* auth.c
* Routines to handle network authentication
*
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2006, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2009, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.144 2006/10/04 00:29:53 momjian Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.178 2009/01/09 10:13:18 mha Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H
+# include <ucred.h>
+#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "libpq/auth.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "storage/ipc.h"
-
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Global authentication functions
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status);
static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
static int recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port);
-char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
-char *pg_krb_srvnam;
-bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
-char *pg_krb_server_hostname = NULL;
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Ident authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+/* Max size of username ident server can return */
+#define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512
+
+/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */
+#define IDENT_PORT 113
+
+static int authident(hbaPort *port);
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * PAM authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
#ifdef USE_PAM
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
* pam_passwd_conv_proc */
#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * LDAP authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
#ifdef USE_LDAP
#ifndef WIN32
/* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */
#endif
static int CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);
+#endif /* USE_LDAP */
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Cert authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+static int CheckCertAuth(Port *port);
#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Kerberos and GSSAPI GUCs
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
+char *pg_krb_srvnam;
+bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
+
+
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
+#ifdef KRB5
+static int pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port);
#include <krb5.h>
/* Some old versions of Kerberos do not include <com_err.h> in <krb5.h> */
#if !defined(__COM_ERR_H) && !defined(__COM_ERR_H__)
#include <com_err.h>
#endif
-
-/*
- * pg_an_to_ln -- return the local name corresponding to an authentication
- * name
- *
- * XXX Assumes that the first aname component is the user name. This is NOT
- * necessarily so, since an aname can actually be something out of your
- * worst X.400 nightmare, like
- * ORGANIZATION=U. C. Berkeley/NAME=Paul M. Aoki@CS.BERKELEY.EDU
- * Note that the MIT an_to_ln code does the same thing if you don't
- * provide an aname mapping database...it may be a better idea to use
- * krb5_an_to_ln, except that it punts if multiple components are found,
- * and we can't afford to punt.
- */
-static char *
-pg_an_to_ln(char *aname)
-{
- char *p;
-
- if ((p = strchr(aname, '/')) || (p = strchr(aname, '@')))
- *p = '\0';
- return aname;
-}
-
-
/*
* Various krb5 state which is not connection specfic, and a flag to
* indicate whether we have initialised it yet.
static krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
static krb5_keytab pg_krb5_keytab;
static krb5_principal pg_krb5_server;
+#endif /* KRB5 */
-static int
-pg_krb5_init(void)
-{
- krb5_error_code retval;
- char *khostname;
-
- if (pg_krb5_initialised)
- return STATUS_OK;
-
- retval = krb5_init_context(&pg_krb5_context);
- if (retval)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("Kerberos initialization returned error %d",
- retval)));
- com_err("postgres", retval, "while initializing krb5");
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
-
- retval = krb5_kt_resolve(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb_server_keyfile, &pg_krb5_keytab);
- if (retval)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("Kerberos keytab resolving returned error %d",
- retval)));
- com_err("postgres", retval, "while resolving keytab file \"%s\"",
- pg_krb_server_keyfile);
- krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
-
- /*
- * If no hostname was specified, pg_krb_server_hostname is already NULL.
- * If it's set to blank, force it to NULL.
- */
- khostname = pg_krb_server_hostname;
- if (khostname && khostname[0] == '\0')
- khostname = NULL;
-
- retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(pg_krb5_context,
- khostname,
- pg_krb_srvnam,
- KRB5_NT_SRV_HST,
- &pg_krb5_server);
- if (retval)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("Kerberos sname_to_principal(\"%s\", \"%s\") returned error %d",
- khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam, retval)));
- com_err("postgres", retval,
- "while getting server principal for server \"%s\" for service \"%s\"",
- khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam);
- krb5_kt_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_keytab);
- krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
-
- pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
- return STATUS_OK;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * pg_krb5_recvauth -- server routine to receive authentication information
- * from the client
- *
- * We still need to compare the username obtained from the client's setup
- * packet to the authenticated name.
- *
- * We have our own keytab file because postgres is unlikely to run as root,
- * and so cannot read the default keytab.
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * GSSAPI Authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
-static int
-pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
-{
- krb5_error_code retval;
- int ret;
- krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
- krb5_ticket *ticket;
- char *kusername;
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
+#include <gssapi.h>
+#else
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
- ret = pg_krb5_init();
- if (ret != STATUS_OK)
- return ret;
+static int pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port);
+#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
- retval = krb5_recvauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
- (krb5_pointer) & port->sock, pg_krb_srvnam,
- pg_krb5_server, 0, pg_krb5_keytab, &ticket);
- if (retval)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("Kerberos recvauth returned error %d",
- retval)));
- com_err("postgres", retval, "from krb5_recvauth");
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- /*
- * The "client" structure comes out of the ticket and is therefore
- * authenticated. Use it to check the username obtained from the
- * postmaster startup packet.
- *
- * I have no idea why this is considered necessary.
- */
-#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_ENC_PART2)
- retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
- ticket->enc_part2->client, &kusername);
-#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_CLIENT)
- retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
- ticket->client, &kusername);
-#else
-#error "bogus configuration"
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SSPI Authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+typedef SECURITY_STATUS
+ (WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (
+ PCtxtHandle, void **);
+static int pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port);
#endif
- if (retval)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("Kerberos unparse_name returned error %d",
- retval)));
- com_err("postgres", retval, "while unparsing client name");
- krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
- krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- kusername = pg_an_to_ln(kusername);
- if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
- ret = pg_strncasecmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER);
- else
- ret = strncmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER);
- if (ret)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("unexpected Kerberos user name received from client (received \"%s\", expected \"%s\")",
- port->user_name, kusername)));
- ret = STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- else
- ret = STATUS_OK;
-
- krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
- krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
- free(kusername);
- return ret;
-}
-#else
-static int
-pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
-{
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
- errmsg("Kerberos 5 not implemented on this server")));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
-}
-#endif /* KRB5 */
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Global authentication functions
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
/*
if (status == STATUS_EOF)
proc_exit(0);
- switch (port->auth_method)
+ switch (port->hba->auth_method)
{
case uaReject:
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
case uaKrb5:
errstr = gettext_noop("Kerberos 5 authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
+ case uaGSS:
+ errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+ break;
+ case uaSSPI:
+ errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+ break;
case uaTrust:
errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaMD5:
- case uaCrypt:
case uaPassword:
errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
-#ifdef USE_PAM
case uaPAM:
errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
-#ifdef USE_LDAP
case uaLDAP:
errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
-#endif /* USE_LDAP */
default:
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
break;
errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
errhint("See server log for details.")));
- switch (port->auth_method)
+ /*
+ * This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for
+ * the current connection, so perform any verifications based on the
+ * hba options field that should be done *before* the authentication
+ * here.
+ */
+ if (port->hba->clientcert)
+ {
+ /*
+ * When we parse pg_hba.conf, we have already made sure that we have
+ * been able to load a certificate store. Thus, if a certificate is
+ * present on the client, it has been verified against our root
+ * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted
+ * already if it didn't verify ok.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (!port->peer)
+ {
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+ errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
+ }
+#else
+ /*
+ * hba.c makes sure hba->clientcert can't be set unless OpenSSL
+ * is present.
+ */
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
+ */
+ switch (port->hba->auth_method)
+ {
+ case uaReject:
+
+ /*
+ * This could have come from an explicit "reject" entry in
+ * pg_hba.conf, but more likely it means there was no matching
+ * entry. Take pity on the poor user and issue a helpful error
+ * message. NOTE: this is not a security breach, because all the
+ * info reported here is known at the frontend and must be assumed
+ * known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less clueful
+ * good guys.
+ */
+ {
+ char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+ pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
+ hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
+ NULL, 0,
+ NI_NUMERICHOST);
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+ errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
+ hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name,
+ port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
+#else
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+ errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
+ hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name)));
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case uaKrb5:
+#ifdef KRB5
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB5);
+ status = pg_krb5_recvauth(port);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case uaGSS:
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS);
+ status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case uaSSPI:
+#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI);
+ status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case uaIdent:
+
+ /*
+ * If we are doing ident on unix-domain sockets, use SCM_CREDS
+ * only if it is defined and SO_PEERCRED isn't.
+ */
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED) && \
+ (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
+ (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)))
+ if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
+ {
+#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
+
+ /*
+ * Receive credentials on next message receipt, BSD/OS,
+ * NetBSD. We need to set this before the client sends the
+ * next packet.
+ */
+ int on = 1;
+
+ if (setsockopt(port->sock, 0, LOCAL_CREDS, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not enable credential reception: %m")));
+#endif
+
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS);
+ }
+#endif
+ status = authident(port);
+ break;
+
+ case uaMD5:
+ if (Db_user_namespace)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+ errmsg("MD5 authentication is not supported when \"db_user_namespace\" is enabled")));
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
+ status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
+ break;
+
+ case uaPassword:
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
+ status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
+ break;
+
+ case uaPAM:
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ pam_port_cludge = port;
+ status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+ break;
+
+ case uaLDAP:
+#ifdef USE_LDAP
+ status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case uaCert:
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ status = CheckCertAuth(port);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case uaTrust:
+ status = STATUS_OK;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (status == STATUS_OK)
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
+ else
+ auth_failed(port, status);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
+ */
+static void
+sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
+{
+ StringInfoData buf;
+
+ pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
+ pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
+
+ /* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
+ if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
+ pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
+
+#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
+
+ /*
+ * Add the authentication data for the next step of the GSSAPI or SSPI
+ * negotiation.
+ */
+ else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT)
+ {
+ if (port->gss->outbuf.length > 0)
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS token of length %u",
+ (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
+
+ pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ pq_endmessage(&buf);
+
+ /*
+ * Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which need
+ * not be sent until we are ready for queries.
+ */
+ if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
+ pq_flush();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect password response packet from frontend.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
+ */
+static char *
+recv_password_packet(Port *port)
+{
+ StringInfoData buf;
+
+ if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
+ {
+ /* Expect 'p' message type */
+ int mtype;
+
+ mtype = pq_getbyte();
+ if (mtype != 'p')
+ {
+ /*
+ * If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
+ * don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in
+ * fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
+ * log.
+ */
+ if (mtype != EOF)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
+ mtype)));
+ return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
+ if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
+ return NULL; /* EOF */
+ }
+
+ initStringInfo(&buf);
+ if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
+ {
+ /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
+ pfree(buf.data);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
+ * contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
+ * StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
+ */
+ if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
+
+ /* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
+ ereport(DEBUG5,
+ (errmsg("received password packet")));
+
+ /*
+ * Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
+ * character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
+ * encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
+ */
+ return buf.data;
+}
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * MD5 and crypt authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
+ * Get the response and check it.
+ */
+static int
+recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
+{
+ char *passwd;
+ int result;
+
+ passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
+
+ if (passwd == NULL)
+ return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
+
+ result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd);
+
+ pfree(passwd);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef KRB5
+
+static int
+pg_krb5_init(Port *port)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ char *khostname;
+
+ if (pg_krb5_initialised)
+ return STATUS_OK;
+
+ retval = krb5_init_context(&pg_krb5_context);
+ if (retval)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("Kerberos initialization returned error %d",
+ retval)));
+ com_err("postgres", retval, "while initializing krb5");
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_kt_resolve(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb_server_keyfile, &pg_krb5_keytab);
+ if (retval)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("Kerberos keytab resolving returned error %d",
+ retval)));
+ com_err("postgres", retval, "while resolving keytab file \"%s\"",
+ pg_krb_server_keyfile);
+ krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If no hostname was specified, pg_krb_server_hostname is already NULL.
+ * If it's set to blank, force it to NULL.
+ */
+ khostname = port->hba->krb_server_hostname;
+ if (khostname && khostname[0] == '\0')
+ khostname = NULL;
+
+ retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(pg_krb5_context,
+ khostname,
+ pg_krb_srvnam,
+ KRB5_NT_SRV_HST,
+ &pg_krb5_server);
+ if (retval)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("Kerberos sname_to_principal(\"%s\", \"%s\") returned error %d",
+ khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam, retval)));
+ com_err("postgres", retval,
+ "while getting server principal for server \"%s\" for service \"%s\"",
+ khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam);
+ krb5_kt_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_keytab);
+ krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
+ return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * pg_krb5_recvauth -- server routine to receive authentication information
+ * from the client
+ *
+ * We still need to compare the username obtained from the client's setup
+ * packet to the authenticated name.
+ *
+ * We have our own keytab file because postgres is unlikely to run as root,
+ * and so cannot read the default keytab.
+ */
+static int
+pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ int ret;
+ krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+ krb5_ticket *ticket;
+ char *kusername;
+ char *cp;
+
+ if (get_role_line(port->user_name) == NULL)
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+
+ ret = pg_krb5_init(port);
+ if (ret != STATUS_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ retval = krb5_recvauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
+ (krb5_pointer) & port->sock, pg_krb_srvnam,
+ pg_krb5_server, 0, pg_krb5_keytab, &ticket);
+ if (retval)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("Kerberos recvauth returned error %d",
+ retval)));
+ com_err("postgres", retval, "from krb5_recvauth");
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The "client" structure comes out of the ticket and is therefore
+ * authenticated. Use it to check the username obtained from the
+ * postmaster startup packet.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_ENC_PART2)
+ retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
+ ticket->enc_part2->client, &kusername);
+#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_CLIENT)
+ retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
+ ticket->client, &kusername);
+#else
+#error "bogus configuration"
+#endif
+ if (retval)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("Kerberos unparse_name returned error %d",
+ retval)));
+ com_err("postgres", retval, "while unparsing client name");
+ krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
+ krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ cp = strchr(kusername, '@');
+ if (cp)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If we are not going to include the realm in the username that is passed
+ * to the ident map, destructively modify it here to remove the realm. Then
+ * advance past the separator to check the realm.
+ */
+ if (!port->hba->include_realm)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ cp++;
+
+ if (port->hba->krb_realm != NULL && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+ {
+ /* Match realm against configured */
+ if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
+ ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
+ else
+ ret = strcmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
+
+ if (ret)
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG2,
+ "krb5 realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
+ cp, port->hba->krb_realm);
+
+ krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
+ krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (port->hba->krb_realm&& strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG2,
+ "krb5 did not return realm but realm matching was requested");
+
+ krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
+ krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, kusername,
+ pg_krb_caseins_users);
+
+ krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
+ krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
+ free(kusername);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * GSSAPI authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+
+#if defined(WIN32) && !defined(WIN32_ONLY_COMPILER)
+/*
+ * MIT Kerberos GSSAPI DLL doesn't properly export the symbols for MingW
+ * that contain the OIDs required. Redefine here, values copied
+ * from src/athena/auth/krb5/src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_generic.c
+ */
+static const gss_OID_desc GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME_desc =
+{10, (void *) "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x01\x02"};
+static GSS_DLLIMP gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME = &GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME_desc;
+#endif
+
+
+static void
+pg_GSS_error(int severity, char *errmsg, OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc gmsg;
+ OM_uint32 lmaj_s,
+ lmin_s,
+ msg_ctx;
+ char msg_major[128],
+ msg_minor[128];
+
+ /* Fetch major status message */
+ msg_ctx = 0;
+ lmaj_s = gss_display_status(&lmin_s, maj_stat, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx, &gmsg);
+ strlcpy(msg_major, gmsg.value, sizeof(msg_major));
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
+
+ if (msg_ctx)
+
+ /*
+ * More than one message available. XXX: Should we loop and read all
+ * messages? (same below)
+ */
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg_internal("incomplete GSS error report")));
+
+ /* Fetch mechanism minor status message */
+ msg_ctx = 0;
+ lmaj_s = gss_display_status(&lmin_s, min_stat, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx, &gmsg);
+ strlcpy(msg_minor, gmsg.value, sizeof(msg_minor));
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
+
+ if (msg_ctx)
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg_internal("incomplete GSS minor error report")));
+
+ /*
+ * errmsg_internal, since translation of the first part must be done
+ * before calling this function anyway.
+ */
+ ereport(severity,
+ (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
+ errdetail("%s: %s", msg_major, msg_minor)));
+}
+
+static int
+pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
+{
+ OM_uint32 maj_stat,
+ min_stat,
+ lmin_s,
+ gflags;
+ int mtype;
+ int ret;
+ StringInfoData buf;
+ gss_buffer_desc gbuf;
+
+ /*
+ * GSS auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
+ * relies on the overall message length word to determine the GSS payload
+ * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages.
+ * (This is, in fact, a design error in our GSS support, because protocol
+ * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
+ * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
+ */
+ if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ errmsg("GSSAPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));
+
+ if (pg_krb_server_keyfile && strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) > 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Set default Kerberos keytab file for the Krb5 mechanism.
+ *
+ * setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 0); except setenv()
+ * not always available.
+ */
+ if (getenv("KRB5_KTNAME") == NULL)
+ {
+ size_t kt_len = strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) + 14;
+ char *kt_path = malloc(kt_len);
+
+ if (!kt_path)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+ snprintf(kt_path, kt_len, "KRB5_KTNAME=%s", pg_krb_server_keyfile);
+ putenv(kt_path);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We accept any service principal that's present in our keytab. This
+ * increases interoperability between kerberos implementations that see
+ * for example case sensitivity differently, while not really opening up
+ * any vector of attack.
+ */
+ port->gss->cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize sequence with an empty context
+ */
+ port->gss->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+
+ /*
+ * Loop through GSSAPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
+ * multiple messags sent in both directions. First message is always from
+ * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
+ * (type 'p').
+ */
+ do
+ {
+ mtype = pq_getbyte();
+ if (mtype != 'p')
+ {
+ /* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
+ if (mtype != EOF)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("expected GSS response, got message type %d",
+ mtype)));
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the actual GSS token */
+ initStringInfo(&buf);
+ if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 2000))
+ {
+ /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
+ pfree(buf.data);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Map to GSSAPI style buffer */
+ gbuf.length = buf.len;
+ gbuf.value = buf.data;
+
+ elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received GSS token of length %u",
+ (unsigned int) gbuf.length);
+
+ maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(
+ &min_stat,
+ &port->gss->ctx,
+ port->gss->cred,
+ &gbuf,
+ GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
+ &port->gss->name,
+ NULL,
+ &port->gss->outbuf,
+ &gflags,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
+
+ /* gbuf no longer used */
+ pfree(buf.data);
+
+ elog(DEBUG5, "gss_accept_sec_context major: %d, "
+ "minor: %d, outlen: %u, outflags: %x",
+ maj_stat, min_stat,
+ (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length, gflags);
+
+ if (port->gss->outbuf.length != 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
+ */
+ OM_uint32 lmin_s;
+
+ elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS response token of length %u",
+ (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
+
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf);
+ }
+
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 lmin_s;
+
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
+ gettext_noop("accepting GSS security context failed"),
+ maj_stat, min_stat);
+ }
+
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+ elog(DEBUG4, "GSS continue needed");
+
+ } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ if (port->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Release service principal credentials
+ */
+ gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &port->gss->cred);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that authentication is now complete.
+ *
+ * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
+ * username that was specified for the connection.
+ */
+ maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
+ gettext_noop("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
+ maj_stat, min_stat);
+
+ /*
+ * Split the username at the realm separator
+ */
+ if (strchr(gbuf.value, '@'))
+ {
+ char *cp = strchr(gbuf.value, '@');
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not going to include the realm in the username that is passed
+ * to the ident map, destructively modify it here to remove the realm. Then
+ * advance past the separator to check the realm.
+ */
+ if (!port->hba->include_realm)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ cp++;
+
+ if (port->hba->krb_realm != NULL && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+ {
+ /*
+ * Match the realm part of the name first
+ */
+ if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
+ ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
+ else
+ ret = strcmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
+
+ if (ret)
+ {
+ /* GSS realm does not match */
+ elog(DEBUG2,
+ "GSSAPI realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
+ cp, port->hba->krb_realm);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG2,
+ "GSSAPI did not return realm but realm matching was requested");
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, gbuf.value,
+ pg_krb_caseins_users);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
+
+ return STATUS_OK;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SSPI authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+static void
+pg_SSPI_error(int severity, char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r)
+{
+ char sysmsg[256];
+
+ if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, r, 0, sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0)
+ ereport(severity,
+ (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
+ errdetail("SSPI error %x", (unsigned int) r)));
+ else
+ ereport(severity,
+ (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
+ errdetail("%s (%x)", sysmsg, (unsigned int) r)));
+}
+
+static int
+pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
+{
+ int mtype;
+ StringInfoData buf;
+ SECURITY_STATUS r;
+ CredHandle sspicred;
+ CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL,
+ newctx;
+ TimeStamp expiry;
+ ULONG contextattr;
+ SecBufferDesc inbuf;
+ SecBufferDesc outbuf;
+ SecBuffer OutBuffers[1];
+ SecBuffer InBuffers[1];
+ HANDLE token;
+ TOKEN_USER *tokenuser;
+ DWORD retlen;
+ char accountname[MAXPGPATH];
+ char domainname[MAXPGPATH];
+ DWORD accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname);
+ DWORD domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname);
+ SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse;
+ HMODULE secur32;
+ QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN _QuerySecurityContextToken;
+
+ /*
+ * SSPI auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
+ * relies on the overall message length word to determine the SSPI payload
+ * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages.
+ * (This is, in fact, a design error in our SSPI support, because protocol
+ * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
+ * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
+ */
+ if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ errmsg("SSPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire a handle to the server credentials.
+ */
+ r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL,
+ "negotiate",
+ SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ &sspicred,
+ &expiry);
+ if (r != SEC_E_OK)
+ pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
+ gettext_noop("could not acquire SSPI credentials handle"), r);
+
+ /*
+ * Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
+ * multiple messags sent in both directions. First message is always from
+ * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
+ * (type 'p').
+ */
+ do
+ {
+ mtype = pq_getbyte();
+ if (mtype != 'p')
+ {
+ /* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
+ if (mtype != EOF)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d",
+ mtype)));
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the actual SSPI token */
+ initStringInfo(&buf);
+ if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 2000))
+ {
+ /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
+ pfree(buf.data);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Map to SSPI style buffer */
+ inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
+ inbuf.cBuffers = 1;
+ inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers;
+ InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data;
+ InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len;
+ InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
+
+ /* Prepare output buffer */
+ OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL;
+ OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
+ OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0;
+ outbuf.cBuffers = 1;
+ outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers;
+ outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
+
+
+ elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received SSPI token of length %u",
+ (unsigned int) buf.len);
+
+ r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred,
+ sspictx,
+ &inbuf,
+ ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY,
+ SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
+ &newctx,
+ &outbuf,
+ &contextattr,
+ NULL);
+
+ /* input buffer no longer used */
+ pfree(buf.data);
+
+ if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
+ */
+ elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u",
+ (unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer);
+
+ port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer;
+ port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;
+
+ sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT);
+
+ FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
+ }
+
+ if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+ {
+ if (sspictx != NULL)
+ {
+ DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
+ free(sspictx);
+ }
+ FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
+ pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
+ gettext_noop("could not accept SSPI security context"), r);
+ }
+
+ if (sspictx == NULL)
+ {
+ sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle));
+ if (sspictx == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory")));
+
+ memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
+ }
+
+ if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+ elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed");
+
+ } while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+
+ /*
+ * Release service principal credentials
+ */
+ FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
+
+
+ /*
+ * SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete.
+ *
+ * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
+ * username that was specified for the connection.
+ *
+ * MingW is missing the export for QuerySecurityContextToken in the
+ * secur32 library, so we have to load it dynamically.
+ */
+
+ secur32 = LoadLibrary("SECUR32.DLL");
+ if (secur32 == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg_internal("could not load secur32.dll: %d",
+ (int) GetLastError())));
+
+ _QuerySecurityContextToken = (QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN)
+ GetProcAddress(secur32, "QuerySecurityContextToken");
+ if (_QuerySecurityContextToken == NULL)
+ {
+ FreeLibrary(secur32);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg_internal("could not locate QuerySecurityContextToken in secur32.dll: %d",
+ (int) GetLastError())));
+ }
+
+ r = (_QuerySecurityContextToken) (sspictx, &token);
+ if (r != SEC_E_OK)
+ {
+ FreeLibrary(secur32);
+ pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
+ gettext_noop("could not get security token from context"), r);
+ }
+
+ FreeLibrary(secur32);
+
+ /*
+ * No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the
+ * token instead.
+ */
+ DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
+ free(sspictx);
+
+ if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg_internal("could not get token user size: error code %d",
+ (int) GetLastError())));
+
+ tokenuser = malloc(retlen);
+ if (tokenuser == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory")));
+
+ if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg_internal("could not get user token: error code %d",
+ (int) GetLastError())));
+
+ if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize,
+ domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg_internal("could not lookup acconut sid: error code %d",
+ (int) GetLastError())));
+
+ free(tokenuser);
+
+ /*
+ * Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case
+ * insensitive.
+ */
+ if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, domainname))
+ {
+ elog(DEBUG2,
+ "SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match",
+ domainname, port->hba->krb_realm);
+
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to
+ * the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive.
+ *
+ * If set to include realm, append it in <username>@<realm> format.
+ */
+ if (port->hba->include_realm)
+ {
+ char *namebuf;
+ int retval;
+
+ namebuf = palloc(strlen(accountname) + strlen(domainname) + 2);
+ sprintf(namebuf, "%s@%s", accountname, domainname);
+ retval = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, namebuf, true);
+ pfree(namebuf);
+ return retval;
+ }
+ else
+ return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, accountname, true);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */
+
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Ident authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident
+ * server. If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true
+ * and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
+ * return false.
+ */
+static bool
+interpret_ident_response(const char *ident_response,
+ char *ident_user)
+{
+ const char *cursor = ident_response; /* Cursor into *ident_response */
+
+ /*
+ * Ident's response, in the telnet tradition, should end in crlf (\r\n).
+ */
+ if (strlen(ident_response) < 2)
+ return false;
+ else if (ident_response[strlen(ident_response) - 2] != '\r')
+ return false;
+ else
+ {
+ while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
+ cursor++; /* skip port field */
+
+ if (*cursor != ':')
+ return false;
+ else
+ {
+ /* We're positioned to colon before response type field */
+ char response_type[80];
+ int i; /* Index into *response_type */
+
+ cursor++; /* Go over colon */
+ while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
+ cursor++; /* skip blanks */
+ i = 0;
+ while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r' && !pg_isblank(*cursor) &&
+ i < (int) (sizeof(response_type) - 1))
+ response_type[i++] = *cursor++;
+ response_type[i] = '\0';
+ while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
+ cursor++; /* skip blanks */
+ if (strcmp(response_type, "USERID") != 0)
+ return false;
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * It's a USERID response. Good. "cursor" should be pointing
+ * to the colon that precedes the operating system type.
+ */
+ if (*cursor != ':')
+ return false;
+ else
+ {
+ cursor++; /* Go over colon */
+ /* Skip over operating system field. */
+ while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
+ cursor++;
+ if (*cursor != ':')
+ return false;
+ else
+ {
+ int i; /* Index into *ident_user */
+
+ cursor++; /* Go over colon */
+ while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
+ cursor++; /* skip blanks */
+ /* Rest of line is user name. Copy it over. */
+ i = 0;
+ while (*cursor != '\r' && i < IDENT_USERNAME_MAX)
+ ident_user[i++] = *cursor++;
+ ident_user[i] = '\0';
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Talk to the ident server on host "remote_ip_addr" and find out who
+ * owns the tcp connection from his port "remote_port" to port
+ * "local_port_addr" on host "local_ip_addr". Return the user name the
+ * ident server gives as "*ident_user".
+ *
+ * IP addresses and port numbers are in network byte order.
+ *
+ * But iff we're unable to get the information from ident, return false.
+ */
+static bool
+ident_inet(const SockAddr remote_addr,
+ const SockAddr local_addr,
+ char *ident_user)
+{
+ int sock_fd, /* File descriptor for socket on which we talk
+ * to Ident */
+ rc; /* Return code from a locally called function */
+ bool ident_return;
+ char remote_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
+ char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+ char local_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
+ char local_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+ char ident_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+ char ident_query[80];
+ char ident_response[80 + IDENT_USERNAME_MAX];
+ struct addrinfo *ident_serv = NULL,
+ *la = NULL,
+ hints;
+
+ /*
+ * Might look a little weird to first convert it to text and then back to
+ * sockaddr, but it's protocol independent.
+ */
+ pg_getnameinfo_all(&remote_addr.addr, remote_addr.salen,
+ remote_addr_s, sizeof(remote_addr_s),
+ remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
+ pg_getnameinfo_all(&local_addr.addr, local_addr.salen,
+ local_addr_s, sizeof(local_addr_s),
+ local_port, sizeof(local_port),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+ snprintf(ident_port, sizeof(ident_port), "%d", IDENT_PORT);
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ hints.ai_family = remote_addr.addr.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_protocol = 0;
+ hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
+ hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
+ hints.ai_addr = NULL;
+ hints.ai_next = NULL;
+ rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(remote_addr_s, ident_port, &hints, &ident_serv);
+ if (rc || !ident_serv)
+ {
+ if (ident_serv)
+ pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, ident_serv);
+ return false; /* we don't expect this to happen */
+ }
+
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ hints.ai_family = local_addr.addr.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_protocol = 0;
+ hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
+ hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
+ hints.ai_addr = NULL;
+ hints.ai_next = NULL;
+ rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(local_addr_s, NULL, &hints, &la);
+ if (rc || !la)
+ {
+ if (la)
+ pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, la);
+ return false; /* we don't expect this to happen */
+ }
+
+ sock_fd = socket(ident_serv->ai_family, ident_serv->ai_socktype,
+ ident_serv->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock_fd < 0)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not create socket for Ident connection: %m")));
+ ident_return = false;
+ goto ident_inet_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Bind to the address which the client originally contacted, otherwise
+ * the ident server won't be able to match up the right connection. This
+ * is necessary if the PostgreSQL server is running on an IP alias.
+ */
+ rc = bind(sock_fd, la->ai_addr, la->ai_addrlen);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not bind to local address \"%s\": %m",
+ local_addr_s)));
+ ident_return = false;
+ goto ident_inet_done;
+ }
+
+ rc = connect(sock_fd, ident_serv->ai_addr,
+ ident_serv->ai_addrlen);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not connect to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
+ remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
+ ident_return = false;
+ goto ident_inet_done;
+ }
+
+ /* The query we send to the Ident server */
+ snprintf(ident_query, sizeof(ident_query), "%s,%s\r\n",
+ remote_port, local_port);
+
+ /* loop in case send is interrupted */
+ do
+ {
+ rc = send(sock_fd, ident_query, strlen(ident_query), 0);
+ } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+ if (rc < 0)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not send query to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
+ remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
+ ident_return = false;
+ goto ident_inet_done;
+ }
+
+ do
+ {
+ rc = recv(sock_fd, ident_response, sizeof(ident_response) - 1, 0);
+ } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+ if (rc < 0)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not receive response from Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
+ remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
+ ident_return = false;
+ goto ident_inet_done;
+ }
+
+ ident_response[rc] = '\0';
+ ident_return = interpret_ident_response(ident_response, ident_user);
+ if (!ident_return)
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("invalidly formatted response from Ident server: \"%s\"",
+ ident_response)));
+
+ident_inet_done:
+ if (sock_fd >= 0)
+ closesocket(sock_fd);
+ pg_freeaddrinfo_all(remote_addr.addr.ss_family, ident_serv);
+ pg_freeaddrinfo_all(local_addr.addr.ss_family, la);
+ return ident_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ask kernel about the credentials of the connecting process and
+ * determine the symbolic name of the corresponding user.
+ *
+ * Returns either true and the username put into "ident_user",
+ * or false if we were unable to determine the username.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+
+static bool
+ident_unix(int sock, char *ident_user)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
+ /* OpenBSD style: */
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+ struct passwd *pass;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ if (getpeereid(sock, &uid, &gid) != 0)
+ {
+ /* We didn't get a valid credentials struct. */
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pass = getpwuid(uid);
+
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("local user with ID %d does not exist",
+ (int) uid)));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ strlcpy(ident_user, pass->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
+
+ return true;
+#elif defined(SO_PEERCRED)
+ /* Linux style: use getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) */
+ struct ucred peercred;
+ ACCEPT_TYPE_ARG3 so_len = sizeof(peercred);
+ struct passwd *pass;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ if (getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &peercred, &so_len) != 0 ||
+ so_len != sizeof(peercred))
+ {
+ /* We didn't get a valid credentials struct. */
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pass = getpwuid(peercred.uid);
+
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("local user with ID %d does not exist",
+ (int) peercred.uid)));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ strlcpy(ident_user, pass->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
+
+ return true;
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPEERUCRED)
+ /* Solaris > 10 */
+ uid_t uid;
+ struct passwd *pass;
+ ucred_t *ucred;
+
+ ucred = NULL; /* must be initialized to NULL */
+ if (getpeerucred(sock, &ucred) == -1)
{
- case uaReject:
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
+ return false;
+ }
- /*
- * This could have come from an explicit "reject" entry in
- * pg_hba.conf, but more likely it means there was no matching
- * entry. Take pity on the poor user and issue a helpful error
- * message. NOTE: this is not a security breach, because all the
- * info reported here is known at the frontend and must be assumed
- * known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less clueful
- * good guys.
- */
- {
- char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
+ if ((uid = ucred_geteuid(ucred)) == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not get effective UID from peer credentials: %m")));
+ return false;
+ }
- pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
- hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
- NULL, 0,
- NI_NUMERICHOST);
+ ucred_free(ucred);
-#ifdef USE_SSL
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
- hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name,
- port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
-#else
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
- hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name)));
-#endif
- break;
- }
+ pass = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("local user with ID %d does not exist",
+ (int) uid)));
+ return false;
+ }
- case uaKrb5:
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB5);
- status = pg_krb5_recvauth(port);
- break;
+ strlcpy(ident_user, pass->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
- case uaIdent:
+ return true;
+#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS))
+ struct msghdr msg;
- /*
- * If we are doing ident on unix-domain sockets, use SCM_CREDS
- * only if it is defined and SO_PEERCRED isn't.
- */
-#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED) && \
- (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
- (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)))
- if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
- {
-#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
+/* Credentials structure */
+#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED)
+ typedef struct cmsgcred Cred;
- /*
- * Receive credentials on next message receipt, BSD/OS,
- * NetBSD. We need to set this before the client sends the
- * next packet.
- */
- int on = 1;
+#define cruid cmcred_uid
+#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED)
+ typedef struct fcred Cred;
- if (setsockopt(port->sock, 0, LOCAL_CREDS, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode_for_socket_access(),
- errmsg("could not enable credential reception: %m")));
-#endif
+#define cruid fc_uid
+#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
+ typedef struct sockcred Cred;
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS);
- }
+#define cruid sc_uid
#endif
- status = authident(port);
- break;
+ Cred *cred;
- case uaMD5:
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
- status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
- break;
+ /* Compute size without padding */
+ char cmsgmem[ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + ALIGN(sizeof(Cred))]; /* for NetBSD */
- case uaCrypt:
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_CRYPT);
- status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
- break;
+ /* Point to start of first structure */
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) cmsgmem;
- case uaPassword:
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
- status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
- break;
+ struct iovec iov;
+ char buf;
+ struct passwd *pw;
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- case uaPAM:
- pam_port_cludge = port;
- status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
- break;
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+ msg.msg_control = (char *) cmsg;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgmem);
+ memset(cmsg, 0, sizeof(cmsgmem));
-#ifdef USE_LDAP
- case uaLDAP:
- status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
- break;
-#endif
+ /*
+ * The one character which is received here is not meaningful; its
+ * purposes is only to make sure that recvmsg() blocks long enough for the
+ * other side to send its credentials.
+ */
+ iov.iov_base = &buf;
+ iov.iov_len = 1;
- case uaTrust:
- status = STATUS_OK;
- break;
+ if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0 ||
+ cmsg->cmsg_len < sizeof(cmsgmem) ||
+ cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDS)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
+ return false;
}
- if (status == STATUS_OK)
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
- else
- auth_failed(port, status);
+ cred = (Cred *) CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+
+ pw = getpwuid(cred->cruid);
+
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("local user with ID %d does not exist",
+ (int) cred->cruid)));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ strlcpy(ident_user, pw->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
+
+ return true;
+#else
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ errmsg("Ident authentication is not supported on local connections on this platform")));
+
+ return false;
+#endif
}
+#endif /* HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS */
/*
- * Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
+ * Determine the username of the initiator of the connection described
+ * by "port". Then look in the usermap file under the usermap
+ * port->hba->usermap and see if that user is equivalent to Postgres user
+ * port->user.
+ *
+ * Return STATUS_OK if yes, STATUS_ERROR if no match (or couldn't get info).
*/
-static void
-sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
+static int
+authident(hbaPort *port)
{
- StringInfoData buf;
+ char ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1];
- pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
- pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
+ if (get_role_line(port->user_name) == NULL)
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
- /* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
- if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
- pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
- else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
- pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->cryptSalt, 2);
+ switch (port->raddr.addr.ss_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+#endif
+ if (!ident_inet(port->raddr, port->laddr, ident_user))
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ break;
- pq_endmessage(&buf);
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+ case AF_UNIX:
+ if (!ident_unix(port->sock, ident_user))
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ break;
+#endif
- /*
- * Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which need
- * not be sent until we are ready for queries.
- */
- if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
- pq_flush();
+ default:
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, ident_user, false);
}
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * PAM authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* not allocated */
/* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */
- if (port->auth_arg && port->auth_arg[0] != '\0')
- retval = pam_start(port->auth_arg, "pgsql@",
+ if (port->hba->pamservice && port->hba->pamservice[0] != '\0')
+ retval = pam_start(port->hba->pamservice, "pgsql@",
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
else
retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@",
#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * LDAP authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
#ifdef USE_LDAP
static int
CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port)
{
char *passwd;
- char server[128];
- char basedn[128];
- char prefix[128];
- char suffix[128];
LDAP *ldap;
- int ssl = 0;
int r;
int ldapversion = LDAP_VERSION3;
- int ldapport = LDAP_PORT;
- char fulluser[128];
+ char fulluser[NAMEDATALEN + 256 + 1];
- if (!port->auth_arg || port->auth_arg[0] == '\0')
+ if (!port->hba->ldapserver|| port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0')
{
ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("LDAP configuration URL not specified")));
+ (errmsg("LDAP server not specified")));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- /*
- * Crack the LDAP url. We do a very trivial parse..
- * ldap[s]://<server>[:<port>]/<basedn>[;prefix[;suffix]]
- */
-
- server[0] = '\0';
- basedn[0] = '\0';
- prefix[0] = '\0';
- suffix[0] = '\0';
-
- /* ldap, including port number */
- r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
- "ldap://%127[^:]:%i/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
- server, &ldapport, basedn, prefix, suffix);
- if (r < 3)
- {
- /* ldaps, including port number */
- r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
- "ldaps://%127[^:]:%i/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
- server, &ldapport, basedn, prefix, suffix);
- if (r >= 3)
- ssl = 1;
- }
- if (r < 3)
- {
- /* ldap, no port number */
- r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
- "ldap://%127[^/]/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
- server, basedn, prefix, suffix);
- }
- if (r < 2)
- {
- /* ldaps, no port number */
- r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
- "ldaps://%127[^/]/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
- server, basedn, prefix, suffix);
- if (r >= 2)
- ssl = 1;
- }
- if (r < 2)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("invalid LDAP URL: \"%s\"",
- port->auth_arg)));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
+ if (port->hba->ldapport == 0)
+ port->hba->ldapport = LDAP_PORT;
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
if (passwd == NULL)
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
- ldap = ldap_init(server, ldapport);
+ ldap = ldap_init(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport);
if (!ldap)
{
#ifndef WIN32
if ((r = ldap_set_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldapversion)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
{
+ ldap_unbind(ldap);
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("could not set LDAP protocol version: error code %d", r)));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
- if (ssl)
+ if (port->hba->ldaptls)
{
#ifndef WIN32
if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(ldap, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
* should never happen since we import other files from
* wldap32, but check anyway
*/
+ ldap_unbind(ldap);
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("could not load wldap32.dll")));
return STATUS_ERROR;
_ldap_start_tls_sA = (__ldap_start_tls_sA) GetProcAddress(ldaphandle, "ldap_start_tls_sA");
if (_ldap_start_tls_sA == NULL)
{
+ ldap_unbind(ldap);
ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("could not load function _ldap_start_tls_sA in wldap32.dll. LDAP over SSL is not supported on this platform.")));
+ (errmsg("could not load function _ldap_start_tls_sA in wldap32.dll"),
+ errdetail("LDAP over SSL is not supported on this platform.")));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/*
- * Leak ldaphandle on purpose, because we need the library to stay
- * open. This is ok because it will only ever be leaked once per
- * process and is automatically cleaned up on process exit.
+ * Leak LDAP handle on purpose, because we need the library to
+ * stay open. This is ok because it will only ever be leaked once
+ * per process and is automatically cleaned up on process exit.
*/
}
if ((r = _ldap_start_tls_sA(ldap, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
#endif
{
+ ldap_unbind(ldap);
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("could not start LDAP TLS session: error code %d", r)));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
- snprintf(fulluser, sizeof(fulluser) - 1, "%s%s%s",
- prefix, port->user_name, suffix);
+ snprintf(fulluser, sizeof(fulluser), "%s%s%s",
+ port->hba->ldapprefix ? port->hba->ldapprefix : "",
+ port->user_name,
+ port->hba->ldapsuffix ? port->hba->ldapsuffix : "");
fulluser[sizeof(fulluser) - 1] = '\0';
r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, fulluser, passwd);
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("LDAP login failed for user \"%s\" on server \"%s\": error code %d",
- fulluser, server, r)));
+ fulluser, port->hba->ldapserver, r)));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
-/*
- * Collect password response packet from frontend.
- *
- * Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
- */
-static char *
-recv_password_packet(Port *port)
-{
- StringInfoData buf;
-
- if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
- {
- /* Expect 'p' message type */
- int mtype;
-
- mtype = pq_getbyte();
- if (mtype != 'p')
- {
- /*
- * If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
- * don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in
- * fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
- * log.
- */
- if (mtype != EOF)
- ereport(COMMERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
- errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
- mtype)));
- return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
- if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
- return NULL; /* EOF */
- }
-
- initStringInfo(&buf);
- if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
- {
- /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
- pfree(buf.data);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
- * contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
- * StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
- */
- if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
- ereport(COMMERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
- errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
-
- /* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
- ereport(DEBUG5,
- (errmsg("received password packet")));
-
- /*
- * Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
- * character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
- * encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
- */
- return buf.data;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
- * Get the response and check it.
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SSL client certificate authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
+#ifdef USE_SSL
static int
-recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
+CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
- char *passwd;
- int result;
-
- passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
-
- if (passwd == NULL)
- return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
-
- result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd);
+ Assert(port->ssl);
- pfree(passwd);
+ /* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
+ if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
+ strlen(port->peer_cn) <= 0)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("Certificate login failed for user \"%s\": client certificate contains no username",
+ port->user_name)));
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
- return result;
+ /* Just pass the certificate CN to the usermap check */
+ return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, port->peer_cn, false);
}
+#endif
projects / postgresql / blobdiff