {"krb5", STARTUP_KRB5_MSG, 1},
- {"kerberos", STARTUP_KRB5_MSG, 1},
-#endif /* KRB5 */
- {UNAUTHNAME, STARTUP_MSG,
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
- 0
-#else /* !(KRB4 || KRB5) */
- 1
-#endif /* !(KRB4 || KRB5) */
- },
- {"password", STARTUP_PASSWORD_MSG, 0}
-};
-
-static const int n_authsvcs = sizeof(authsvcs) / sizeof(struct authsvc);
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-/*
- * MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 4
- */
-
-#include "krb.h"
-
-/* for some reason, this is not defined in krb.h ... */
-extern char *tkt_string(void);
-
-/*
- * pg_krb4_init -- initialization performed before any Kerberos calls are made
- *
- * For v4, all we need to do is make sure the library routines get the right
- * ticket file if we want them to see a special one. (They will open the file
- * themselves.)
- */
-static void
-pg_krb4_init()
-{
- char *realm;
- static int init_done = 0;
-
- if (init_done)
- return;
- init_done = 1;
-
- /*
- * If the user set PGREALM, then we use a ticket file with a special
- * name: <usual-ticket-file-name>@<PGREALM-value>
- */
- if ((realm = getenv("PGREALM")))
- {
- char tktbuf[MAXPGPATH];
-
- (void) snprintf(tktbuf, sizeof(tktbuf), "%s@%s", tkt_string(), realm);
- krb_set_tkt_string(tktbuf);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * pg_krb4_authname -- returns a pointer to static space containing whatever
- * name the user has authenticated to the system
- *
- * We obtain this information by digging around in the ticket file.
- */
-static char *
-pg_krb4_authname(char *PQerrormsg)
-{
- char instance[INST_SZ + 1];
- char realm[REALM_SZ + 1];
- int status;
- static char name[SNAME_SZ + 1] = "";
-
- if (name[0])
- return name;
-
- pg_krb4_init();
-
- name[SNAME_SZ] = '\0';
- status = krb_get_tf_fullname(tkt_string(), name, instance, realm);
- if (status != KSUCCESS)
- {
- snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- "pg_krb4_authname: krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n",
- krb_err_txt[status]);
- return (char *) NULL;
- }
- return name;
-}
+#include "libpq/md5.h"
-/*
- * pg_krb4_sendauth -- client routine to send authentication information to
- * the server
- *
- * This routine does not do mutual authentication, nor does it return enough
- * information to do encrypted connections. But then, if we want to do
- * encrypted connections, we'll have to redesign the whole RPC mechanism
- * anyway.
- *
- * If the user is too lazy to feed us a hostname, we try to come up with
- * something other than "localhost" since the hostname is used as an
- * instance and instance names in v4 databases are usually actual hostnames
- * (canonicalized to omit all domain suffixes).
- */
-static int
-pg_krb4_sendauth(char *PQerrormsg, int sock,
- struct sockaddr_in * laddr,
- struct sockaddr_in * raddr,
- const char *hostname)
-{
- long krbopts = 0; /* one-way authentication */
- KTEXT_ST clttkt;
- int status;
- char hostbuf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- const char *realm = getenv("PGREALM"); /* NULL == current realm */
-
- if (!hostname || !(*hostname))
- {
- if (gethostname(hostbuf, MAXHOSTNAMELEN) < 0)
- strcpy(hostbuf, "localhost");
- hostname = hostbuf;
- }
-
- pg_krb4_init();
-
- status = krb_sendauth(krbopts,
- sock,
- &clttkt,
- PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
- hostname,
- realm,
- (u_long) 0,
- (MSG_DAT *) NULL,
- (CREDENTIALS *) NULL,
- NULL,
- laddr,
- raddr,
- PG_KRB4_VERSION);
- if (status != KSUCCESS)
- {
- snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("Kerberos 4 error: %s\n"),
- krb_err_txt[status]);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- return STATUS_OK;
-}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
#ifdef KRB5
/*
*/
#include <krb5.h>
+/* Some old versions of Kerberos do not include <com_err.h> in <krb5.h> */
+#if !defined(__COM_ERR_H) && !defined(__COM_ERR_H__)
#include <com_err.h>
+#endif
/*
* pg_an_to_ln -- return the local name corresponding to an authentication
* provide an aname mapping database...it may be a better idea to use
* krb5_an_to_ln, except that it punts if multiple components are found,
* and we can't afford to punt.
+ *
+ * For WIN32, convert username to lowercase because the Win32 kerberos library
+ * generates tickets with the username as the user entered it instead of as
+ * it is entered in the directory.
*/
static char *
pg_an_to_ln(char *aname)
if ((p = strchr(aname, '/')) || (p = strchr(aname, '@')))
*p = '\0';
+#ifdef WIN32
+ for (p = aname; *p; p++)
+ *p = pg_tolower(*p);
+#endif
+
return aname;
}
* Various krb5 state which is not connection specific, and a flag to
* indicate whether we have initialised it yet.
*/
+/*
static int pg_krb5_initialised;
static krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
static krb5_ccache pg_krb5_ccache;
static krb5_principal pg_krb5_client;
static char *pg_krb5_name;
+*/
+
+struct krb5_info
+{
+ int pg_krb5_initialised;
+ krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
+ krb5_ccache pg_krb5_ccache;
+ krb5_principal pg_krb5_client;
+ char *pg_krb5_name;
+};
static int
-pg_krb5_init(char *PQerrormsg)
+pg_krb5_init(char *PQerrormsg, struct krb5_info *info)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
- if (pg_krb5_initialised)
+ if (info->pg_krb5_initialised)
return STATUS_OK;
- retval = krb5_init_context(&pg_krb5_context);
+ retval = krb5_init_context(&(info->pg_krb5_context));
if (retval)
{
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- retval = krb5_cc_default(pg_krb5_context, &pg_krb5_ccache);
+ retval = krb5_cc_default(info->pg_krb5_context, &(info->pg_krb5_ccache));
if (retval)
{
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_init: krb5_cc_default: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
- krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
+ krb5_free_context(info->pg_krb5_context);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_ccache,
- &pg_krb5_client);
+ retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(info->pg_krb5_context, info->pg_krb5_ccache,
+ &(info->pg_krb5_client));
if (retval)
{
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_init: krb5_cc_get_principal: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
- krb5_cc_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_ccache);
- krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
+ krb5_cc_close(info->pg_krb5_context, info->pg_krb5_ccache);
+ krb5_free_context(info->pg_krb5_context);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_client, &pg_krb5_name);
+ retval = krb5_unparse_name(info->pg_krb5_context, info->pg_krb5_client, &(info->pg_krb5_name));
if (retval)
{
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_init: krb5_unparse_name: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
- krb5_free_principal(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_client);
- krb5_cc_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_ccache);
- krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
+ krb5_free_principal(info->pg_krb5_context, info->pg_krb5_client);
+ krb5_cc_close(info->pg_krb5_context, info->pg_krb5_ccache);
+ krb5_free_context(info->pg_krb5_context);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- pg_krb5_name = pg_an_to_ln(pg_krb5_name);
+ info->pg_krb5_name = pg_an_to_ln(info->pg_krb5_name);
- pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
+ info->pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
return STATUS_OK;
}
+static void
+pg_krb5_destroy(struct krb5_info *info)
+{
+ krb5_free_principal(info->pg_krb5_context, info->pg_krb5_client);
+ krb5_cc_close(info->pg_krb5_context, info->pg_krb5_ccache);
+ krb5_free_context(info->pg_krb5_context);
+ free(info->pg_krb5_name);
+}
+
+
/*
- * pg_krb5_authname -- returns a pointer to static space containing whatever
- * name the user has authenticated to the system
- */
-static const char *
+ * pg_krb5_authname -- returns a copy of whatever name the user
+ * has authenticated to the system, or NULL
+ */
+static char *
pg_krb5_authname(char *PQerrormsg)
{
- if (pg_krb5_init(PQerrormsg) != STATUS_OK)
+ char *tmp_name;
+ struct krb5_info info;
+ info.pg_krb5_initialised = 0;
+
+ if (pg_krb5_init(PQerrormsg, &info) != STATUS_OK)
return NULL;
+ tmp_name = strdup(info.pg_krb5_name);
+ pg_krb5_destroy(&info);
- return pg_krb5_name;
+ return tmp_name;
}
* the server
*/
static int
-pg_krb5_sendauth(char *PQerrormsg, int sock, const char *hostname)
+pg_krb5_sendauth(char *PQerrormsg, int sock, const char *hostname, const char *servicename)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int ret;
krb5_principal server;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_error *err_ret = NULL;
- int flags;
+ struct krb5_info info;
+ info.pg_krb5_initialised = 0;
+
+ if (!hostname)
+ {
+ snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
+ "pg_krb5_sendauth: hostname must be specified for Kerberos authentication\n");
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
- ret = pg_krb5_init(PQerrormsg);
+ ret = pg_krb5_init(PQerrormsg, &info);
if (ret != STATUS_OK)
return ret;
- retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(pg_krb5_context, hostname, PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
+ retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(info.pg_krb5_context, hostname, servicename,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
if (retval)
{
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_sendauth: krb5_sname_to_principal: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
+ pg_krb5_destroy(&info);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/*
- * libpq uses a non-blocking socket. But kerberos needs a blocking
- * socket, and we have to block somehow to do mutual authentication
- * anyway. So we temporarily make it blocking.
+ * libpq uses a non-blocking socket. But kerberos needs a blocking socket,
+ * and we have to block somehow to do mutual authentication anyway. So we
+ * temporarily make it blocking.
*/
- flags = fcntl(sock, F_GETFL);
- if (flags < 0 || fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, (long) (flags & ~O_NONBLOCK)))
+ if (!pg_set_block(sock))
{
char sebuf[256];
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
libpq_gettext("could not set socket to blocking mode: %s\n"), pqStrerror(errno, sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
- krb5_free_principal(pg_krb5_context, server);
+ krb5_free_principal(info.pg_krb5_context, server);
+ pg_krb5_destroy(&info);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- retval = krb5_sendauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
- (krb5_pointer) & sock, PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
- pg_krb5_client, server,
+ retval = krb5_sendauth(info.pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
+ (krb5_pointer) & sock, (char *) servicename,
+ info.pg_krb5_client, server,
AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED,
NULL, 0, /* no creds, use ccache instead */
- pg_krb5_ccache, &err_ret, NULL, NULL);
+ info.pg_krb5_ccache, &err_ret, NULL, NULL);
if (retval)
{
if (retval == KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED && err_ret)
{
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_ERROR_TEXT_DATA)
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("Kerberos 5 authentication rejected: %*s\n"),
- err_ret->text.length, err_ret->text.data);
+ libpq_gettext("Kerberos 5 authentication rejected: %*s\n"),
+ (int) err_ret->text.length, err_ret->text.data);
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_ERROR_E_DATA)
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("Kerberos 5 authentication rejected: %*s\n"),
- err_ret->e_data->length,
+ libpq_gettext("Kerberos 5 authentication rejected: %*s\n"),
+ (int) err_ret->e_data->length,
(const char *) err_ret->e_data->data);
#else
#error "bogus configuration"
}
if (err_ret)
- krb5_free_error(pg_krb5_context, err_ret);
+ krb5_free_error(info.pg_krb5_context, err_ret);
ret = STATUS_ERROR;
}
- krb5_free_principal(pg_krb5_context, server);
+ krb5_free_principal(info.pg_krb5_context, server);
- if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, (long) flags))
+ if (!pg_set_noblock(sock))
{
char sebuf[256];
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("could not restore non-blocking mode on socket: %s\n"),
+ libpq_gettext("could not restore non-blocking mode on socket: %s\n"),
pqStrerror(errno, sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
ret = STATUS_ERROR;
}
+ pg_krb5_destroy(&info);
return ret;
}
#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+/*
+ * Respond to AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS challenge.
+ *
+ * Note: current backends will not use this challenge if HAVE_GETPEEREID
+ * or SO_PEERCRED is defined, but pre-7.4 backends might, so compile the
+ * code anyway.
+ */
static int
pg_local_sendauth(char *PQerrormsg, PGconn *conn)
{
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
- (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)) && \
- !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED)
+ (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS))
char buf;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
#endif
/*
- * The backend doesn't care what we send here, but it wants exactly
- * one character to force recvmsg() to block and wait for us.
+ * The backend doesn't care what we send here, but it wants exactly one
+ * character to force recvmsg() to block and wait for us.
*/
buf = '\0';
iov.iov_base = &buf;
return STATUS_OK;
#else
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("SCM_CRED authentication method not supported\n"));
+ libpq_gettext("SCM_CRED authentication method not supported\n"));
return STATUS_ERROR;
#endif
}
{
char *crypt_pwd2;
- if (!(crypt_pwd = malloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1)) ||
- !(crypt_pwd2 = malloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1)))
+ /* Allocate enough space for two MD5 hashes */
+ crypt_pwd = malloc(2 * (MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1));
+ if (!crypt_pwd)
{
- perror("malloc");
+ fprintf(stderr, libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- if (!EncryptMD5(password, conn->pguser,
- strlen(conn->pguser), crypt_pwd2))
+
+ crypt_pwd2 = crypt_pwd + MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1;
+ if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, conn->pguser,
+ strlen(conn->pguser), crypt_pwd2))
{
free(crypt_pwd);
- free(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- if (!EncryptMD5(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"), conn->md5Salt,
- sizeof(conn->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
+ if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"), conn->md5Salt,
+ sizeof(conn->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
{
free(crypt_pwd);
- free(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- free(crypt_pwd2);
break;
}
case AUTH_REQ_CRYPT:
}
/*
- * fe_sendauth -- client demux routine for outgoing authentication information
+ * pg_fe_sendauth
+ * client demux routine for outgoing authentication information
*/
int
-fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn, const char *hostname,
- const char *password, char *PQerrormsg)
+pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn, const char *hostname,
+ const char *password, char *PQerrormsg)
{
-#if !defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
+#ifndef KRB5
(void) hostname; /* not used */
#endif
break;
case AUTH_REQ_KRB4:
-#ifdef KRB4
- if (pg_krb4_sendauth(PQerrormsg, conn->sock,
- (struct sockaddr_in *) & conn->laddr.addr,
- (struct sockaddr_in *) & conn->raddr.addr,
- hostname) != STATUS_OK)
- {
- snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("Kerberos 4 authentication failed\n"));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- break;
-#else
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("Kerberos 4 authentication not supported\n"));
+ libpq_gettext("Kerberos 4 authentication not supported\n"));
return STATUS_ERROR;
-#endif
case AUTH_REQ_KRB5:
#ifdef KRB5
+ pglock_thread();
if (pg_krb5_sendauth(PQerrormsg, conn->sock,
- hostname) != STATUS_OK)
+ hostname, conn->krbsrvname) != STATUS_OK)
{
- snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("Kerberos 5 authentication failed\n"));
+ /* PQerrormsg already filled in */
+ pgunlock_thread();
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
+ pgunlock_thread();
break;
#else
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("Kerberos 5 authentication not supported\n"));
+ libpq_gettext("Kerberos 5 authentication not supported\n"));
return STATUS_ERROR;
#endif
if (password == NULL || *password == '\0')
{
(void) snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- "fe_sendauth: no password supplied\n");
+ PQnoPasswordSupplied);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (pg_password_sendauth(conn, password, areq) != STATUS_OK)
{
(void) snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- "fe_sendauth: error sending password authentication\n");
+ "fe_sendauth: error sending password authentication\n");
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
default:
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("authentication method %u not supported\n"), areq);
+ libpq_gettext("authentication method %u not supported\n"), areq);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
return STATUS_OK;
}
-/*
- * fe_setauthsvc
- * fe_getauthsvc
- *
- * Set/return the authentication service currently selected for use by the
- * frontend. (You can only use one in the frontend, obviously.)
- *
- * NB: This is not thread-safe if different threads try to select different
- * authentication services! It's OK for fe_getauthsvc to select the default,
- * since that will be the same for all threads, but direct application use
- * of fe_setauthsvc is not thread-safe. However, use of fe_setauthsvc is
- * deprecated anyway...
- */
-
-static int pg_authsvc = -1;
-
-void
-fe_setauthsvc(const char *name, char *PQerrormsg)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < n_authsvcs; ++i)
- if (strcmp(name, authsvcs[i].name) == 0)
- {
- pg_authsvc = i;
- break;
- }
- if (i == n_authsvcs)
- {
- snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("invalid authentication service name \"%s\", ignored\n"),
- name);
- }
- return;
-}
-
-MsgType
-fe_getauthsvc(char *PQerrormsg)
-{
- if (pg_authsvc < 0 || pg_authsvc >= n_authsvcs)
- {
- fe_setauthsvc(DEFAULT_CLIENT_AUTHSVC, PQerrormsg);
- if (pg_authsvc < 0 || pg_authsvc >= n_authsvcs)
- {
- /* Can only get here if DEFAULT_CLIENT_AUTHSVC is misdefined */
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return authsvcs[pg_authsvc].msgtype;
-}
/*
- * fe_getauthname -- returns a pointer to dynamic space containing whatever
+ * pg_fe_getauthname -- returns a pointer to dynamic space containing whatever
* name the user has authenticated to the system
- * if there is an error, return the error message in PQerrormsg
+ *
+ * if there is an error, return NULL with an error message in PQerrormsg
*/
char *
-fe_getauthname(char *PQerrormsg)
+pg_fe_getauthname(char *PQerrormsg)
{
- const char *name = (char *) NULL;
- char *authn = (char *) NULL;
- MsgType authsvc;
+#ifdef KRB5
+ char *krb5_name = NULL;
+#endif
+ const char *name = NULL;
+ char *authn;
- authsvc = fe_getauthsvc(PQerrormsg);
+#ifdef WIN32
+ char username[128];
+ DWORD namesize = sizeof(username) - 1;
+#else
+ char pwdbuf[BUFSIZ];
+ struct passwd pwdstr;
+ struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+#endif
- /* this just guards against broken DEFAULT_CLIENT_AUTHSVC, see above */
- if (authsvc == 0)
- return NULL; /* leave original error message in place */
+ /*
+ * pglock_thread() really only needs to be called around
+ * pg_krb5_authname(), but some users are using configure
+ * --enable-thread-safety-force, so we might as well do the locking within
+ * our library to protect pqGetpwuid(). In fact, application developers
+ * can use getpwuid() in their application if they use the locking call we
+ * provide, or install their own locking function using
+ * PQregisterThreadLock().
+ */
+ pglock_thread();
-#ifdef KRB4
- if (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB4_MSG)
- name = pg_krb4_authname(PQerrormsg);
-#endif
#ifdef KRB5
- if (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB5_MSG)
- name = pg_krb5_authname(PQerrormsg);
+ /* pg_krb5_authname gives us a strdup'd value that we need
+ * to free later, however, we don't want to free 'name' directly
+ * in case it's *not* a Kerberos login and we fall through to
+ * name = pw->pw_name; */
+ krb5_name = pg_krb5_authname(PQerrormsg);
+ name = krb5_name;
#endif
- if (authsvc == STARTUP_MSG
- || (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB4_MSG && !name)
- || (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB5_MSG && !name))
+ if (!name)
{
#ifdef WIN32
- char username[128];
- DWORD namesize = sizeof(username) - 1;
-
if (GetUserName(username, &namesize))
name = username;
#else
- char pwdbuf[BUFSIZ];
- struct passwd pwdstr;
- struct passwd *pw = NULL;
-
- if (pqGetpwuid(geteuid(), &pwdstr,
- pwdbuf, sizeof(pwdbuf), &pw) == 0)
+ if (pqGetpwuid(geteuid(), &pwdstr, pwdbuf, sizeof(pwdbuf), &pw) == 0)
name = pw->pw_name;
#endif
}
- if (authsvc != STARTUP_MSG && authsvc != STARTUP_KRB4_MSG && authsvc != STARTUP_KRB5_MSG)
- snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
- libpq_gettext("fe_getauthname: invalid authentication system: %d\n"),
- authsvc);
+ authn = name ? strdup(name) : NULL;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+ /* Free the strdup'd string from pg_krb5_authname, if we got one */
+ if (krb5_name)
+ free(krb5_name);
+#endif
+
+ pgunlock_thread();
- if (name && (authn = (char *) malloc(strlen(name) + 1)))
- strcpy(authn, name);
return authn;
}
+
+
+/*
+ * PQencryptPassword -- exported routine to encrypt a password
+ *
+ * This is intended to be used by client applications that wish to send
+ * commands like ALTER USER joe PASSWORD 'pwd'. The password need not
+ * be sent in cleartext if it is encrypted on the client side. This is
+ * good because it ensures the cleartext password won't end up in logs,
+ * pg_stat displays, etc. We export the function so that clients won't
+ * be dependent on low-level details like whether the enceyption is MD5
+ * or something else.
+ *
+ * Arguments are the cleartext password, and the SQL name of the user it
+ * is for.
+ *
+ * Return value is a malloc'd string, or NULL if out-of-memory. The client
+ * may assume the string doesn't contain any special characters that would
+ * require escaping.
+ */
+char *
+PQencryptPassword(const char *passwd, const char *user)
+{
+ char *crypt_pwd;
+
+ crypt_pwd = malloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
+ if (!crypt_pwd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!pg_md5_encrypt(passwd, user, strlen(user), crypt_pwd))
+ {
+ free(crypt_pwd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return crypt_pwd;
+}
projects / postgresql / blobdiff