1 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 * functions related to setting up a secure connection to the frontend.
5 * Secure connections are expected to provide confidentiality,
6 * message integrity and endpoint authentication.
9 * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2005, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
10 * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
14 * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.61 2006/01/11 08:43:12 neilc Exp $
16 * Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key)
17 * will normally be stored unencrypted so that the database
18 * backend can restart automatically, it is important that
19 * we select an algorithm that continues to provide confidentiality
20 * even if the attacker has the server's private key. Empheral
21 * DH (EDH) keys provide this, and in fact provide Perfect Forward
22 * Secrecy (PFS) except for situations where the session can
23 * be hijacked during a periodic handshake/renegotiation.
24 * Even that backdoor can be closed if client certificates
25 * are used (since the imposter will be unable to successfully
26 * complete renegotiation).
28 * N.B., the static private key should still be protected to
29 * the largest extent possible, to minimize the risk of
32 * Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and
33 * clients to use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital
34 * signatures, not encryption, and are often acceptable in
35 * jurisdictions where RSA keys are unacceptable.
37 * The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to
38 * use ssldump(1) if there's a problem establishing an SSL
39 * session. In this case you'll need to temporarily disable
40 * EDH by commenting out the callback.
44 * Because the risk of cryptanalysis increases as large
45 * amounts of data are sent with the same session key, the
46 * session keys are periodically renegotiated.
49 * milestone 1: fix basic coding errors
50 * [*] existing SSL code pulled out of existing files.
51 * [*] SSL_get_error() after SSL_read() and SSL_write(),
52 * SSL_shutdown(), default to TLSv1.
54 * milestone 2: provide endpoint authentication (server)
55 * [*] client verifies server cert
56 * [*] client verifies server hostname
58 * milestone 3: improve confidentially, support perfect forward secrecy
59 * [ ] use 'random' file, read from '/dev/urandom?'
60 * [*] emphermal DH keys, default values
61 * [*] periodic renegotiation
62 * [*] private key permissions
64 * milestone 4: provide endpoint authentication (client)
65 * [*] server verifies client certificates
67 * milestone 5: provide informational callbacks
68 * [*] provide informational callbacks
72 * [ ] more informative psql
74 *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
83 #include <sys/socket.h>
86 #include <netinet/in.h>
87 #ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
88 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
89 #include <arpa/inet.h>
93 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
94 #include <openssl/dh.h>
97 #include "libpq/libpq.h"
98 #include "miscadmin.h"
99 #include "tcop/tcopprot.h"
104 #define ROOT_CERT_FILE "root.crt"
105 #define SERVER_CERT_FILE "server.crt"
106 #define SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE "server.key"
108 static DH *load_dh_file(int keylength);
109 static DH *load_dh_buffer(const char *, size_t);
110 static DH *tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
111 static int verify_cb(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
112 static void info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int type, int args);
113 static int initialize_SSL(void);
114 static void destroy_SSL(void);
115 static int open_server_SSL(Port *);
116 static void close_SSL(Port *);
117 static const char *SSLerrmessage(void);
122 * How much data can be sent across a secure connection
123 * (total in both directions) before we require renegotiation.
125 #define RENEGOTIATION_LIMIT (512 * 1024 * 1024)
127 static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
130 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
131 /* Hardcoded values */
132 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
135 * Hardcoded DH parameters, used in empheral DH keying.
136 * As discussed above, EDH protects the confidentiality of
137 * sessions even if the static private key is compromised,
138 * so we are *highly* motivated to ensure that we can use
139 * EDH even if the DBA... or an attacker... deletes the
140 * $DataDir/dh*.pem files.
142 * We could refuse SSL connections unless a good DH parameter
143 * file exists, but some clients may quietly renegotiate an
144 * unsecured connection without fully informing the user.
147 * Alternately, the backend could attempt to load these files
148 * on startup if SSL is enabled - and refuse to start if any
149 * do not exist - but this would tend to piss off DBAs.
151 * If you want to create your own hardcoded DH parameters
152 * for fun and profit, review "Assigned Number for SKIP
153 * Protocols" (http://www.skip-vpn.org/spec/numbers.html)
158 static const char file_dh512[] =
159 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
160 MEYCQQD1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWak\n\
161 XUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpKgVfAgEC\n\
162 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
164 static const char file_dh1024[] =
165 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
166 MIGHAoGBAPSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY7288kjwEPwpVsY\n\
167 jY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6\n\
168 ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpL3jHAgEC\n\
169 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
171 static const char file_dh2048[] =
172 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
173 MIIBCAKCAQEA9kJXtwh/CBdyorrWqULzBej5UxE5T7bxbrlLOCDaAadWoxTpj0BV\n\
174 89AHxstDqZSt90xkhkn4DIO9ZekX1KHTUPj1WV/cdlJPPT2N286Z4VeSWc39uK50\n\
175 T8X8dryDxUcwYc58yWb/Ffm7/ZFexwGq01uejaClcjrUGvC/RgBYK+X0iP1YTknb\n\
176 zSC0neSRBzZrM2w4DUUdD3yIsxx8Wy2O9vPJI8BD8KVbGI2Ou1WMuF040zT9fBdX\n\
177 Q6MdGGzeMyEstSr/POGxKUAYEY18hKcKctaGxAMZyAcpesqVDNmWn6vQClCbAkbT\n\
178 CD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkmuquiXsNV6TILOwIBAg==\n\
179 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
181 static const char file_dh4096[] =
182 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
183 MIICCAKCAgEA+hRyUsFN4VpJ1O8JLcCo/VWr19k3BCgJ4uk+d+KhehjdRqNDNyOQ\n\
184 l/MOyQNQfWXPeGKmOmIig6Ev/nm6Nf9Z2B1h3R4hExf+zTiHnvVPeRBhjdQi81rt\n\
185 Xeoh6TNrSBIKIHfUJWBh3va0TxxjQIs6IZOLeVNRLMqzeylWqMf49HsIXqbcokUS\n\
186 Vt1BkvLdW48j8PPv5DsKRN3tloTxqDJGo9tKvj1Fuk74A+Xda1kNhB7KFlqMyN98\n\
187 VETEJ6c7KpfOo30mnK30wqw3S8OtaIR/maYX72tGOno2ehFDkq3pnPtEbD2CScxc\n\
188 alJC+EL7RPk5c/tgeTvCngvc1KZn92Y//EI7G9tPZtylj2b56sHtMftIoYJ9+ODM\n\
189 sccD5Piz/rejE3Ome8EOOceUSCYAhXn8b3qvxVI1ddd1pED6FHRhFvLrZxFvBEM9\n\
190 ERRMp5QqOaHJkM+Dxv8Cj6MqrCbfC4u+ZErxodzuusgDgvZiLF22uxMZbobFWyte\n\
191 OvOzKGtwcTqO/1wV5gKkzu1ZVswVUQd5Gg8lJicwqRWyyNRczDDoG9jVDxmogKTH\n\
192 AaqLulO7R8Ifa1SwF2DteSGVtgWEN8gDpN3RBmmPTDngyF2DHb5qmpnznwtFKdTL\n\
193 KWbuHn491xNO25CQWMtem80uKw+pTnisBRF/454n1Jnhub144YRBoN8CAQI=\n\
194 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
197 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
198 /* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
199 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
202 * Initialize global context
205 secure_initialize(void)
210 r = initialize_SSL();
217 * Destroy global context
228 * Attempt to negotiate secure session.
231 secure_open_server(Port *port)
236 r = open_server_SSL(port);
243 * Close secure session.
246 secure_close(Port *port)
255 * Read data from a secure connection.
258 secure_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
268 n = SSL_read(port->ssl, ptr, len);
269 err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, n);
275 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
276 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
278 pgwin32_waitforsinglesocket(SSL_get_fd(port->ssl),
279 (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) ?
280 FD_READ | FD_CLOSE : FD_WRITE | FD_CLOSE);
283 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
286 (errcode_for_socket_access(),
287 errmsg("SSL SYSCALL error: %m")));
291 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
292 errmsg("SSL SYSCALL error: EOF detected")));
299 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
300 errmsg("SSL error: %s", SSLerrmessage())));
302 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
308 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
309 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
318 prepare_for_client_read();
320 n = recv(port->sock, ptr, len, 0);
329 * Write data to a secure connection.
332 secure_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
341 if (port->count > RENEGOTIATION_LIMIT)
343 SSL_set_session_id_context(port->ssl, (void *) &SSL_context,
344 sizeof(SSL_context));
345 if (SSL_renegotiate(port->ssl) <= 0)
347 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
348 errmsg("SSL renegotiation failure")));
349 if (SSL_do_handshake(port->ssl) <= 0)
351 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
352 errmsg("SSL renegotiation failure")));
353 if (port->ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK)
355 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
356 errmsg("SSL failed to send renegotiation request")));
357 port->ssl->state |= SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
358 SSL_do_handshake(port->ssl);
359 if (port->ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK)
361 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
362 errmsg("SSL renegotiation failure")));
367 n = SSL_write(port->ssl, ptr, len);
368 err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, n);
374 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
375 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
377 pgwin32_waitforsinglesocket(SSL_get_fd(port->ssl),
378 (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) ?
379 FD_READ | FD_CLOSE : FD_WRITE | FD_CLOSE);
382 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
385 (errcode_for_socket_access(),
386 errmsg("SSL SYSCALL error: %m")));
390 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
391 errmsg("SSL SYSCALL error: EOF detected")));
398 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
399 errmsg("SSL error: %s", SSLerrmessage())));
401 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
407 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
408 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
416 n = send(port->sock, ptr, len, 0);
421 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
422 /* SSL specific code */
423 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
427 * Private substitute BIO: this wraps the SSL library's standard socket BIO
428 * so that we can enable and disable interrupts just while calling recv().
429 * We cannot have interrupts occurring while the bulk of openssl runs,
430 * because it uses malloc() and possibly other non-reentrant libc facilities.
432 * As of openssl 0.9.7, we can use the reasonably clean method of interposing
433 * a wrapper around the standard socket BIO's sock_read() method. This relies
434 * on the fact that sock_read() doesn't call anything non-reentrant, in fact
435 * not much of anything at all except recv(). If this ever changes we'd
436 * probably need to duplicate the code of sock_read() in order to push the
437 * interrupt enable/disable down yet another level.
440 static bool my_bio_initialized = false;
441 static BIO_METHOD my_bio_methods;
442 static int (*std_sock_read) (BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
445 my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
449 prepare_for_client_read();
451 res = std_sock_read(h, buf, size);
459 my_BIO_s_socket(void)
461 if (!my_bio_initialized)
463 memcpy(&my_bio_methods, BIO_s_socket(), sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
464 std_sock_read = my_bio_methods.bread;
465 my_bio_methods.bread = my_sock_read;
466 my_bio_initialized = true;
468 return &my_bio_methods;
471 /* This should exactly match openssl's SSL_set_fd except for using my BIO */
473 my_SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
478 bio = BIO_new(my_BIO_s_socket());
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
485 BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
486 SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
493 * Load precomputed DH parameters.
495 * To prevent "downgrade" attacks, we perform a number of checks
496 * to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
497 * what we expect it to contain.
500 load_dh_file(int keylength)
503 char fnbuf[MAXPGPATH];
507 /* attempt to open file. It's not an error if it doesn't exist. */
508 snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "dh%d.pem", keylength);
509 if ((fp = fopen(fnbuf, "r")) == NULL)
512 /* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_SH); */
513 dh = PEM_read_DHparams(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
514 /* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_UN); */
517 /* is the prime the correct size? */
518 if (dh != NULL && 8 * DH_size(dh) < keylength)
520 elog(LOG, "DH errors (%s): %d bits expected, %d bits found",
521 fnbuf, keylength, 8 * DH_size(dh));
525 /* make sure the DH parameters are usable */
528 if (DH_check(dh, &codes))
530 elog(LOG, "DH_check error (%s): %s", fnbuf, SSLerrmessage());
533 if (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
535 elog(LOG, "DH error (%s): p is not prime", fnbuf);
538 if ((codes & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) &&
539 (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME))
542 "DH error (%s): neither suitable generator or safe prime",
552 * Load hardcoded DH parameters.
554 * To prevent problems if the DH parameters files don't even
555 * exist, we can load DH parameters hardcoded into this file.
558 load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
563 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *) buffer, len);
566 dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
569 (errmsg_internal("DH load buffer: %s",
577 * Generate an empheral DH key. Because this can take a long
578 * time to compute, we can use precomputed parameters of the
581 * Since few sites will bother to precompute these parameter
582 * files, we also provide a fallback to the parameters provided
583 * by the OpenSSL project.
585 * These values can be static (once loaded or computed) since
586 * the OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from
587 * the information provided.
590 tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
593 static DH *dh = NULL;
594 static DH *dh512 = NULL;
595 static DH *dh1024 = NULL;
596 static DH *dh2048 = NULL;
597 static DH *dh4096 = NULL;
603 dh512 = load_dh_file(keylength);
605 dh512 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh512, sizeof file_dh512);
611 dh1024 = load_dh_file(keylength);
613 dh1024 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh1024, sizeof file_dh1024);
619 dh2048 = load_dh_file(keylength);
621 dh2048 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh2048, sizeof file_dh2048);
627 dh4096 = load_dh_file(keylength);
629 dh4096 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh4096, sizeof file_dh4096);
635 dh = load_dh_file(keylength);
639 /* this may take a long time, but it may be necessary... */
640 if (r == NULL || 8 * DH_size(r) < keylength)
643 (errmsg_internal("DH: generating parameters (%d bits)....",
645 r = DH_generate_parameters(keylength, DH_GENERATOR_2, NULL, NULL);
652 * Certificate verification callback
654 * This callback allows us to log intermediate problems during
655 * verification, but for now we'll see if the final error message
656 * contains enough information.
658 * This callback also allows us to override the default acceptance
659 * criteria (e.g., accepting self-signed or expired certs), but
660 * for now we accept the default checks.
663 verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
669 * This callback is used to copy SSL information messages
670 * into the PostgreSQL log.
673 info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int type, int args)
677 case SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START:
679 (errmsg_internal("SSL: handshake start")));
681 case SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE:
683 (errmsg_internal("SSL: handshake done")));
685 case SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP:
687 (errmsg_internal("SSL: accept loop")));
689 case SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT:
691 (errmsg_internal("SSL: accept exit (%d)", args)));
693 case SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP:
695 (errmsg_internal("SSL: connect loop")));
697 case SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT:
699 (errmsg_internal("SSL: connect exit (%d)", args)));
701 case SSL_CB_READ_ALERT:
703 (errmsg_internal("SSL: read alert (0x%04x)", args)));
705 case SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT:
707 (errmsg_internal("SSL: write alert (0x%04x)", args)));
713 * Initialize global SSL context.
723 SSL_load_error_strings();
724 SSL_context = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
727 (errmsg("could not create SSL context: %s",
731 * Load and verify certificate and private key
733 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_context,
737 (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
738 errmsg("could not load server certificate file \"%s\": %s",
739 SERVER_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage())));
741 if (stat(SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE, &buf) == -1)
743 (errcode_for_file_access(),
744 errmsg("could not access private key file \"%s\": %m",
745 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE)));
748 * Require no public access to key file.
750 * XXX temporarily suppress check when on Windows, because there may
751 * not be proper support for Unix-y file permissions. Need to think
752 * of a reasonable check to apply on Windows. (See also the data
753 * directory permission check in postmaster.c)
755 #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
756 if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode) || (buf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) ||
757 buf.st_uid != geteuid())
759 (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
760 errmsg("unsafe permissions on private key file \"%s\"",
761 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE),
762 errdetail("File must be owned by the database user and must have no permissions for \"group\" or \"other\".")));
765 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_context,
766 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE,
769 (errmsg("could not load private key file \"%s\": %s",
770 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE, SSLerrmessage())));
772 if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(SSL_context))
774 (errmsg("check of private key failed: %s",
778 /* set up empheral DH keys */
779 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_context, tmp_dh_cb);
780 SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
782 /* setup the allowed cipher list */
783 if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_context, "ALL:!ADH:!LOW:!EXP:!MD5:@STRENGTH") != 1)
784 elog(FATAL, "could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");
787 * Require and check client certificates only if we have a root.crt file.
789 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, ROOT_CERT_FILE, NULL))
791 /* Not fatal - we do not require client certificates */
793 (errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
794 ROOT_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
795 errdetail("Will not verify client certificates.")));
799 SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
801 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT |
802 SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
810 * Destroy global SSL context.
817 SSL_CTX_free(SSL_context);
823 * Attempt to negotiate SSL connection.
826 open_server_SSL(Port *port)
834 if (!(port->ssl = SSL_new(SSL_context)))
837 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
838 errmsg("could not initialize SSL connection: %s",
843 if (!my_SSL_set_fd(port->ssl, port->sock))
846 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
847 errmsg("could not set SSL socket: %s",
854 r = SSL_accept(port->ssl);
857 err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, r);
860 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
861 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
863 pgwin32_waitforsinglesocket(SSL_get_fd(port->ssl),
864 (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) ?
865 FD_READ | FD_CLOSE | FD_ACCEPT : FD_WRITE | FD_CLOSE);
868 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
871 (errcode_for_socket_access(),
872 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %m")));
875 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
876 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
880 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
881 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %s",
884 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
886 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
887 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
891 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
892 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
902 /* get client certificate, if available. */
903 port->peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(port->ssl);
904 if (port->peer == NULL)
906 strncpy(port->peer_dn, "(anonymous)", sizeof(port->peer_dn));
907 strncpy(port->peer_cn, "(anonymous)", sizeof(port->peer_cn));
911 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
912 port->peer_dn, sizeof(port->peer_dn));
913 port->peer_dn[sizeof(port->peer_dn) - 1] = '\0';
914 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
915 NID_commonName, port->peer_cn, sizeof(port->peer_cn));
916 port->peer_cn[sizeof(port->peer_cn) - 1] = '\0';
919 (errmsg("SSL connection from \"%s\"", port->peer_cn)));
921 /* set up debugging/info callback */
922 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_context, info_cb);
928 * Close SSL connection.
931 close_SSL(Port *port)
935 SSL_shutdown(port->ssl);
942 X509_free(port->peer);
948 * Obtain reason string for last SSL error
950 * Some caution is needed here since ERR_reason_error_string will
951 * return NULL if it doesn't recognize the error code. We don't
952 * want to return NULL ever.
957 unsigned long errcode;
958 const char *errreason;
959 static char errbuf[32];
961 errcode = ERR_get_error();
963 return "No SSL error reported";
964 errreason = ERR_reason_error_string(errcode);
965 if (errreason != NULL)
967 snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "SSL error code %lu", errcode);